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Abstract
It  is  argued  that  reference  in  first-person  thought  is  distinct  from  reference  in 
other  thoughts  about  objects.  This  difference  is  located  in  the  lack  of 
acquaintance required  for first-person thought.  In order to be  in the position to 
think about and refer to other objects, a subject must be acquainted with them.  It 
is this acquaintance relation which enables him to think about a particular object. 
In  contrast,  a  subject  can  think  about  himself without  being  acquainted  with 
himself because  he  is  the  subject  of his  thought.  No  acquaintance  relation  is 
required in order for him to be in a position to think about himself -  he is in this 
position already.
Part I of this thesis sets out the problem of first-person thought, and introduces a 
distinction  between  subjective  and  objective  first-person  thought.  Part  II 
explores singular thought, and what it is for a subject to have a thought about a 
particular  object.  It  is  argued  that  a  subject's  acquaintance  with  an  object  is 
necessary  for him  to  be able to  think  about and refer to an  independent object. 
This  means  that  for  a  subject  to  think  about  an  independent  object  that  object 
must in some way be present to him.  In Part III  it is argued that for a subject to 
think  first-personally  the  object  -   himself -   need  not  be  present  to  him.  The 
subject  has  experiences  from  the  first-person  perspective,  grounding  his 
subjective  first-person thoughts.  Because  he  has  such experiences  he  can  refer 
reflexively.  He is at the centre of his scheme of reference.  And it is because he 
can  refer in  subjective  first-person thoughts that  he  can  refer  in  objective  first- 
person thoughts.4
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Introduction
This thesis is about first-person reference.  But it is not about to what a subject 
refers when he thinks first-personally.  Indeed, one consequence of the proposal 
is that the subject does not need to know to what he refers when he successfully 
refers  first-personally.  Instead  it  is  about how a subject  refers  first-personally, 
and, crucially,  in what respect this differs  from  how he  is able to refer to other 
objects.
The proposal is that in order to think about an independent object a subject must 
be acquainted with that object.  But in order to refer first-personally, the subject 
does not need to be acquainted with himself.  Reference in first-person thought is 
distinct from reference in other thoughts about objects.
The thesis is divided into three parts:
Part I:  First-Person Thought 
Part II:  Acquaintance
Part III:  First-Person Reference without Acquaintance
In  Part  I,  the  problem  of first-person  thought  is  introduced.  Anscombe  (1975) 
argues that what is required for a subject to refer to an object is not present in the 
case of first-person  thought.  Her  striking conclusion  is that  T   does  not  refer. 
Evans (1982)  rejects this conclusion,  and this  is because he thinks that what  is 
normally required for reference to an object is also present in many first-person 
thoughts.  He  therefore  abandons  what  Anscombe  takes  to  be  an  important 
feature of T   and first-person thoughts -  that if T   refers, it cannot fail to refer. 
Evans accepts that in some cases where what is required for singular reference is 
lacking, a subject’s first-person thoughts can fail to refer to an object.
The  position  advanced  in  this  thesis  is  that  Anscombe  is  right  that  what  is 
normally required for reference is lacking in first-person thoughts.  However, she 
is wrong that this entails that a subject’s first-person thoughts do not refer.  When 
a subject refers first-personally in some kinds of first-person thoughts -  thoughts 
which in this thesis will be termed subjective first-person thoughts -  the grounds 
for his  thought  do  not  involve  his  acquaintance  with  himself.  The  experiences9
which ground such first-person thoughts are from the first-person perspective, or 
from  ‘the  inside’.  The  subject  can  self-ascribe  such  experiences,  referring  to 
himself reflexively.
But not all  first-person thoughts are as a result of a subject having experiences 
from the first-person perspective.  As Evans points out:
It  is  vital  to  remember this  feature  of our thought  about  ourselves.  T- 
thoughts are not, as is sometimes suggested, restricted to thoughts about 
states  of affairs  ‘from  the  point  of view of the  subject’.  (Evans  (1982), 
p209-10)
In Chapter  1, subjective  first-person thoughts -  those which have grounds  from 
the  first-person  perspective  -   are  distinguished  from  objective  first-person 
thoughts, which are not so grounded.  It is also argued that objective first-person 
thoughts can be  further divided,  into those which are,  and those which are not, 
immune to error through misidentification.1   The distinction between subjective.—- 
and objective first-person thought is important because in Part III it is argued that 
a subject  can  refer to  himself first-personally  without  acquaintance  because  he 
has  subjective  first-person  thoughts.  Reference  is  possible  in  objective  first- 
person thoughts because a subject can refer in subjective first-person thoughts.
In  Chapter  2,  some  of  the  existing  accounts  of  first-person  reference  are 
considered.  These focus predominantly on the content of first-person statements, 
and on how such statements differ in content from statements about the subject 
which  are  not  first-personal.  For  instance,  Perry  ((1977/2000),  p i7)  gives  an 
example of a subject Lingens who is an amnesiac.2  He is reading a biography of 
himself, but does not realize he is reading about himself.  Perhaps the biography 
states that Lingens is the cousin of a spy.  Lingens is prepared to assert ‘Lingens 
is the cousin of a spy’, but not the first-personal ‘I am the cousin of a spy’.  What 
is the difference when he thinks first-personally, as opposed to merely thinking 
about himself?  How does he think first-personally?
Castafieda  (1967,  1968)  and  Perry  (1977,  1979)  have argued  convincingly  that 
when a subject thinks and expresses a first-person thought this is not equivalent 
to his thinking a descriptive thought.  I  think that this is right -  when a subject
1   Immunity to error through misidentification will be explained in Chapter  1, Section 2.1
2 The name ‘Lingens’  is taken  from  Frege (1918)10
thinks  first-personally  he  is  thinking  about  an  object,  himself.  But  still  the 
question remains: how is it that he thinks about himself first-personally?  How 
does he refer to himself?  Does this differ from how he is able to refer to other 
objects?  In Chapter 2, Lewis’s account of first-person thought in ‘Attitudes De 
Dicto and De Se' (1979) is considered.  If this account is correct it has the result 
that the content of a subject’s first-person thought is structurally very different to 
the content of his thoughts about other objects.  But, for reasons which will be 
explained, I do not think that Lewis’s account can be correct.  A Fregean can also 
explain the data that a subject’s first-person thought is distinct from his non-first- 
personal  thought  about  himself.  And  his  explanation  does  not  have  the 
consequence that the  structure  of the  content  of first-personal  thought  differs 
from the structure of the content of his thought about other objects.  But most 
Fregeans  would  also think that a subject’s  reference  in  first-personal  cases  is 
achieved in basically the same way as his reference to independent objects.
To understand why this is wrong -  why it is that first-person reference is distinct 
from other singular reference -  it is necessary to understand what is required for 
a subject to be able to refer to other objects.  Only when this is understood can 
one see why what is normally necessary for reference is not required in the first- 
person case.  Part  II  of this thesis explores  what  it is  for a subject to  have  a 
thought about a particular object.  It is argued that to have a singular thought 
about an independent object -  to refer to a particular object which is independent 
of the subject -  the subject must be acquainted with the object.  The claim is not 
that  a subject’s acquaintance  with  an object  fully  explains how a  subject  can 
think  about  the  object.  Instead  it  is  that  acquaintance  with  an  object  is  a 
necessary condition for a subject’s thought to be about an object.  Without being 
acquainted  with  the  object  the  subject  is  not  in  a  position  to  think  about  it. 
Acquaintance is not required in subjective first-person thought as the subject is 
already in a position to think about himself, the subject of thought.
The phrases  ‘referring to an object’  and  ‘referring to an object in thought’  are 
used frequently in this thesis.  By ‘referring to an object in thought’ I mean that a 
subject has a singular thought about an object -  he is thinking about a particular 
object.  Some (e.g. Bach (1987)) dispute that singular thought is a kind of mental11
reference.  This is because they understand referring as something that speakers 
do.  On this view, a speaker uses a word to refer an audience to an object he is 
already thinking of.  Understood in this way, a subject’s thinking of an object is 
necessary for his referring to that object.  Thus it makes no sense to understand 
thinking of an object as referring to it in thought.  In this thesis, reference is not 
understood in this way.  A subject can refer in language, but he can also refer in 
thought;  this  is  mental  reference,  or  singular  thought.  As  Sainsbury  (2007) 
writes:
Thought precedes language, and can occur in creatures which are not, and 
never  will  be,  language  users.  Mental  reference  precedes  linguistic 
reference, and can occur in creatures which are not, and never will  be, 
language users.  Pre-linguistic humans refer to things in thought, and this 
capacity helps them acquire linguistic skills. (Sainsbury (2007), p216)
Sometimes a subject refers in thought by using language -  speaking ‘internally’.
He may, in such cases, be able to think of objects which he would not be able to
think of without language.  But being able to think of, and refer to, an object,
need not always involve language.
When a subject has a singular thought, or refers to an object in thought,  he is 
thinking  about  a  particular  object.  Singular thought  is  to  be  contrasted  with 
general or descriptive thought.  If I think about this keyboard 1  am typing on I am 
thinking about this  particular object  in  front of me.  I  am  not thinking  about 
whatever happens to fulfil a certain description; I am not thinking, for instance, 
about whatever happens to  be  black,  with  white  letters  of the  alphabet on  its 
keys.  I  could  think  about  this  keyboard  and  be  mistaken  about  some  of its 
properties -  perhaps it is not black at all, and I only think it is because of a trick 
of the  light.  Whether  or  not  my  thought  that  this  keyboard  is  black  is  true 
depends on how things are with this particular keyboard.  I cannot have the same 
thought about a different keyboard, even one that looks the same.  This is not the 
case with descriptive thoughts.  I may think that the shortest spy has blond hair. 
If this is a descriptive thought, rather than a thought about a particular person, 
then it is about whoever fulfils the condition of being the shortest spy.  This may 
be about a different person if the situation were different, but the thought remains 
the same.12
Chapter 3 focuses primarily on the work of Russell from  1903 until  1919.  The 
principle that to think about an object one must be acquainted with  it is most 
commonly  associated  with  Russell.  But  Russell  claims  far  more  for 
acquaintance than is claimed in this thesis.  For Russell, not only does a subject's 
acquaintance with an object enable him to think about it, but it is the very things 
with which the subject is acquainted which are combined in thought.  This latter 
role  of  acquaintance  is  rejected  in  this  thesis.  However,  Russell's  basic 
understanding of acquaintance is the following:
1  think that the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is 
simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes 
presentation. (Russell (1911), p200-01)
In  Chapter  4,  this  notion  of  acquaintance  is  developed.  Acquaintance,  as
employed  in  this  thesis,  does  not  involve  discriminating  knowledge,  or  a
subject’s knowing which object he is thinking of.  Instead, it is more like Evans’s
notion of information as used in The  Varieties of Reference (1982).  Purported
counterexamples  to  an  acquaintance  restriction  on  singular  thought  are  also
considered -  none  of these  is  found to  be a case of singular thought without
acquaintance.3  Chapters 5 and 6 continue to explore the notion of acquaintance
and the consequences of such a restriction on thought.  In Chapter 6 it is argued
that because  acquaintance  restricts  the  thoughts  a subject  is able  to  have,  the
content of a subject’s thought cannot be represented by a set of possible worlds.
A subject's acquaintance with an independent object is necessary for him to have 
a singular thought about that object.  By being acquainted with the object he is in 
a position to think about it -  it is this which makes his thought about one object 
rather than another.  But this is not required for first-person thoughts because the 
subject is the object of thought.  In Part III of this thesis first-person reference 
without acquaintance  is explained.  When a subject thinks certain  first-person 
thoughts -  subjective  first-person thoughts -  the  grounds for his thoughts  are 
from the first-person perspective.  For instance, when a subject thinks what he 
would express by ‘I am sitting down’ or ‘I am tired’ what grounds this thought is 
the  experience  of  sitting  down,  or  the  experience  of  being  tired.  These 
experiences are from the inside.  But there is no object present in the experience
3 In this thesis I do not consider how a subject thinks about abstract objects.  Abstract objects 
pose special problems of their own.  The claim is that to refer to an independent concrete object 
the subject must be acquainted with it.13
which  puts  the  subject  in  a  position  to  think  about  it  -   the  subject  is  not 
acquainted with himself in such experiences.  It is instead the fact that the subject 
is undergoing these experiences which enables him to refer to himself.  He is the 
subject of the experience, and can ascribe the experience to himself.
Chapter 7 considers the worry that there  is something circular in this account. 
What does  it mean to  say that a subject  refers  to  himself?  Can this only  be 
explained  in terms of the first person?  Anscombe (1975) has argued that the 
token-reflexive  rule -  the  rule  that  a  subject  uses  ‘I’  to  refer to  himself -   is 
circular.  She  thinks  that  ‘himself,  if explaining  how  a  subject  refers  first- 
personally, can only be explained in terms of T .  In Chapter 7 of this thesis it is 
argued that this is not the case.  The reason why Anscombe thinks it circular is 
because  she  assumes  that  what  is  necessary  for  a  subject’s  reference  to 
independent objects is also necessary for his reference in first-person thoughts. 
But the main purpose of this thesis is to argue against this.  Once one accepts 
that a subject’s reference in first-person thought is distinct from his reference to 
independent objects the argument that the token-reflexive rule  is circular does 
not  go  through.  In  this  chapter  the  position  developed  in  this  thesis  is  also 
contrasted with Rumfitt’s (1994) interpretation of the token-reflexive rule.
It is probably worth reiterating at this point that this thesis is about how a subject 
is  able  to think first-personally.  It  is  about  how  his  reference  in  first-person 
thought is distinct from his reference in other singular thoughts.  Although such 
thoughts are primarily expressed by ‘I’4, this thesis is not about the meaning of 
the word T .  A subject, understanding the token-reflexive rule, can use  ‘I’  to 
refer to himself in thought.  He does not need to be acquainted with himself in 
order to do this.  But this thesis does not have anything to say about what ‘I’, 
written down on a piece of paper, or recorded in a message, might mean.  There 
has been some debate about this: whether ‘I’ refers to the producer or the user of 
the  term,  whether  it depends  on  the  intentions of the producer or user,  or on 
pragmatic  conventions.5   This thesis  is not concerned  with  such matters;  it  is 
concerned with how a subject thinks first-personally about himself.
4 Or by other first-person terms or verbal inflections in other languages
5 For instance, see Sidelle (1991), Predelli (1998a&b) and Corazza, Fish, and Gorvett (2002)14
The final chapter develops the notion of the first-person perspective.  The claim 
is  that  because  a  subject  has  experiences  from  this  perspective  he  can  refer 
reflexively.  The objection that it is precisely in having such experiences from the 
first-person perspective that a subject is acquainted with himself is considered 
and rejected.  These experiences do not put the subject in contact with an object 
so that he can refer to it.  They are experiences of the subject, who can ascribe 
such  experiences to  himself.  This  chapter  also  returns  to  Anscombe’s  initial 
position -  that if what is normally required for successful reference to objects is 
not present in the case of first-person thought, a subject’s first-person thoughts 
do not refer to an object. The position in this thesis is that such thoughts do refer 
to an object -  the subject himself -  and that the subject is an object in the world, 
among  other objects.  Chapter  8  explores  how,  on the  picture  of first-person 
reference developed here, this can be so.  Subjective first-person thought -  first- 
person  thought  based  on  grounds  from  the  first-person  perspective  -   is 
fundamental.  Because  a  subject  can  refer  unproblematically  to  himself  in 
subjective  first-person thoughts, he can also refer to himself in objective  first- 
person  thoughts.  And  it  is  because  he,  the  subject,  is  acquainted  with  other 
objects in the world, that he can refer to them.Part I
First-Person Thought16
Chapter 1 
The Varieties of First-Person Thought
1  The Problem of First-Person Thought
Our questions were a combined reductio ad absurdum of the idea of T  as 
a word whose role is to 'make a singular reference’.  I mean the questions 
how one  is guaranteed to  get the object right,  whether one  may  safely 
assume no unnoticed substitution, whether one could refer to oneself 'in 
absence’, and so on.  The suggestion of getting the object right collapses 
into absurdity when we work it out and try to describe how getting hold 
of the wrong object may be excluded.
Getting hold of the wrong object is excluded, and that makes us think that 
getting hold of the right object is guaranteed.  But the reason is that there 
is  no  getting  hold  of  an  object  at  all.  With  names,  or  denoting 
expressions... there are two things to grasp: the kind of use, and what to 
apply  them  to  from  time  to  time.  With  ‘I’  there  is  only  the  use. 
(Anscombe (1975), pi 47)
In  Anscombe’s  comments  towards  the  end  of her  article  ‘The  First  Person’ 
(1975),  we  find her startling claim that  ‘I’  is not a referring expression.  One 
reason  she thinks this  is because  she believes that there  is nothing which can 
explain how a subject’s mind "latches on to” the object which he is, so enabling 
him to refer to an object by his use of the term  ‘I’  (e.g. pi37, pl42).  In her 
article  Anscombe  considers  how  singular  terms  such  as  names  and 
demonstratives refer to objects, and how a subject using such terms must think 
about the objects.  Her conclusion is that what is necessary for singular reference 
is lacking in the cases where subjects express thoughts with the first-person.
Anscombe is not alone in thinking that what is normally required for reference is 
lacking in first-person thought.  Although Strawson (1959,  1966) thinks that ‘I’ 
does  refer,  he  thinks this  because  it comes  from the mouth of an empirically 
identifiable  person.  But  if a subject’s  first-personal  thoughts were  not  linked 
with communication in this way then there would be no referring use for ‘I’. This 
is because the way in which a subject thinks first-personally is not the same as 
the way in which he thinks of other objects:
...how can  it be right to talk of ascribing in the case of oneself?  For 
surely there can be a question of ascribing only if there is or could be a17
question of identifying that to which the ascription is made; and though 
there may be a question of identifying the one who is in pain when that 
one  is  another,  how  can  there  be  such  a  question  when  that  one  is 
oneself?  But this query answers itself as soon as we remember that we 
speak primarily to others,  for the  information of others.  In one  sense, 
indeed, there is no question of my having to tell who it is who is in pain, 
when I am.  In another sense, however, I may have to tell who it is, i.e. to 
let others know who it is. (Strawson (1959), pi00)
Even many who reject Anscombe’s conclusion that ‘I’ does not refer accept her 
assumption  that  if  what  is  normally  required  for  successful  reference  were 
lacking, then a subject’s first-person thoughts would fail to refer.  Thus Evans 
(1982) admits that in a case where a subject is, and always has been, a brain in a 
vat, subject to various hallucinations, what is normally required for successful 
reference  is lacking.  Because  it is lacking, the  subject’s first-person thoughts 
cannot refer ((1982), p250-l).  But usually, Evans contends, what is required for 
successful singular thought is also present in some first-person thoughts, and it is 
because  of  this  that  a  subject’s  first-person  thoughts  refer.  Because  he 
assimilates  first-person  reference  to  other  singular  reference,  Evans  gives  up 
what Anscombe takes to be a key feature of first-person thought: that if it refers, 
it is guaranteed to refer.
In  this  thesis  it  is  argued  that  Anscombe,  against  Evans,  is  right.  What  is 
normally required for successful singular reference need not be present when a 
subject  thinks  first-personal  thoughts.  There  need  be  no  ‘getting  hold  of an 
object’ to think first-personally in the same way that one must ‘get hold of an 
object’  to  refer  non-first-personally  to  an  object.  But  from  this  correct 
observation Anscombe draws the invalid conclusion that ‘I’ does not refer.  Both 
she and Evans make the mistaken assumption that what is required for reference 
in the first-person case must be similar to what is required for a subject to be able 
to think about and refer to independent objects.
The proposal in this thesis is that what is normally required for a subject to think 
about and refer to an object is that he is acquainted with the object.  It is being 
acquainted with an object that puts the subject in a position to think about that 
object.  This enables him to have a singular thought about that object, rather than 
another.  It enables him to have a singular thought about that object, rather than a18
descriptive thought which happens to denote an object.  But a subject can think 
about himself very easily because he is the subject of his first-person thoughts. 
T   can refer to an object very easily, precisely because the subject thinking a 
first-personal  thought  expressed  by  ‘I’  is  also  the  object  of the  thought.  A 
subject’s acquaintance  with  himself is  not  needed to  put him  in  a position to 
think about himself.  To think that it is, as Evans does, is to misunderstand the 
nature of first-person thought, and to misunderstand the role that acquaintance, in 
a subject’s singular thoughts about other objects, is playing.  Reference in first- 
person thought is distinct from reference in other thoughts about objects.
Anscombe gets it almost right when she writes:
But  T   is  not  a  name:  these  T-thoughts  are  examples  of  reflective 
consciousness of states, actions, motions, etc...These ‘I’-thoughts (allow 
me to pause and think some!)... are unmediated conceptions (knowledge 
or  belief,  true  or  false)  of states,  motions,  etc.,  of this  object  here... 
(Anscombe (1975), pi 51)
She continues at the end of her article,  when discussing a subject who  is not
thinking first-personally:
He did not have what I call ‘unmediated agent-or-patient conceptions of 
actions, happenings, and states’.  These conceptions are subjectless.  That 
is,  they  do  not  involve  the  connection  of  what  is  understood  by  a 
predicate with a distinctly conceived subject. (Anscombe (1975), pi 53)
Anscombe is right that when a subject thinks some first-personal thoughts what
is  experienced  does  not  involve  a  distinctly  conceived  subject.  But  such
unstructured experiences, unstructured ‘actions, happenings, and states’, are what
ground many of a subject’s first-person thoughts.  By experiencing these from
the first-person perspective -  by undergoing the experiences -  he can refer to
himself.  He can refer to himself reflexively.1
But such thoughts -  where the grounds are from the first-person perspective -  are 
not the only kind of first-person thoughts.  There are also first-person thoughts 
where  the  grounds,  if  there  are  any  grounds,  are  not  from  the  first-person 
perspective.  To fully understand first-person thought, and how a subject is able 
to refer to himself first-personally, a distinction must be made between subjective 
and objective first-person thought.
1  This is explained further in Chapter 719
2  Subjective and Objective First-Person Thought
Wittgenstein describes two different uses of the word ‘I’:
There are two different cases in the use of the word ‘I’ (or ‘my’) which I 
might call ‘the use as object’ and ‘the use as subject’.  Examples of the 
first kind of use are these: ‘My arm is broken’, ‘I have grown six inches’, 
‘I  have  a  bump  on  my  forehead’,  ‘The  wind  blows  my  hair  about’. 
Examples of the second kind are: 7 see so-and-so’, 7 hear so-and-so’, 7 
try to lift my arm’,  7  think it will  rain’,  7 have a toothache’.  One can 
point to the difference between these two categories by saying: The cases 
of the first category  involve the recognition of a particular person, and 
there is in these cases the possibility of an error, or as 1  should rather put 
it: The possibility of an error has been provided for....It is possible that, 
say in an accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, see a broken arm at my 
side, and think it is mine, when really it is my neighbour’s. And I could, 
looking into a mirror, mistake a bump on his forehead for one on mine. 
On the other hand there is no question of recognizing a person when I say 
I  have toothache.  To ask  ‘are you sure that it’s you who have pains?’ 
would be nonsensical...And  now this way of stating our idea suggests 
itself:  that  it  is  impossible  that  in  making  the  statement  ‘I  have  a 
toothache’ I should have mistaken another person for myself, as it is to 
moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else for me.  To 
say, ‘I have pain’ is no more a statement about a particular person than 
moaning is. (Wittgenstein (1958), p66-7)
Although  it  is disputed  exactly  where  the  line  should  be  drawn -   Evans,  for
instance, thinks that ‘The wind is blowing my hair about’ is a case of the use of
‘I*  as subject, when this is known in a first-personal way (e.g.  (Evans (1982),
p218) -  it is generally agreed, following Shoemaker (1968), that in cases where
‘I’  is  used  as  subject,  such  judgements  are  immune  to  error  through
misidentification,  and where ‘I’ is used as object they are not.
1   think  that  there  is  an  important  distinction  between  thoughts  which  can  be 
expressed  with  ‘I’  as  subject  and  with  ‘I’  as  object;  thoughts  I  will  term 
‘subjective  first-person  thoughts’  and  ‘objective  first-person  thoughts’ 
respectively.  However,  this distinction  is not marked by whether or not such 
thoughts  are  immune  to  error  through  misidentification.  There  certainly  are 
cases of objective first-person thoughts where these thoughts are subject to errors 
of misidentification.  But  there  is  also  an  important class  of cases  where  a 
subject thinks of himself objectively,  and yet such thoughts are not subject to 
errors of misidentification.  The category of objective first-person thought should
2 Immunity to error through misidentification is explained in Section 2.1 below.20
be divided into two -  of those that are, and those that are not, immune to error 
through misidentification.
All  subjective  first-person  thoughts  are  immune  to  error  through 
misidentification, but this is not the defining characteristic of the class.  Instead, 
it is that such thoughts have an internal aspect -  they are from the  ‘inside’  or 
from the first-person perspective.  Objective first-person thoughts do not share 
this first-person perspective -  they are not from the ‘inside’.  But nevertheless, 
the subject is thinking first-personally and is referring to himself.
I disagree with Wittgenstein, who suggests that when T  is used as subject it does 
not refer:
To say,  ‘I have pain’  is no more a statement about a particular person 
than moaning is. (Wittgenstein (1958), p67)
Unlike Wittgenstein, I think that subjective first-person thoughts are the central
cases of where a subject refers to himself first-personally.  It is because a subject
can refer to himself in his subjective first-person thoughts that he can refer in his
objective first-person thoughts.  How a subject refers first-personally to himself
both subjectively and objectively is explored in Part III of this thesis.  In the rest
of this chapter I explain in what  I take the distinction between  subjective and
objective  first-person  thought  to  consist,  and  explain  the  further  subdivision
within the category of objective first-person thought.
2.1  Immunity to Error through Misidentification3
When a subject’s thought that a is F is as a result of his thought that b is F and 
a=6, then such a thought is based on an identification -  the subject’s thought that 
object  a  is  identical  to  object  b.  This  identification  may  be  mistaken.  For 
instance, the subject may perceive a woman wearing a red coat.  He identifies the 
woman he sees as Mary and comes to think that Mary is wearing a red coat.  This 
thought is based on an identification -  that Mary is that woman (the woman he 
perceives) -  and so as such may be subject to an identification error.  He may be 
wrong in identifying Mary as that woman.  If he is wrong in identifying Mary as 
that woman, the subject’s thought that Mary is wearing a red coat is still about
3 For further discussion see Shoemaker (1968), Evans (1982, Chapter 6 and 7), Pryor (1999) and 
Campbell (1999), among others.21
Mary; he is able to think about and refer to Mary.4  But his thought that Mary is 
wearing a red coat is based on a mistaken identification of Mary with the woman 
he perceives, and so his belief about Mary is mistaken.
Pryor (1999) argues that there is another way in which a subject’s thought may 
be subject to a misidentification error.  In this second kind of case the subject 
does not make a mistake identifying objects a and b, so thinking that the wrong 
thing is F.  Instead he makes a mistake working out what thing is F in the first 
place.  He has reason to believe that BxFx and goes wrong in thinking a is F. 
Pryor gives the example of smelling a skunky smell  in his garden.  He sees a 
small  animal,  and  thinks  what  he  would  express  by  'That  is  a  skunk  in  my 
garden’.  But he is mistaken.  The small animal he singles out is not a skunk, 
although there is a skunk in his garden.
There are supposed to be some thoughts which are immune to such errors -  such 
thoughts are said to be immune to errors of misidentification.  For instance,  a 
subject’s thought expressed by the sentence ‘that woman is wearing a red coat’, 
formed  on  the  basis  of perceiving  the  woman,  is  immune  to  error  through 
misidentification.  The subject may be mistaken about the colour of the coat, or 
whether she is wearing a coat at all, but he has not misidentified the woman, as 
his thought is not based on an identity assumption.  If a thought is immune to 
error through misidentification then it is not based on an identity assumption; it 
is, as Evans (1982) terms it ‘identification-free’.  Evans proposes that there is a 
test for whether a thought is identification-free:
What we should say is that a judgement is identification-free if it is based 
upon a way of knowing about objects such that it does not make sense for 
the subject to utter ‘Something is F, but is it a that is F?\ when the first 
component expresses knowledge which the subject does not think he has, 
or may have, gained in any other way. (Evans (1982), pl89-90)5
It  is  important  to  realize  that  what  make  a thought  immune  to  error  through 
misidentification are the grounds on which it is based.  A subject’s thought that 
he would express by ‘That man is sunburnt’, which is grounded in his perception 
of a  man  with  a  bright  red  face,  is  identification-free  and  immune  to  error
4 Perhaps he knows Mary personally, and because of this is able to think of and refer to her.
5 This is a modified version of a test proposed by Shoemaker (1968), p8222
through misidentification.  It is not based on an identity judgement of that man 
with anyone else, or on his grounds for thinking that someone is sunburnt, and 
then  identifying  that  man  as  the  person  who  fulfils  this  condition.  But  his 
thought that ‘That man is sunburnt’, based on his belief that that man is Bill, and 
his  knowledge  that  Bill  is  sunburnt,  is  not  immune  to  error  through 
misidentification.  It is based on his identification of that man with Bill.  If he is 
wrong that that  man  is  Bill,  he  still  refers  to  that  man  in  thought,  but  has  a 
mistaken belief about him that he is sunburnt.
2.2  Subjective First-Person Thought
Wittgenstein’s examples of the use of ‘I’ as subject are generally considered to 
be  cases  where  the  judgements  expressed  are  immune  to  error  through 
misidentification.  When a subject thinks 7  see so-and-so’ or 7  hear so-and-so’ 
or 7  think it will rain’, it does not make sense for him to say ‘Someone sees so- 
and-so,  but  is  it me?’,  ‘Someone  hears  so-and-so,  but  do  I  hear  so-and-so?’, 
‘Someone thinks it will rain, but do I think it will rain?’.  The judgements that 
the subject has made do not seem  based on his  identification of himself with 
another object, or on his belief that something has a certain property, and then 
identifying the thing that has a certain property as himself.  Shoemaker (1968, 
p81-2) points out that such first-person thoughts which are immune to error in 
this way need not be incorrigible.  A subject may think what he would express by 
‘I see a canary’.  He may be mistaken -  there may be no canary in front of him -  
but  he  cannot  have  misidentified  himself as  the  person  he  thinks  can  see  a 
canary.  Evans  ((1982),  p218-22)  argues  that  first-person  thoughts  which  are 
immune to error through misidentification are not limited to cases of mental self­
ascription.  Wittgenstein treats the example ‘The wind is blowing my hair’ as a 
case of the use of ‘I’ (in this case ‘my’) as object.  Evans thinks this is wrong:
For it was this treatment which gave rise to the widespread belief that the 
phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification, which is so 
central  to  the  notion  of  self-consciousness,  does  not  extend  to  self­
ascription of physical properties.  But of course it does.  There is a way of 
knowing  that  the  property  of  £’s  hair  being  blown  by  the  wind  is 
currently  instantiated,  such  that  when  the  first  component  expresses 
knowledge  gained  in  this  way,  the  utterance  ‘The  wind  is  blowing 
someone’s hair, but it is my hair that the wind is blowing?’ will not make 
sense.  Wittgenstein’s discussion does not take sufficient account of the 
fact that the property of being immune to error through misidentification 
is  not  one  which  applies  to  propositions  simpliciter,  but  one  which23
applies  only  to judgements  made  upon  this  or  that  basis.  Once  we 
appreciate this relativity to a basis, which arguably must be taken  into 
account in the case of mental self-ascription as well, the fact that there are 
cases  involving the  self-ascription  of physical  predicates  in which  ‘the 
possibility of error has been provided for’ will be seen not to impugn the 
fact that there are cases in which it just as clearly has not. (Evans (1982), 
p218-9)
The key  point  Evans wants to get across  is that  it  is the grounds  for making 
certain first-person judgements which make those judgements immune to error 
through  misidentification.  So  a  subject’s  thought  expressed  by  ‘The  wind  is 
blowing my hair about’, if it is formed on the basis of the subject feeling his hair 
blowing about in a first-personal way, is not based on an identification.  If he 
thinks it because he sees himself in a mirror with his hair blowing about, or if he 
sees his (long) hair out of the comer of his eye, then this thought is not immune 
to  error  -   he  may  have  mistaken  someone  else  for  himself.  Likewise,  his 
thoughts that  ‘I am sitting down’  or  ‘I  have my  legs crossed’,  if based on an 
experience  from the first-person perspective, will  be  immune to error through 
misidentification.  But if such judgements are formed on another basis they will 
not be.6
It  is  this  first-personal  basis  -   experiences  or  grounds  from  the  first-person 
perspecfive~^which  is  crucial  to  first-person  thoughts  expressed  with  ‘I’  as 
subject.  These are subjective first-person thoughts.  We clearly do have thoughts 
which are based on a special first-person perspective -  there is a first-personal 
way of knowing that one is sitting down, or that one is in pain.  Such subjective 
first-person thoughts are also identification-free, but this is not what delimits the 
class.
This  special  first-person  perspective,  from  the  inside,  has  been  illustrated  by 
Williams in ‘Imagination and the Self (1966/1973).  He argues (p38) that there 
are  three  ways  in  which  a  subject  can  imagine  something.  Firstly,  he  can 
imagine  something  without  the  subject  being  in  the  imagined  world  at  all. 
Secondly, he can imagine the world from his perspective -  from a first-person 
perspective.  The  subject  imagines  moving  around  the  world,  seeing  things,
6 Although see Chapter 8, Section 1.1, for a discussion of whether such thoughts really are 
immune to error through misidentification where there is the possibility of deviant causal chains.24
having various kinaesthetic experiences, and so on.  Williams terms this second 
kind of imagination  'participation  imagination’.  And thirdly,  he can imagine, 
from the outside, a figure who is himself, doing something.  As an example of 
the  first  case,  the  subject  might  just  imagine  a  children’s  playground;  he 
imagines the swings, the climbing  frame, the seesaw,  and children playing on 
these things.  In the second kind of participation imagining the subject imagines 
the playground from his perspective -  he imagines what he sees and hears.  He 
might imagine seeing the children on the swings, and hearing their laughter. He 
might imagine the slide in front, and the roundabout to the left.  In the third kind 
of imagining, he imagines himself in the playground.  He does not imagine the 
experience (e.g.) of helping a child down the slide, but instead imagines a person 
(who is himself) helping a child down the slide.  This third kind of imagination 
can alternate with the second kind:
...if I am prone to fantasies of being a world champion racing driver, this 
could  involve  kinaesthetic  imagery  of tension,  hands  clasped  on  the 
steering wheel, and visualisation of wet tarmac as seen through an oil- 
spattered  windscreen,  and  so  forth;  and,  also  at  some  different  point, 
some  visual  image  of myself,  as  though  in  a  newspaper  photograph, 
having a garland hung around my neck.  (Williams, (1966/1973, p38)
It is the second kind of imagining -  participation imagination -  which captures 
the first-person perspective.  In such cases, the subject imagines experiences -  
undergoing experiences, or experiences befalling him -  of the kind which would 
warrant  subjective  first-person  thoughts.  If  he  imagines  sitting  down,  he 
imagines the  experience  of sitting down,  from the  first-person perspective,  or 
from the inside.  If this experience were actual, rather than imagined, it would 
ground the thought ‘I am sitting down’.  This is a subjective first-person thought, 
and involves the use of ‘I’ as subject.
Higginbotham, in  ‘Remembering,  Imagining, and the First Person’  (2003) also 
brings  out  the  internal  dimension  of  subjective  first-person  thoughts.  He 
particularly  considers  cases  of remembering and  imagining,  and  suggests  that 
reports of what I have termed ‘subjective first-person thoughts’ -  those which are 
immune to error and have an  ‘internal  aspect’  can be captured by  attributions25
involving the understood subject PRO.7   Thus he thinks even if I cannot play the 
piano I can imagine my playing Three Blind Mice on the piano. I can imagine it 
as an event 1  witness, from the ‘outside’.  But I cannot imagine (PRO) playing 
Three Blind Mice on the piano as I  cannot imagine it from the  ‘inside’, as an 
action performed (see Higginbotham (2003), p509).
Higginbotham  also  gives  an  example  where  first-person  memory  is  from  the 
first-person perspective, and contrasts this with a first-person memory which is 
not from the inside.  The former, but not the latter, can be attributed using PRO. 
He gives the following example:
Suppose that we form a small party, agreeing that we will call on John 
and encourage him to finish his thesis by July.  Having cornered John, we 
explain how he should really be prudent given his scholastic and financial 
circumstances, and so forth.  After the session, I try to remember whether 
we merely hinted around the subject, or whether it was explicitly said to 
John  that  he  should  finish  his  thesis  by  July.  After  a  time,  I  might 
remember  someone  saying to  John that  he  should  finish  his  thesis  by
July; but I  don’t remember whether  it was I  who said it.  Your memory
for the occasion is better than mine, and you do remember my saying it, 
and you tell me so.  I draw an inference as follows:
(1)  I remember someone saying John should finish his thesis by July;
In fact, as I am now assured, it was I who said it; therefore,
I remember my saying John should finish his thesis by July.
The reasoning seems to me to be impeccable.  But (2) does not follow 
from the premisses of (1), and is indeed obviously false:
(2)  I remember saying John should finish his thesis by July 
However, the only difference between (2) and the true conclusion of (1) 
is  that  the  first-person  pronoun  has  been  replaced  by  PRO. 
(Higginbotham (2003), p508; my numbering)
The  conclusion of (1)  is not immune to  errors of misidentification  in  Piyor’s
second sense.  I remember that someone said that John should finish his thesis by
July, and then identify myself as this person.  Hence I may be mistaken that it
was I who said it.  But (2) is not subject to such an error.  If I remember saying
John should finish his thesis by July it does not make sense to wonder ‘Someone
said John should  finish his thesis by July,  but did  I say John should finish his
thesis  by July?’.8 I remember this from the  inside, as an act performed.  Both the
memory of my saying John should finish his thesis by July, and the memory of
7 Higginbotham follows Chomsky (1981) in taking PRO to have an interpretation necessarily 
anaphoric to the main clause subject, but no phonetic realization.
8 Some may think that it does make sense to ask this, because of the possibility of quasi-memory. 
For a discussion of quasi-memory see Chapter 8, Section 1.2, of this thesis.26
saying John should finish his thesis by July ground the thought expressed by "1 
said John should finish his thesis by July’.  But if it is grounded by my hearing 
my voice hanging in the air, it is not immune to error through misidentification 
and is not from the inside.  Whereas if it is grounded by my remembering saying 
John should finish his thesis by July, these grounds are from the inside, and this 
is a subjective first-person thought.
The phenomenon of subjective first-person thought occurs in many places.  A 
subject may anticipate things happening from the first-person perspective.  He 
may  want,  hope  or  expect  to  do  certain  things;  these  desires,  hopes  and 
expectations being from the inside.  He may intend to do something in the future. 
If he intends to do something in the future then he represents the intended action 
from his own point of view.  For instance, he may intend to mow the lawn.  This 
entails representing mowing the lawn from the inside, from his own perspective. 
The point of this intention is to be acted on, and it can be acted on by the subject 
only  if it  is  from  his  first-person  perspective.9  His  thought  based  on  these 
grounds, expressed by ‘I will mow the lawn’ is a subjective first-person thought.
Thoughts  which  are  expressed  with  ‘I’  as  subject  are  subjective  first-person 
thoughts.  They  are  immune  to  error  through  misidentification,  and  the 
experiences  (or  memories,  etc.)  which  ground  them  are  from  the  first-person 
perspective.  It is this latter fact, the  internal,  first-person perspective,  which 
makes them subjective first-person thoughts.
23  Objective First-Person Thought
Subjective  first-person  thought  is  to  be  contrasted  with  objective  first-person 
thought.  Objective first-person thoughts are first-person thoughts which are not 
subjective.  The grounds for them, if they have grounds, are not from the first- 
person perspective; they are not from the inside.
Objective  first-person  thoughts  are  still  first-personal.  They  must  not  be 
confused  with  a  subject’s  non-first-personal  thoughts  about  himself.  For 
instance, Perry’s (1977) amnesiac Lingens, who reads about himself in a book,
9 For a discussion of intention along these lines see Velleman (1996) p70-l27
may come to have the thought he would express by ‘Lingens is the cousin of a 
spy’.  This is a non-first-personal thought about himself.  It is not an objective 
first-person thought.  When Lingens comes to believe ‘1  am the cousin of a spy’, 
this is an objective first-person thought.  It is a first-person thought, but is not 
based on grounds from the first-person perspective.
Wittgenstein seems to assume that where there is no  ‘internal dimension’  to a 
first-person thought, the thought is subject to errors of identification.  He says 
“the  possibility  of  an  error  has  been  provided  for”  because  such  thoughts 
“involve the recognition of a particular person.”  As examples of the use of ‘I’ as 
object,  Wittgenstein  gives  ‘1   have  a  bump  on  my  forehead’,  or  ‘My  arm  is 
broken’.  He thinks that a subject might look in the mirror, and see a person with 
a bump on his forehead, when that person is not really himself.  Or he might see 
a broken arm at his side, when really this arm belongs to someone else.  To what 
does  Wittgenstein take  ‘I’  as object to  refer?  Does he  take  it to  refer to  the 
particular person being recognized?  If so, if I see myself in the mirror, and have 
not made an error of identification, then perhaps ‘I’ refers to this body.  But what 
happens  in  a  case  where  an  error  is  made?  If  I  mistake  a  bump  on  my 
neighbour’s forehead for one on my own, am I referring to my neighbour with 
my use of ‘I’ as object?  This seems implausible.  It is more likely that I am still 
supposed to  be  referring to this  body,  as  in my body,  and  I  have  mistakenly 
identified this body with my neighbour’s body.  But if this is the case, how do I 
refer to this body?
I think that in such cases, when the subject says ‘I have a bump on my head’, or 
‘My  arm  is  broken’,  he  is  still  referring  to  himself,  first-personally;  he  is 
referring to the same object he refers to when he thinks subjective first-person 
thoughts.1 0   This option is obviously not open to Wittgenstein, who suggests that 
‘I’  as  subject does not  refer.  But we  both  agree that the basis on  which  the 
subject makes his judgement could be based on a mistaken identification -  with 
himself and that man in the mirror, or himself and the person whose arm is by his 
side.1 1   Even  if he does not mistake  someone else for himself,  his judgement
10 This will be developed in Chapter 8
II Clearly we might disagree over what ‘himself as object refers to here, or at least over how it 
refers.28
seems based on an identification.  His grounds for his judgement are not from the 
‘inside’ and they are subject to identification errors.
Similarly, Higginbotham’s example of when I remember my saying to John that 
he should finish his thesis by July, based on my remembering a voice hanging in 
the air and identifying that voice as mine, lacks both an internal dimension and is 
based on an identification.  The thought, expressed by ‘I said to John he should 
finish his thesis by July’, if based on such grounds, is an objective first-person 
thought.  It is not immune to error through misidentification.
There are many cases of objective first-person thoughts which are not immune to 
error  through  misidentification,  and  are  not  based  on  first-personal  grounds. 
Perry’s example of the amnesiac Lingens, reading about himself in a book, who 
finally realizes what he would express by ‘I am the cousin of a spy’  seems, on 
the surface, to be such a case.1 2   His thought is based on the grounds that he 
knows that Lingens is the cousin a spy, and he has come to identify himself as 
Lingens.  Such a thought does not seem to be identification-free.
But  these  are  not  the  only  cases  where  a  subject  has  objective  first-person 
thoughts.  As Evans  (1982)  points  out,  there  are many cases where  a subject 
thinks first-person thoughts for which he has no grounds:
...we  are  perfectly  capable  of  grasping  propositions  about  ourselves 
which we are quite incapable of deciding, or even offering grounds for.  I 
can  grasp the thought that  I  was breast-fed,  for example or that  I was 
unhappy on my first birthday, or that I tossed and turned in my sleep last 
night,  or  that  I  shall  be  dragged  unconscious  through  the  streets  of 
Chicago, or that I shall die. (Evans (1982), p208-9)
The thought that I was breast-fed, for instance, may be based on an identification;
perhaps I see a photo of a baby being breast-fed and base my judgement on the
identity assumption expressed by ‘I am that baby’.  But equally, I may have no
grounds for the thought;  it may be an idle speculation.  If this is the case, this
seems to involve ascribing the property of being breast-fed to myself, thought of
first-personally, whatever this may mean. This is not based on an identification.
It also seems immune to errors of misidentification.  It does not make sense to
12 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of whether statements such as ‘I am Lingens’ are identity 
statements.29
ask ‘Someone was breast-fed, but was it I?’.  Such thoughts are first-personal and 
immune to error through misidentification, yet they are not from the first-person 
perspective.  They  are  objective  first-person  thoughts  which  are  immune  to 
identification error.
Objective  first-person  thoughts  which  are  immune  to  error  through 
misidentification  can  be  extended  to  cases  in  imagination.  Recall  Williams 
(1966/1973) distinguishes between participation imagination -  where a subject 
imagines an experience from the inside -  and a third kind of imagination, where 
he  imagines  someone  who  is  himself,  doing  something.  One  way  he  might 
imagine himself from the outside is non-first-personal.  For instance, the subject 
may perceive himself in the mirror, dressed up as a fairy.  He may imagine that 
fairy flying through space.  But there is also a way that a subject can imagine 
himself objectively, by stipulating that a certain object is himself, labelling it as 
himself.  The  subject  does  not  imagine  the  experience  from  the  first-person 
perspective, but it is not like non-first-personal imagination either.  He cannot be 
mistaken  that  he  is  thinking  about  himself.  He  imagines  himself,  from  the 
outside.  Such a case of objective first-personal imagination, like subjective, is 
immune to error through misidentification -  the wrong object cannot be picked 
out, because the object imagined is stipulated to be himself.
Martin has suggested1 3  that the phenomenon here termed objective first-person 
thought is also present in intention.  As Higginbotham puts it:
There is, for instance, a difference in the intentions I may have when I 
intend to  stop  smoking  (i.e.  PRO to stop smoking), and when I  intend 
merely that 1  should stop smoking.  The latter intention might be fulfilled, 
say, by  paying  someone  forcibly to remove cigarettes from  my person 
whenever  1   am  caught  with  them;  but  that  is  not  fulfillment  of  an 
intention to stop smoking, which can only be done through willful refusal 
to put a cigarette to my lips and light up. (Higginbotham (2003), p509)
The former intention is one from the inside.  It is framed from the first-person
perspective.  But the latter is not -  there is no agency implied.  1  may intend that I
should stop smoking in the same way that I might intend that John should stop
smoking.  Intending  that  I  should  stop  smoking  may  be  a  case  where  the
intention is non-first-personal.  I may intend that the person in the mirror should
1 3  Martin’s response to an earlier version of Higginbotham’s paper is discussed in Higginbotham 
(2003)30
stop  smoking  because  they  look  so  awful,  but  not  realize  that  that  person  is 
myself.  But  it  can  also  be  a  first-person  intention;  an  intention  from  the 
‘outside’.  But if this is the case it does not seem that I can be mistaken about the 
object  of my  intention  here  -   it  is  not  based  on  an  identification.  I  have 
stipulated that the object of my intention is myself, from the outside.  Such cases 
are probably very rare, but not impossible.
2.4  Conclusions
The  distinction  between  subjective  and  objective  first-person  thought  is 
important, as it is because a subject can have subjective first-person thoughts that 
he is able to refer to himself, the subject.  He is able to have singular thoughts 
about himself.  How this is possible will be explained in Part III.  And because  °  
the  subject  can  think  about  himself first-personally,  he  is  also  able  to  have 
objective first-person thoughts, where such thoughts do not have first-personal 
grounds.  Objective first-person thoughts sometimes have no grounds.  But some 
of them  do  have grounds  which  seem  based on an identification.  There  is  a  yJ 
subclass of objective first-person thought which is not immune to error through 
misidentification.  The identification seems to be of the subject, thought of first- 
personally, with the subject, thought of in a different way; perhaps as that man in 
the mirror, that person being read about, etc.  But is understanding this as an 
identity assumption really the best way to explain what is going on here?  And if 
it is an identity assumption, does this mean that a subject must think of himself in 
a certain way when he thinks first-personally?  These issues are considered in 
Chapter 2.31
Chapter 2 
The Structure of First-Person Thought
Writing in the nineteenth century, Mach describes a case where he has a thought 
about himself but does not have a first-person thought:
Not long ago, after a trying railway journey by night, when I was very 
tired,  1   got into an omnibus, just as another man appeared at the other 
end.  ‘What a shabby pedagogue that is, that has just entered’, thought I. 
(Mach (1914), p4n)
Although  Mach thinks  a thought he  would  express  by  ‘that  man  is  a  shabby 
pedagogue’ he does not yet think first-personally what he would express by the 
sentence ‘I am a shabby pedagogue’.  This only happens later, when he realizes:
It was myself: opposite me hung a large mirror.  The physiognomy of my 
class, accordingly, was better known to me than my own. ((1914), p4n)
There are many more examples in the literature which bring out the fact that a
subject’s thinking first-personally is not just the same as his thinking of himself.
There is Castafieda’s (1968) editor of Soul who knows that the editor of Soul is a
millionaire, but does not think the first-personal thought he would express by ‘I
am  a  millionaire’  (p440-41).  Kaplan,  in  ‘Demonstratives’  (1989a,  p533)
discusses a subject who watches a man in a mirror with his pants on fire, but
does not realize that that person is himself.  He does not think first-personally
what he would express by  ‘My pants are on fire’.  Anscombe (1975) gives the
example of John Smith, who does not know that he is John Horatio Auberon
Smith, as named in a will, and so who refers to himself without knowing he is
referring to himself; he thinks thoughts that would be expressed by ‘John Horatio
Auberon Smith is F  but not those that would be expressed by ‘I am F ’ (pi36-7).
Perry also gives many examples where a subject thinks of himself, but does not
think first-personally.  For instance,  in his early work, Perry (1977) describes
amnesiac  Lingens,1   lost  in  Stanford  library,  reading all  about a person  called
Lingens  but  not  realizing that  it  is  himself;  he does not think  the  thought he
would express by ‘I am Lingens’ (pi7 in Perry (2000)).  In his ‘The Problem of
the Essential Indexical’ (1979) Perry gives the example of a shopper who follows
a trail of sugar around a supermarket, trying to trace the shopper who is making a
mess.  He knows the shopper is making a mess, but he doesn’t realize that the
1  The name Rudolf Lingens is taken from Frege (1918)32
shopper is himself.  It is only later that he realizes what he would express by ‘I 
am making a mess’ (p27 in Perry (2000)).
In some of these examples where a subject is thinking non-first-personally, the 
subject may  have a descriptive thought which denotes himself.  For example, 
Perry’s messy shopper knows that someone is making a mess, but does not know 
who satisfies this description.2  However, in many of the examples, the subject is 
having a singular thought about himself, but is not thinking first-personally.  In 
such cases he is thinking of himself in a way in which he normally thinks about 
independent objects.  Mach, for instance, perceives someone; it happens to be his 
own reflection in the mirror.  On the basis of this perception, he thinks what he 
would express by ‘That man is a shabby pedagogue’.  Similarly with Kaplan’s 
example; the subject perceives a man with his pants on fire, and because of this 
thinks  ‘That man  has  his  pants  on  fire’.  Anscombe’s John  Horatio  Auberon 
Smith example, and Perry’s Lingens example concern a subject reading about a 
named person.  This is another way  in which a subject can normally come to 
have singular thoughts about independent objects -  on the basis of testimony. 
Because he hears or reads about these people, the subject is able to think about 
them.  In these cases, the subject happens to be thinking about himself.  But he is 
thinking about himself non-first-personally, rather than first-personally.
The  proposal  in this thesis  is that in order to think non-first-personally  of an 
object the subject must be acquainted with the object.  This is taken to mean that 
in order to have a thought about an object, the object must somehow be present 
to the subject.3  It is this that puts the subject in a position to be able to think of 
the object. But to be able to think first-personally, the subject does not need to be 
acquainted with himself.  In this chapter, the focus will be on the cases above -  
the contrast between a subject’s first-person thought and his non-first-personal 
thought about himself.  It is undeniable, I think, that there is a contrast here.  But 
is  this  because  what  is  involved  in  thinking  about  himself is  fundamentally 
different in each case?
2 The shopper’s thought ‘I am making a mess’ is not immune to identification error in Pryor’s
(1999) second sense.  He has grounds for thinking that someone is making a mess and comes to 
conclude that he is making a mess.  But he does not originally have a non-first-personal singular 
thought about himself.  See Chapter 1, Section 2.1  for discussion.
3 This understanding of acquaintance and the reasons for it will be discussed in detail in Part II.33
In  Chapter  1   a  distinction  was  made  between  subjective  and  objective  first- 
person  thought.  Subjective  first-person  thoughts  are  from  the  inside  -   their 
grounds are from the first-person perspective.  A subject, Lingens, thinking what 
he would express by ‘I am sitting down’, or ‘I am hot’, where he comes to know 
this in a first-personal way, is thinking subjective first-person thoughts.  He can 
have such thoughts even when amnesiac and  lost.  But suppose he reads in a 
book that Lingens is the cousin of a spy.  He has the non-first-personal thought 
he would express by ‘Lingens is the cousin of a spy’, but he does not yet have 
the first-person thought he would express by ‘1  am the cousin of a spy’.  When he 
comes to think this, he now has an objective first-person thought.  It is not based 
on grounds from the first-person perspective.  It is not immune to error through 
misidentification -  it makes sense for Lingens to say ‘Someone is the cousin of a 
spy, but is it I?’.  When he is finally in the position to say ‘I am the cousin of a 
spy’  it seems that what he has learned is an informative identity; an identity he 
would express by ‘I am Lingens’.
In  ‘Indexical  Belief  (1981),  Stalnaker  argues  that  statements  such  as  ‘I  am 
Lingens’  expressed  by  Lingens  are  indeed  identity  statements.  There  is  not 
anything special about first-person thought.  He argues that examples such as the 
amnesiac Lingens who does not think ‘I am Lingens’, or the man who does not 
realize ‘I am that man with his pants on fire’,  are just the same as cases where 
the subject is ignorant about the  identity of an independent object.  These are 
cases where the subject thinks of the same object in two different ways, and does 
not appreciate that he is thinking of the same object.  For example, a subject may 
think of the planet Venus in two different ways; as Hesperus (which he perceives 
in the evening sky), and as Phosphorus (which he perceives in the morning sky). 
He may rationally believe that Hesperus is a planet, but that Phosphorus is not. 
In the same way, so the thought goes, he may rationally believe that Lingens is 
the cousin of a spy (from reading about Lingens in a book) and not think first 
personally what he would express by ‘I am the cousin of a spy.’  As Stalnaker 
puts his proposal:
They are all cases that involve some kind of identity confusion, and all
should be explained in the same way. ((1999), pi9)34
Yet Stalnaker later rejects this, saying:
This now seems to me at best misleading, and wrong if it implies that
there is not a distinctive problem about indexical belief...((1999), pi9)
His later proposal is now that Lingens’s ignorance when he does not know ‘I am 
Lingens’ cannot be modelled in the same way as his ignorance that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus.  It is not a case of identity confusion.  Lewis, in ‘Attitudes De Dicto 
and  De Se’  (1979) reaches a  similar conclusion.  The content of the  thought, 
expressed by Lingens as ‘I am Lingens’, is not structurally similar to the content 
of his thought that ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’.
In this chapter I begin by exploring Lewis’s solution in ‘Attitudes De Dicto and 
De  Se\  Is  the  thought  ‘I  am  Lingens’,  expressed  by  Lingens,  an  identity 
statement?  If not,  what is its content?  Is the content of his belief ‘I  am  the 
cousin of a spy’ structurally distinct from the content of his belief ‘Lingens is the 
cousin of a spy’?  I conclude that Lewis’s account cannot be quite right, and go 
on to explore accounts which treat statements such as ‘1  am Lingens’  said by 
Lingens,  as  an  informative  identity  statement.  The  accounts  considered  are  a 
Fregean  account,  and  Stalnaker’s  account  in  ‘Indexical  Belief  (1981). 
Statements such as ‘I am Lingens’ said by Lingens, can be treated as informative 
identity  statements,  provided  that  one  has  a  notion  of content  which  is  fine­
grained  enough.  A  Fregean  notion  of  content  is  fine-grained  enough.  But 
accepting a Fregean notion of content does not mean that one needs to accept 
everything that Frege says about sense; one need not conclude that in order to 
think first-personally a subject must be present to himself in a special way.
1  Lewis’s Proposal
Lewis, in ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’ (1979), proposes an account of what he 
calls ‘attitudes de se’ which has the consequence that the content of a subject’s 
first-person beliefs is structurally different from the content of his beliefs about 
other objects.  He does not treat the amnesiac Lingens, coming to believe what he 
would  state by  ‘I am  Lingens’,  as his coming to learn an informative  identity 
statement.  He  does  not  see  it  as  parallel  to  a  subject  coming  to  learn  that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus,  for instance.  Lewis, prior to  ‘Attitudes De Dicto and 
De Se\ takes the content of a belief to be a proposition, by which he means a set 
of possible  worlds.  Informative  identity  statements  are  true  in  all  possible35
worlds. Thus the belief that Hesperus is Phosphorus has the same content as the 
belief  that  Hesperus  is  Hesperus:  the  set  of  all  possible  worlds.  This  is 
something that a possible worlds account of thought content needs to be able to 
deal with.4  But Lewis does not think that Lingens’s statement ‘I am Lingens’ is 
an  informative  identity  statement,  and  so  does  not  address  the  issue  of 
informative identity statements in his article:
1   know  perfectly  well  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  ignorance  of 
noncontingent  matters.  1   do not know what is the proper treatment of 
such  ignorance;  several  very  different  strategies  have  been  proposed. 
They  depart  to  different  degrees,  and  in  different  directions,  from  the 
assignment of sets of possible worlds as propositional objects.  My hunch 
is that this problem cuts across the issues 1  want to discuss,  so  I  shall 
ignore it. (Lewis (1979), pi 35)
Lewis’s proposal is that when a subject has a first-person belief such as ‘I am F , 
the  content  of this  belief cannot  be  represented  by  a  set  of possible  worlds. 
Instead such a belief is a relation between a subject and a property, rather than a 
proposition.  The subject who thinks ‘I am F  self-ascribes the property of Fness. 
The thoughts of two different  subjects who both think  1 am f   will  have the 
same content; both have the content of being F.  If both Mary and Jane believe 
what  they  would  express  by  saying  ‘I  am  sitting down’  then  they  both  self- 
ascribe the property of sitting down.  When Lingens thinks first-personally ‘I am 
the cousin of a spy’, he self-ascribes the property of being the cousin of a spy. 
When he thinks ‘I am Lingens’ he self-ascribes the property of being Lingens.
Lewis also extends his account to explain what the content of a subject’s singular 
thoughts must be.  Lewis thinks that in order to have a singular thought or a de re 
belief about  an  object,  the  subject  must  be  acquainted  with  the  object.  He 
discusses  different  examples  where  he  thinks  that  it  is  uncontroversial  that  a
subject can have a de re belief, or singular thought:
What have these cases in common?  To put a name to it:  a relation of 
acquaintance, [footnote omitted] To make it a little more precise: in each 
case, I and the one of whom I have beliefs de re are so related that there is 
an  extensive causal  dependence of my states upon his;  and this causal 
dependence is of a sort apt for the reliable transmission of information.
4 See Section 3.1  below, for how Stalnaker (1981) deals with informative identity statements 
given an austere possible worlds account of content.36
It is too much to require that information actually be reliably transmitted. 
In  every  case,  a  lot  might  go  wrong  and  I  might  be  very  badly 
misinformed, and yet I could have beliefs de re -  many of them wrong, 
perhaps -  about the one to whom I bear a relation of acquaintance. (Lewis 
(1979), pl55)
Lewis’s proposal is that if a subject has a singular thought about an object, the 
content of this thought is given by the subject self-ascribing bearing a certain 
relation  to  the  object  which  has  a  particular property.  This  relation between 
subject and the object thought about must involve acquaintance. For instance, if 
Lewis perceives his cat and thinks ‘That cat is furry’ he self-ascribes the property 
of looking at an object that  is  furry.  The  relation  looking at  is a relation of 
acquaintance.  What happens when Lingens thinks non-first-personally ‘Lingens 
is the cousin of a spy’?  In this case he self-ascribes the property of reading about 
an object that is the cousin of a spy.  Reading about is a relation of acquaintance. 
So this thought differs structurally from his first-person thought ‘I am the cousin 
of a spy’.  When he thinks first-personally  ‘I am the cousin of a spy’  he self- 
ascribes the property of being the cousin of a spy.
Self-ascription of properties is ascription to oneself under the relation of identity. 
So one might think that first-person beliefs are not structurally distinct from non- 
first-personal beliefs.  When Lingens thinks ‘Lingens is the cousin of a spy’ he 
self-ascribes the property of reading about an object that is the cousin of a spy, 
while when he thinks ‘I am the cousin of a spy’ he self-ascribes the property of 
being identical to an object that is the cousin of a spy’.  Lewis thinks that identity 
is an acquaintance relation; indeed, he describes it as “a relation of acquaintance 
par excellence” ((1979), pi56).  But identity is not a relation of acquaintance, 
according to the notion of acquaintance developed in this thesis.5  The object is 
not present to the subject just because the object and the subject are identical.6 
Lingens  self-ascribing the  property  of being  identical  to  an  object  that  is  the 
cousin of a spy collapses into Lingens self-ascribing the property of being the
5 See Part II
6 The notion of acquaintance developed in this thesis is along the lines of Russell -  that 
acquaintance between subject and object is the converse of the object being present to the subject. 
If identity fulfilled this requirement, Russell’s agonising over whether the subject could be 
acquainted with himself makes little sense.37
cousin of a spy.  And this is distinct from his non-first-personal thought about 
himself.
Lewis’s  account  can  explain  the  difference  between  a  subject’s  first-person 
thought, and his non-first-personal thought about himself.  And this explanation 
involves  acquaintance  being  a  requirement  for  non-first-personal  singular 
thoughts, and not for first-person thoughts.  But there is a problem.  The problem 
is  not  the  difference  between  first-person  and  non-first-person  thought.  It  is 
instead the distinction between subjective and objective first-person thought. Can 
Lewis’s proposal account for this?  The issue is not immediately apparent when 
cases of belief are considered.  In first-person belief, a subject refers to himself 
first-personally, and ascribes a property to himself.7  Whether or not this belief 
has  grounds  which  are  from  the  first-person  perspective  does  not  affect  the 
content of the belief.  When a subject believes what he would express by 41  am 
F \ either subjectively or objectively, he self-ascribes the property of being F. 
But Lewis’s account is supposed to extend to attitudes generally.  His view is 
that  the  object  of the  attitude  is  a  property,  rather  than  a  proposition.  For 
instance, in discussing desire he says:
1  suppose I might want to be a poached egg. (An ordinary poached egg -  
not an eggy creature that walks and talks.)  Would I then want to inhabit 
one of the worlds where I am a poached egg?  That’s not it.  I take it there 
are no such worlds.  No poached egg is a counterpart of mine!  If the 
object of my  want  is  a proposition,  it is the empty proposition.  How 
could I want the empty proposition, in such a guise that I recognize it for 
what it is?  But if the object is a property, it is nonempty.  It is a property 
that plenty of poached eggs actually have. (Lewis (1979), pi46)
If I want to be a poached egg, then I want the property of being a poached egg.
Presumably if I intend to be a poached egg then I intend the property of being a
poached egg.  But if there can be subjective and objective first-person intentions,
Lewis’s  account,  as  it  stands,  seems  unable  to  deal  with  this.  How  can  it
distinguish between the intentions expressed by the sentences ‘I intend to give up
smoking’ and ‘I intend that I should give up smoking’.  Both are first-personal,
and yet if Higginbotham (2003) and Martin8  are right, the latter need not involve
an  internal  aspect.9  Similarly in  imagination.  Can the contents of ‘I  imagine
7 According to the proposal developed in this thesis, which takes both subjective and objective 
first-person thoughts to refer to an object.
8 Quoted in Higginbotham (2003)
9 See Chapter 1   for discussion.playing  Three  Blind Mice on the piano'  and  ‘I  imagine  myself playing  Three 
Blind Mice on the piano’ be distinguished?  If I imagine the property of playing 
Three  Blind  Mice,  this  does  not  seem  to  capture  the  objective  first-person 
interpretation.  And  yet  if I  imagine  the  property of seeing an object  playing 
Three Blind Mice, although this captures the fact that the thought is objective, it 
does not capture the fact that it is first-personal.I0  On Lewis’s account, when I 
refer to myself first-personally, what I am doing is identifying a perspective on 
the  world.  This  cannot  capture  cases  where  there  are  objective  first-person 
attitudes, not grounded in the first-person perspective.
In a related point, Lewis’s account of first-person belief has the consequence that 
the subject disappears; again, it is only identifying a perspective on the world. 
The  fact  that  Lingens’s  belief  is  about  himself,  Lingens,  is  not  important. 
Lingens’s belief that he would express by ‘I am sitting down’  is no different to 
Lewis’s belief that he would express by the same sentence.  But I think these two 
beliefs should be distinguished -  they are each thinking of different objects.  The 
accounts which I will now explore treat the first-person thought of Lingens and 
the first-person thought of Lewis as having different contents.
2  A Fregean Solution
The  subject  Lingens  is  amnesiac,  and  is  reading  all  about  a  person  called 
‘Lingens’, but he does not realize he is reading about himself.  He thinks what he 
would express by the sentence ‘Lingens is the cousin of a spy’, but not what he 
would express by ‘I am the cousin of a spy’.  He does not believe what he would 
express  by  ‘I  am  Lingens’.  A  Fregean  response  to  this  example  is to  say  a 
statement by  Lingens of ‘I am  Lingens’  is exactly what it appears to be -  an 
informative identity statement.  Before he comes to realize this identity, Lingens 
does not realize he is thinking of the same object when he thinks what he would 
express by ‘Lingens is the cousin of a spy’ and ‘I am the cousin of a spy’.  There 
are many other puzzle cases concerning identity confusion; it is not peculiar to 
first-person thought.
10 To be fair to Lewis, he does admit that his account might not extend to some “ill-understood 
attitudes of imagining, conceiving, contemplating, or entertaining a thought.” ((1979), pi45)39
Frege,  in  ‘On  Sinn  and  Bedeutung’  (1892),  proposes  that  a  subject  can  hold 
differing cognitive attitudes to the sentences ‘a is F  and ‘ft is F  even when ‘a’ 
and  ‘ft’  refer  to  the  same  object.  For  example,  a  subject  might  believe  that 
Hesperus  is  a  planet,  yet disbelieve  that  Phosphorus  is  a planet,  even  though 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ refer to the same object.  Frege argues that we can 
explain this by saying that although V  and ‘ft’ have the same reference -  they 
refer to the same object -   they do not express the same sense.  So ‘Hesperus’ 
and ‘Phosphorus’ have the same reference -  they both refer to the planet Venus -  
but  they  do  not  express  the  same sense.  It  is the  sense of the  term,  not  the 
reference,  which  is part of the thought,  in Frege’s terminology,  or part of the 
content of the belief.  When a subject has the belief that Hesperus is a planet he 
must  grasp  the  sense  of the  term  ‘Hesperus’.  When  he  has  the  belief that 
Phosphorus is a planet, he must grasp the sense of the term ‘Phosphorus’.  As 
these senses are different, the contents of the beliefs that Hesperus is a planet and 
that  Phosphorous  is  a  planet  are  different.  And  the  content  of ‘Hesperus  is 
Phosphorus’  is  not  the  same  as  the  content of ‘Hesperus  is  Hesperus’.  It  is 
possible for the subject to be unaware that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and come to 
learn this.  It is not possible that he does not realize that Hesperus is Hesperus.
Frege describes the sense of a term as containing a ‘mode of presentation’ of an 
object:
It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign (name, 
combination  of  words,  written  mark),  besides  that  which  the  sign 
designates, which may be called the Bedeutung of the sign, also what I 
should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation 
is contained. (Frege, (1892/1997), pi 52)
The object, the planet Venus,  is presented in one way to the subject when he
perceives  it  in  the  evening  (and  terms  it  ‘Hesperus’)  and  it  is presented  in  a
different way to the subject when he perceives it in the morning (and terms it
‘Phosphorus’).  Belief content  is  individuated by mode of presentation  of an
object.
Is this what is going on in the Lingens case?  Is Lingens presented to himself in 
one way when he thinks first-personally, and in another way when he thinks of 
himself as Lingens?  Frege suggests that this is the case.  Just as ‘Hesperus is a 
planet’  and  ‘Phosphorus  is  a  planet’  have  the  same  reference  but  express40
different senses, so ‘I am F  said by X, and ‘X is F  have the same reference, but
different senses.  It is true that the word T  does not express a sense on its own;
in this case it is ‘I’ said by X which expresses a particular sense.  ‘I’  said by Y
would express a different sense. But this is the case for any terms whose meaning
is sensitive to context:
In all such cases the mere wording, as it can be preserved in writing, is 
not  the  complete  expression  of the  thought;  the  knowledge  of certain 
conditions  accompanying  the  utterance,  which  are  used  as  means  of 
expressing  the  thought,  is  needed  for  us  to  grasp  the  thought 
correctly....The same utterance containing the word ‘I’  in the mouths of 
different men will express different thoughts of which some may be true, 
others false. (Frege (1918), p332 in Beaney (1997))
When the subject thinks that Lingens is the cousin of a spy, this is as a result of
reading about  Lingens  in  a book.  He  is learning about  Lingens  in  this  way;
Lingens is presented to him in this way.  But when Lingens thinks what he would
express by ‘I am the cousin of a spy’, on Frege’s view, Lingens is presented to
himself in a different way.  This is a special first-personal way.  As Frege says, in
discussing a subject Dr Lauben:
Now everyone is presented to himself in a special and primitive way, in 
which  he  is  presented  to  no  one  else.  So,  when  Dr  Lauben  has  the 
thought  that  he  was  wounded,  he  will  probably  be  basing  it  on  this 
primitive way in which he is presented to himself. (Frege, (1892/1997), 
p333 in Beaney (1997))
What does it mean to say that a subject is presented to himself in a special first- 
personal  way  when  he thinks  first-personally?  The task  of explaining this  is 
taken up by Evans ((1982), Chapter 7).  Evans says:
...we have a general capacity to perceive our own bodies, although this 
can  be  broken  down  into  several  distinguishable  capacities:  our
proprioceptive  sense,  our  sense  of balance,  of heat  and  cold,  and  of 
pressure. ((1982), p220)
On Evans’s view, the subject is presented to himself as a physical object.  The
ways  in  which  he  is  presented  to  himself are  special  first-personal  modes  of
presentation.  It is unlike other modes of presentation of independent objects, or
modes  of presentation which present a subject to himself non-first-personally.
Nevertheless, the subject is present to himself, albeit in a special first-personal
way.  On Evans view, that the subject is at least sometimes present to himself in
these ways is what enables him to think about himself first-personally.  When a
subject  refers  non-first-personally  to  himself,  he  is  present  to  himself  in  a41
different  way,  which  does  not  involve  the  special  first-personal  mode  of 
presentation.1 1
Evans and Frege agree that two different subjects, Lingens and Dr. Lauben, for 
instance, both thinking 'I am the cousin of a spy’, will have different thoughts. 
In this they differ from Lewis (1979).  They have different thoughts because a 
different object  is  presented  in each case,  in the  special  first-personal  way  in 
which an object can be presented.  It is because Lingens is presented to himself 
in this  special  first-personal  way that he  can  refer to  himself first-personally. 
And Lingens, thinking both ‘I am the cousin of a spy’ and ‘Lingens is the cousin 
of a spy’ will have two different thoughts because, although the same object is 
presented, it is presented in different ways in each case.  ‘I am Lingens’  is an 
informative  identity  statement  which  the  subject  comes  to  believe  when  he 
recognizes that it is the same object being presented in two different ways.
Anscombe  (1975)  disagrees  with  Evans’s  analysis  of the  evidential  situation. 
"She does not think that the subject is present to himself when he thinks first- 
personally.  This  is  because  she  thinks  that  a  subject  can  still  think  first- 
personally even if amnesiac and in a sensory deprivation tank, when no physical 
object would be presented to him.  Her conclusion is that if there is reference 
here, it could only be reference to a Cartesian Ego, as that is the only thing that 
could be presented to the subject in such a situation12:
For, let us suppose that it is some other object.  A plausible one would be 
this  body.  And  now  imagine  that  I  get  into  a  state  of  ‘sensory 
deprivation’.  Sight is cut off, and I am locally anaesthetized everywhere, 
perhaps floated in a tank of tepid water; I am unable to speak, or to touch 
any part of my body with any other.  Now I tell myself ‘I won’t let this 
happen again!’  If the object meant by ‘I’ is this body, this human being, 
then in these circumstances  it won’t be present to my senses; and how 
else can it be ‘present’ to me?  But have I lost what I mean by ‘I’?  Is that 
not present to me?  Am I reduced to, as it were, ‘referring in absence’?  I
1 1  Evans actually explains his understanding of sense in terms of a ‘way of thinking of an object’, 
rather than Frege’s modes of presentation.
1 2  Anscombe actually takes her example of the subject in a sensory deprivation tank to be a case 
where she has “waive[d] the question about the sense of ‘I’” (pl46).  Her understanding of what 
is involved to grasp the sense of a term differs from mine -  she does not argue that to grasp the 
sense of an object the subject must be acquainted with it, but instead that to grasp the sense of a 
term the subject must have a conception of the object referred to, where this involves 
understanding what kind of object it is.42
have not lost my ‘self-consciousness’; nor can what I mean by ‘I’ be an 
object no longer present to me....
.. .Nothing but a Cartesian Ego will serve....
Thus we discover that //‘I’ is a referring expression, then Descartes was 
right about what the referent was. (Anscombe (1975), pi46-7)
Anscombe takes such a conclusion to be absurd, and it is this that leads her to say
that ‘I’ does not refer to an object at all.  It cannot be the Ego presented to the
subject, as this is absurd, and it cannot be the body presented, as a subject can
still think  first-personally when amnesiac and sensorily deprived,  so no object
can be presented at all.
Because Anscombe thinks that no object is presented she thinks that there can be 
no  reference.  The  Fregean  solution must be wrong.  ‘I  am  Lingens’  said  by 
Lingens,  and  ‘I  am  E.A.’  said  by  Anscombe, are  not  identity  statements,  she 
thinks:
If I am right in my general thesis, there is an important consequence -  
namely,  that  ‘I  am  E.A.’  is  after all not an  identity  proposition.  It  is 
connected with an identity proposition, namely, ‘This thing here is E.A.’. 
But  there  is  also  the  proposition  ‘I  am  this  thing  here.’  (Anscombe 
(1975), pl48-9)
But  this  is  to  make  the  assumption  that  if there  is  reference  in  first-person 
thoughts, how a subject refers must be similar to how he refers to other objects. 
It  is  precisely  this  which  this  thesis  aims to challenge.  Perhaps the  Fregean 
solution  of  treating  statements  like  Lingens’s  ‘I  am  Lingens’  as  identity 
statements is basically correct.  It is just that the blanket treatment of sense as 
modes  of presentation  which  is  mistaken.  Are  there  any  other  reasons  for 
thinking that  Lingens’s  statement  ‘I  am  Lingens’  should  not be treated as  an 
informative identity?
Stalnaker (1999, 2003b) thinks that there are.  But to understand his reasons, it is 
first  necessary  to  consider  a  non-Fregean  framework  which  treats  examples 
where  Lingens does not know  ‘I  am  Lingens’  as a kind of identity confusion. 
Stalnaker  himself does  this  in  his  earlier  work,  and  it  is  this  which  he  later 
rejects.43
3  Stalnaker’s Proposal
3.1  Stalnaker’s Two-Dimensional Framework
Stalnaker’s  notion  of content  differs  from  Frege’s.  He  does  not  think  that 
content is individuated in a fine-grained way in terms of modes of presentation of 
objects.  The  content  of an  assertion  or thought  does  not  consist  of Fregean 
senses or of less  fine-grained Russellian propositions:  combinations of objects 
and properties.  On Stalnaker’s view, possible worlds -  different possibilities -  
are what assertions and other states with content distinguish between:
The  content  of  speech  acts  and  intentional  mental  states  should  be 
identified  with  their  truth-conditions,  represented  by  a  set  of possible 
situations. (Stalnaker (1999), p26)
Like Lewis prior to ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’ (1979), Stalnaker takes the
content  of an  assertion  to  be  a  proposition,  where  a  proposition  is  a  set  of
possible  worlds.  Equivalently,  a proposition can be  seen as  a  function  from
possible worlds to truth values -  for example, the necessary proposition is true in
all possible worlds, and the function takes each possible world to the value True.
If a subject says ‘Mary  is sitting down’, then the content of his assertion is a
proposition which is the set of all and only the possible worlds in which Mary is
sitting down.  This is a function from all and only the possible worlds in which
Mary is sitting down to the value True.  Possible worlds are possible ways the
world might be -  different combinations of all the actual and possible objects,
with all the actual and possible properties.  A thinking subject will have a whole
range of possible worlds which are compatible with his beliefs.  When he comes
to have a new belief, the content of this belief can be represented by eliminating
possible  worlds  that  are  no  longer  compatible  with  the  belief.  A  belief is
informative if some possibilities are ruled out.
How does a possible worlds notion of content account for a subject coming to 
leam  an  informative  identity?1 3   The  belief that  Hesperus  is  a planet  and  the 
belief that Phosphorus is a planet are true in exactly the same possible worlds and 
so seem to have the same content.  Not only does it seem implausible that such 
beliefs have the same content -  surely a subject could believe one, but disbelieve 
the other -  but when this is combined with the view that coming to have a belief
1 3  Recall Lewis does not attempt to answer this question in ‘Attitudes de dicto and de se’ thinking 
that the problem of indexical beliefs cuts across this.44
consists in ruling worlds out, then it is difficult to see how one can ever come to 
have a belief in the necessary proposition.  ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true in all 
possible worlds, so it is difficult to see how a subject can ever come to believe 
that Hesperus is Phosphorus, as no possible worlds are ruled out.  As the terms 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ refer to the same object in the actual world, and are 
rigid designators, they must refer to the same object in all possible worlds.  So 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true in all possible worlds.  We might represent the 
proposition, or set of possible worlds like this, where j  is the actual world: 
j   k 
j   T  T
Nothing changes when the subject comes to believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
No worlds are ruled out when the subject comes to have this belief.  Thus the 
belief cannot be  informative.  The belief that Hesperus is Phosphorus has the 
same content as the belief that Hesperus is Hesperus -  the content of both is the 
necessary proposition, as both are true in all possible worlds.
Stalnaker argues that in fact the assertions ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus 
is  Phosphorus’  can  have  different  contents  -   where  the  content  is  still  a 
proposition, interpreted as a set of possible worlds.  This is because there is:
...more complexity and  flexibility -  and more context-dependence -  in 
the  relationship  between  sentences  or  sentential  complements  and  the 
propositions they express or denote.  Sentences necessarily equivalent in 
one context may be only contingently equivalent in another. (Stalnaker 
(1987/1999), pi 18)
To take account of this context-dependence, Stalnaker introduces the notion of a 
propositional concept which is a function from possible worlds into propositions 
(e.g. (1978/1999), p81).  As propositions are functions from possible worlds to 
truth-values,  one  can  also  think  of a  propositional  concept  as  being  a  two- 
dimensional function from possible worlds to truth-values, or a two-dimensional 
proposition.  Stalnaker is primarily concerned with the content of assertions and 
the content of belief ascriptions, rather than with the content of a subject’s beliefs 
or thoughts.  However, he also thinks that “[pjropositional concepts can help us 
to understand the relationship between the content of a belief and the way that a 
believer might represent his belief to himself’ ((1987/1999), pi 25)  Stalnaker’s 
suggestion  is  that  when  a  subject  comes  to  believe  (e.g.)  that  Hesperus  is 
Phosphorus, the content of this belief is the diagonal proposition expressed by45
‘Hesperus  is  Phosphorus’  rather  than  the  horizontal  proposition  which  is 
standardly  denoted  by  ‘Hesperus  is  Phosphorus’.  This  is  a  different  set  of 
possible  worlds,  and  so  need  not  be  the  necessary  proposition,  so  it  can  be 
explained how such a belief can be informative.
Consider the subject who does not know whether Hesperus is Phosphorus, and 
later comes to believe this.  Although ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’  refer to the 
same object in all possible worlds, Stalnaker thinks we can imagine a context in 
which what the subject believes is true.  Suppose j  is the actual world, where 
Hesperus is Phosphorus, and k is a world where ({hgy are distinct.  The object in 
the  sky  in  the  evening  is  different  to  the  one  in  the  morning,  although  the 
heavens  resemble  the  actual  world  to  the  untrained  eye  (e.g.  see  Stalnaker 
(1987/1999), pi23).  On a standard possible worlds semantics, when a subject 
believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus he believes the necessary proposition:
j   *
y  T  T
However, if world k is considered as actual, then in this world ‘Hesperus’  and 
‘Phosphorus’ refer to distinct objects.  As they refer to distinct objects, they will 
refer to distinct objects in the counterfactual world j  (J is counterfactual, as k is 
being considered as the actual world).  So in world k, the subject’s belief that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus is false in both j  and k.
j   k
k  F  F
Putting these together we have a propositional concept: 
j   k
j   T  T
k  F  F
The content of the subject’s belief that Hesperus is Phosphorus seems to be the 
diagonal proposition, highlighted in bold above. When he learns that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus he rules out world k,  where  ‘Hesperus’  and  ‘Phosphorus’  refer to 
different objects.
The subject who does not know whether Hesperus is Phosphorus thinks that the 






Both worlds j  and k are compatible with his belief.  When he comes to believe 
that Hesperus is Phosphorus, world k is eliminated. Objects in different worlds 
are used to model the subject’s epistemic possibilities.
Recall  that  the  Fregean  explains  how  the  identity  statement  'Hesperus  is 
Phosphorus’  can be informative by saying that the same object is presented in 
different ways.  Belief content  is  individuated by  mode of presentation  of an 
object,  rather  than  by  the  object  itself.  We  can  understand  how  the  object 
presented  in the  Hesperus and  Phosphorus case  is presented differently to the 
subject, because it is presented in the evening and the morning, and the subject 
may not realize it is the same object.  For Stalnaker, the fact that the subject sees 
Hesperus  in  the  evening  and  Phosphorus  in  the  morning  also  gives  us  two 
different ways in which an object is presented, but these modes of presentation 
are not part of the content of the belief.  Instead, they provide us with a way of 
determining which alternative possible worlds should be taken into account when 
characterizing content.  Because Venus is presented differently in the morning 
and  evening  we  should  consider  possible  worlds where  in  fact there  are  two 
different objects -  one in the morning,  and one in the evening -  and possible 
worlds where there is only one object.  We can then use such possible worlds in 
characterizing a subject’s belief.  For Stalnaker, a belief is not simply about an 
object; it is about whatever plays a certain role in the world.  This role can be 
played by different objects in different possible worlds.
Let us return to the amnesiac Lingens case, where Lingens knows that Lingens is 
the cousin of a spy, but does not know that he himself is the cousin of a spy. In 
‘Indexical Belief (1981) Stalnaker thinks this can be resolved by saying that in 
this case, the proposition believed  is not the standard  ‘horizontal’  proposition, 
but  is  instead  the  ‘diagonal’  proposition.  If the  horizontal  proposition  was 
believed,  then  both  beliefs  expressed  by  ‘I  am  the  cousin  of a  spy’  and  by 
‘Lingens  is  the  cousin  of a  spy’  would  have  the  same  content,  which  seems47
implausible  as  the  subject  can  believe  one  and  not  the  other.  However,  the 
diagonal proposition of each sentence is different.  In this way, Stalnaker treats 
Lingens’s first-personal and non-first-personal beliefs about himself in the same 
way  as he would treat Lingens’s beliefs about  Hesperus and  Phosphorus.  He 
compares his treatment to that of his treatment of Quine’s  (1966)  example of 
Ralph,  who does not realize that the man  in the brown hat is the man on the 
beach:
My account of the Lingens example treats it as a special case of a more 
general problem about de re belief.  The problem is essentially the same, 
according  to  my  explanation,  as  the  old  problem  of Ortcutt,  the  man
whom Ralph knows in two different guises  In both the Lingens and
the  Ortcutt  cases,  the  problem  is  that  two  distinct  individuals  in  the 
possible situations used to characterize a state of mind correspond to the 
same individual in the real world.  In the case of Lingens, the relevant 
real  world  individual  is the  same as the one  with the  state of mind  in 
question,  but this does  not  seem to  make very  much  difference  to  the 
explanation.  (Stalnaker (1981/1999) pi42-3)
As with the Hesperus/Phosphorus case, Stalnaker believes that “to understand the 
content of a person’s belief, ask what the world would be like if the belief were 
correct.” (1981/1999, pl36)  Because the amnesiac is Lingens, when he refers to 
himself using ‘I’, he will rigidly designate Lingens.  Thus in all possible worlds, 
‘I’  and ‘Lingens’  will refer to the same object.  But this is not how the world 
appears to the amnesiac.  Instead, different possible situations seem compatible 
with  his  beliefs.  According  to  him,  there  are  possible  worlds  in  which  an 
amnesiac lost in a library is reading a biography about a person called ‘Lingens’. 
In some of these worlds the amnesiac is the same as the person called ‘Lingens’. 
In  other  worlds,  there  are  two  people,  the  amnesiac  and  the  person  called 
‘Lingens’  who  is read about.  Thus  in  some possible worlds compatible with 
Lingens’s beliefs, there are more objects (i.e. the amnesiac and the person called 
‘Lingens’) than in the actual world -  in the possible worlds used to characterize 
his state of mind there are two distinct individuals which correspond to Lingens 
in  the  actual  world.  Stalnaker  gives  three  possible  situations  ((1981/1999), 
pi 42-3):
z is the actual situation in which Lingens the amnesiac is the subject of 
the biography and is the cousin of a spy
j  is a possible world in which the biography correctly describes ‘Lingens 
2’, and Lingens the amnesiac is not the cousin of a spy48
k is like y, in that the biography says that Lingens 2 is the cousin of a spy, 
except that the biography makes false claims, and Lingens 2’s cousin is 
not a spy.
We are trying to get at the content of Lingens’s belief that Lingens is the cousin 
of a spy, and so are looking at the possibilities as Lingens takes them to be.  If 
we take i as the actual world, ‘Lingens’ refers rigidly to Lingens, and Lingens is 
the cousin of a spy in /, but not in j  or k.  Ify is the actual world, ‘Lingens’ refers 
rigidly to Lingens 2, who is the cousin of a spy in y, but not in i or k.  With k as 
actual ‘Lingens’ also refers rigidly to Lingens 2, who is the cousin of a spy iny, 
but not in i or k.  So we get the prepositional concept:
i  j   *
i  T  F  F
j   F  T  F
k  F  T  F
The content of Lingens’s belief seems to be the diagonal proposition (shown in 
bold).  He is distinguishing between different possibilities, and believes that he is 
either in i ory, but not in k.
Stalnaker does not discuss the content of Lingens’s belief ‘I am the cousin of a 
spy’, and how this would differ from the content of ‘Lingens is the cousin of a 
spy’.  But he does seem to assume in his descriptions of the possibilities which 
seem open to the subject that ‘I’ refers to the amnesiac -  he says (pl41) that in 
his description he assumes that in each situation Lingens does not know who the 
subject of the biography  is, but does know who he is -  that Lingens himself, 
rather than Lingens 2, is the person denoted by ‘I’.  Presumably, in world  ‘I’ 
refers to the amnesiac Lingens who is the cousin of a spy.  Considering world / 
as actual, ‘I’ will refer rigidly to Lingens, but in the counterfactual worlds j  and 
k, the amnesiac Lingens is not a spy.  If worlds j  and k are considered as actual, 
‘I’  also refers to the amnesiac Lingens, rather than to Lingens 2 (‘Lingens’  in 
these  situations  refers  to  Lingens  2).  In  the  counterfactual  situations,  the 
amnesiac Lingens is the cousin of a spy in i,  but not in j  or k.  The proposition 
concept is thus:49
i  J  *
/  T  F  F
j   T  F  F
k  T  F  F
The content of Lingens’s belief expressed by ‘I am the cousin of a spy’  is the 
diagonal  proposition.  The  only  world  in  which  this  is  true  is  /,  where  the 
amnesiac is identical to the subject of the biography.  The other worlds, where 
there  is  an  additional  object,  Lingens  2,  are  ruled  out.  Thus  the  diagonal 
proposition is different in this case from that expressed by 'Lingens is the cousin 
of a spy’.
Stalnaker thinks that he has treated Lingens’s beliefs that Lingens would express 
by ‘1  am the cousin of a spy’  and 'Lingens is the cousin of a spy’  in the same 
way  that  he  would  treat  Lingens’s  beliefs  that  Hesperus  is  a  planet  and 
Phosphorus is a planet.  The beliefs have different content because of identity 
confusion, and this leads to different possible worlds being ruled out.
3.2  A Problem for Stalnaker
Stalnaker later rejects his 'Indexical Belief (1981) solution, saying:
This now seems to me at best misleading, and wrong if it implies that 
there is not a distinctive problem about indexical belief.. .((1999), pi 9)
What does hjl'think is wrong with his original position?  He had hoped to treat
the case of Lingens not knowing ‘I am Lingens’ in the same way that he treats a
subject  not  realizing that  Hesperus  is  Phosphorus.  The  subject  who  does  not
know whether Hesperus is Phosphorus thinks there are worlds where Hesperus is
Phosphorus, and worlds where there are two distinct objects.1 4   When he comes
to  believe that Hesperus  is  Phosphorus  he  rules out possible worlds  in which
there are two entities, rather than one.  What happens in the Lingens case when
the subject is ignorant over whether he is Lingens?  Which worlds are ruled out
when he comes to realize that he  is  Lingens?  Stalnaker has characterized the
possibilities open by saying that in some worlds there is one object, the amnesiac
Lingens  1, who is also being read about.  In other worlds there are two objects,
the amnesiac Lingens 1, and Lingens 2 who is being read about.  So presumably
Stalnaker thinks that when the subject learns what he would express by  ‘I  am
1 4  These possibilities must be understood on the diagonal50
Lingens’ he rules out those worlds where there are two entities -  Lingens 1   and 
Lingens  2  -   and  retains  those  where  there  is  only  one.  But,  given  the 
possibilities characterized above, this does not seem to give the content of the 
belief ‘I am Lingens’.  Instead, it seems to give the content of the belief ‘The 
amnesiac Lingens 1   is Lingens 2 (the person being read about).’  And this is not 
a first-person thought.
The  problem  can  be  brought  out  clearly  by  considering  how  Stalnaker,  in 
‘Indexical  Belief, tries to explain Lewis’s ‘two gods’  scenario (Lewis (1979), 
pi39).  In ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se ’ Lewis describes two gods, one who 
lives on the tallest mountain and throws down manna, and one who lives on the 
coldest  mountain  and  throws  down  thunderbolts.  Each  is  omniscient  with 
respect  to  propositional  knowledge;  according  to  Lewis  each  knows  exactly 
which world he lives  in, and there are no other possible worlds open to him. 
However, neither knows which god he is.  Stalnaker thinks that this is not the 
case.  If we reinterpret along the diagonal, and consider the possibilities as they 
appear to the gods, Stalnaker thinks that there is not just one possibility, but two 
possible worlds between which the gods are indifferent.  When one of the gods 
wonders whether he is on the tallest mountain, he is wondering which of two 
possible worlds is actual; the actual world (W), or one exactly the same except 
where the gods have swapped places (V).  Stalnaker thinks when a god learns 
which god he is, then he rules out world V.
Lewis has already anticipated this solution, and rejects it outright in his original 
(1979) article, saying that each god does know exactly which world he was in.
Let’s  grant,  briefly,  that  the  world  W  of the  gods  has  its  qualitative 
duplicate  V  in which the  gods  have  traded places.  Let the  god on the 
tallest mountain know that his world is W, not V.  Let him be omniscient 
about all propositions, not only qualitative ones.  How does this help? 
Never mind  V,  where  he  knows  he  doesn’t  live.  There are  still  two 
different mountains in  W where he might,  for all he knows, be  living. 
(Lewis (1979) pl41)
In  ‘Indexical  Belief,  Stalnaker  thinks  Lewis’s  position  gets  its  plausibility
because he compares location in logical space to location in actual space,  and
says that location in logical space (in a particular possible world) will not tell us
where  in that possible world we are located.  But as  Stalnaker is not a realist51
about possible worlds he does not think it is so obvious that not knowing where 
you are in the world is no^cnowing which world is the actual world.  But this is 
not the root of the problem.
Let us call one god ‘X’, and the other god ‘Y\  X does not know which mountain 
he is on, or that he is god X.  But he does know that god X is either on the tallest 
or coldest mountain.  His belief state can be characterized as leaving open the 
two possibilities W and V.  In world W, X is on the tallest mountain and Y is on 
the coldest mountain.  In world V, the gods have swapped places:  Y is on the 
tallest mountain and X is on the coldest.  Suppose god X comes to eliminate the 
second possible world V, and so now knows that god X is on the tallest mountain 
and  god  Y  is on the coldest mountain.  But he still does not know where he 
himself is, as he will only know this if he knows that he himself is god X -  if he 
can think ‘I am god X’.
Stalnaker" s way of accounting for the first-personal thought of Lingens and of 
Lewis’s  two  gods certainly seems to be  incorrect.  But is this because  it  is  a 
mistake  to  treat  a  subject  who  does  not  know  ‘I  am  X’  as  not  knowing  an 
informative identity statement?  This is the conclusion that Stalnaker draws.  But 
I do not think that this is the problem.  I think instead it is that Stalnaker has 
characterized the possibilities which are open incorrectly.
Let us return to the case of the amnesiac Lingens, reading a biography of himself 
in the library.  The possibilities which Stalnaker described as being open to the 
subject involved  some worlds where the amnesiac Lingens and Lingens being 
read  about  were  one  and  the  same,  and  other  worlds  where  there  were  two 
objects,  Lingens the  amnesiac,  and  Lingens 2  who was being read  about.  In 
these worlds both Lingens the amnesiac and Lingens 2 are counterparts of the 
actual Lingens. If the worlds where there were two counterparts of Lingens were 
ruled  out,  the  subject’s  belief seems  only  to  be  the  identity  belief that  ‘The 
amnesiac  Lingens  is  the  subject  of the  biography  Lingens  2’,  rather than  the 
realization that he would express by  ‘I am Lingens’.  This obviously does not 
capture the first-personal content of his belief.  But consider again a Fregean way 
of looking at this example.  The presumption made in Section 2 of this chapter 
was that we could explain why the content of the subject’s belief that ‘I am the52
cousin of a spy’ differed from that of ‘Lingens is the cousin of a spy’ because in 
the first case the object is presented to the subject in a special first-personal way, 
while in the second case the object is presented through testimony.  Modes of 
presentation were used to individuate content.  Can we now use these modes of 
presentation to characterize the possible worlds open to Lingens the subject?
Consider the following:
World 1: ‘I’ and ‘Lingens’ both refer to one and the same object, which is 
the cousin of a spy
World 2:  ‘I’ and ‘Lingens’ both refer to one and the same object which is 
not the cousin of a spy
World 3:  ‘I’  and  ‘Lingens’  refer to two distinct objects.  The object  ‘I’ 
refers to is not the cousin of a spy.  The object ‘Lingens’ refers to is the 
cousin of a spy.
World 4:  ‘I’  and  ‘Lingens’  refer to two distinct objects.  The object  ‘I’ 
refers to is the cousin of a spy.  The object ‘Lingens’ refers to is not the 
cousin of a spy.
World 5:  ‘I’ and ‘Lingens’  refer to distinct objects, neither of which is 
the cousin of a spy
World 6: ‘I’ and ‘Lingens’ refer to distinct objects, both of which are the 
cousin of a spy.
If the subject does not know that he is Lingens, then the content of his belief that 
Lingens is the cousin of a spy will be worlds 1, 3 and 6.  Worlds 2, 4 and 5 will 
be ruled out.  If his belief is ‘I am the cousin of a spy’ his belief has the content 
represented by worlds  1, 4 and 6.  Worlds 2, 3 and 5 are ruled out.  When he 
comes to believe what he would express by saying  ‘I am  Lingens and am the 
cousin of a spy’ he eliminates all worlds except world 1.
There seems nothing wrong in principle with characterizing the possibilities open 
in this way -  in terms of the referents of ‘I’  and  ‘Lingens’.  But once this has 
been done  explicitly,  it can be  seen why  Stalnaker has a problem with  it.  A 
crucial  notion  for  Stalnaker  is  that  of shared  informational  content -   what  is 
communicated  between  a  speaker  and  his  audience.  A  belief or  assertion  is 
informative  if  some  possibilities  are  ruled  out.  As  Stalnaker  writes  in  his 
Introduction to Context and Content (1999):
The  reason  I  thought,  and  continue  to  think,  that  it  is  important  to 
represent the contents of indexical beliefs as impersonal propositions is 
that we want our notion of content to help explain persistence and change 
of belief,  agreement and  disagreement between different believers,  and53
the communication of beliefs.  When,  for example,  I  tell the amnesiac 
who he is, he learns something that I already knew, so there had better be 
a proposition that represents what I knew and he leamed.(p20)
The worlds 1  to 6 described above do not seem to fulfil this role.  When Lingens 
comes to believe ‘I am Lingens"  he locates himself in world  1   or 2, ruling out 
those worlds where ‘I’  and ‘Lingens’  refer to distinct objects.  But can this be 
what Lingens himself leams, or must this be private to Lingens?  It has echoes of 
Frege’s comment about the sense of‘I’:
Now everyone is presented to himself in a special and primitive way, in 
which he is presented to no one else... And only Dr Lauben himself can 
grasp thoughts specified in this way. (Frege (1918/1997), p333)
There is another problem for Stalnaker.  He wants to limit the possible worlds 
which  represent  the  content  of an  assertion  (or  other  states  with  content)  to 
metaphysically possible worlds.  In the Hesperus/Phosphorus identity confusion 
case  he  thinks  it  is  possible  to  do  this.  In  some  worlds  characterizing  the 
subject’s belief state there are two entities, both counterparts of Venus.  But these 
are objects in the possible worlds which play the two different roles that Venus 
plays in the actual world (as Hesperus and as Phosphorus).  In the Lingens case, 
as Stalnaker says:
... Lingens’s belief is not simply about Lingens; it is about whoever plays 
a certain role in the world, and that role is played by different people in 
different alternative possible situations.  (Stalnaker (1981/1999), p 140)
Stalnaker is quite happy that two different objects can play the role of Lingens
(being read about) and Lingens the amnesiac.  But he does not want to objectify
the referent of ‘I’ in the way that would need to be done (as in Worlds 1-6 above)
to capture the first-personal nature of the belief.  What would it be for there to be
a separate I in the world?  He thinks this is objectifying the self, which he does
not want to do.
Stalnaker limits epistemic possibility to metaphysical possibility.  For Stalnaker, 
if the  referent of ‘1’  and the  referent of ‘Lingens’  are distinct  in  some of the 
possible worlds which make up the diagonal proposition used to characterize the 
subject’s state of mind, this means that such possibilities must be metaphysically 
possible.  This is a problem for him, as he thinks that if there are worlds where54
the referent of ‘I’ and the referent of ‘Lingens’  are distinct, then he thinks this 
must involve objectifying the self, which he thinks is a mistake:
....I am not sure that the metaphysics can be so easily avoided.  If the 
thought  ‘I  am  TN’  (thought  by  TN)  is  conceivably  false  (if even  a 
logically omniscient TN might grasp the thought without knowing that it 
is true), then why is its falsity not a metaphysical possibility? (Stalnaker 
(2003a), p261 nlO)
This is not a problem for the Fregean.  The Fregean does not have to accept that 
it is metaphysically possible that the referent of T  and the referent of ‘Lingens’ 
are distinct.  Instead -  one object, Lingens -  is presented in two different ways. It 
is presented in a special first-personal way, and through reading about himself. 
Stalnaker’s limitation of epistemic possibility to metaphysical possibility, and his 
austere notion of content in terms of possible worlds, means that he cannot treat a 
subject Lingens’s failure to know ‘I am Lingens’ as merely the result of identity 
confusion.  But  there  is  no  reason  why  the  Fregean,  making  different 
assumptions about content, cannot continue to do so.
4  Anticipation
The Fregean can explain how Lingens’s thought ‘I am the cousin of a spy’ can be 
different in content to his thought ‘Lingens is the cousin of a spy’.  The sense of 
‘I’, said by Lingens, and the sense of ‘Lingens’ are different in each case.  The 
statement ‘I  am Lingens’  is an  informative  identity  statement because  of this. 
But the problem comes when senses are understood as modes of presentation. 
Anscombe thinks that a subject can still think first-personally even when there is 
no  possibility  he  could  be  present  to  himself.  Thinking  first-personally  -  
thinking thoughts expressed by ‘I’ -  cannot, she thinks, involve a subject being 
presented to himself.  And so she thinks ‘I’ cannot refer, and ‘I am Lingens’ said 
by Lingens cannot be an identity statement.
It is time to explore what it is for a subject to have a singular thought about an 
object; what it is for him to refer to an object.  I will argue that an object being 
present to the subject is indeed necessary for reference to independent objects; 
the  subject  must  be  acquainted  with  the  object,  where  acquaintance  between 
subject and object is the converse of presentation of object to subject.  This is 
what puts the subject in a position to think about a particular object; it enables55
him  to  think  about  one  object  rather  than  another.  But  acquaintance  is  not 
required  in first-personal thought; the subject is already  in a position to think 
about  himself.  A  statement  such  as  ‘I  am  Lingens’,  said  by  Lingens,  is  an 
identity statement.  Both sides of it involve the subject thinking about himself in 
different ways.  But this is not because he is present to himself in two different 
ways.  When  he thinks  first-personally  he  is  not  present to  himself in  a way 
which grounds reference.Part II 
Acquaintance57
Chapter 3 
The Role of Acquaintance: Explaining Thought?
A subject often has thoughts about particular objects in the world. I may think 
about this particular cup next to me, or this particular keyboard I am typing on.  I 
may think of Bertrand Russell, and his views on acquaintance.  I may think of 
my mother, remembering her.  It is an assumption made throughout this thesis 
that a subject's thoughts about particular objects are fundamentally different to 
his general or descriptive thoughts. A subject may be thinking about a particular 
object even if he is totally mistaken about its properties -  he is thinking about 
that particular object, rather than about something having certain properties.  To 
have a general or descriptive thought, the subject thinks of whatever it is that 
satisfies the description.  Even  if there  is only  one object which  satisfies the 
description, having such a general thought is not the same as having a singular 
thought about a particular object.
What  is  it  for a  subject  to  have  a  thought  about  a  particular  object?  Some 
philosophers  take  as  their  starting  point  the  view  that  thought  involves 
representations.  For a thought to be about a particular object it must contain a 
representation  of that  object.  Thus  we  find  Crimmins  (1992)  saying  that  a 
subject's thought is about an object if it contains a notion of an object, where a 
notion of an object is a representation of an object:
My  belief  that  Ockham  was  a  metaphysician  is  a  belief  about  an 
individual  and,  in  a sense, about a property....The belief involves two 
representations: my representation of Ockham, and my representation of 
the  property  of  being  a  metaphysician.  Beliefs  that  involve 
representations  of  things,  properties  and  relations  -   beliefs  that  are 
“conceptually  articulated”  -   I  call  ideational  beliefs.  Among  the 
representations  that  figure  in  ideational  beliefs,  I  will  call  the 
representations of things notions.... (Crimmins (1992), p75)
Millikan  (1997)  also  takes  it  for  granted  that  to  think  about  an  object  the
subject’s mind has a representation of the object, and she goes on to investigate
the way that the  subject’s mind  might be  able to represent “...that two of its
representations were of the same object ...” (Millikan (1997), p500). Sainsbury
(2007) follows, terming the representations of objects individual concepts:
I  shall suggest that mental  reference  is structurally  similar to  linguistic 
reference.  Corresponding  to  referring  expressions  are  what  I  call58
individual  concepts.  These  are  not  Fregean  senses  or  functions  from 
possible  worlds  to  entities,  but  elements  of  individual  psychology. 
(Sainsbury (2007), p216)
The view that thought involves representations is not uncontroversial.  But even 
if one  accepts  this  premise,  saying  that  a  thought  contains  a  notion  or  an 
individual concept is not yet to say what is involved in a subject’s thinking of an 
object.  We still need to know what it is  for a subject’s thought to contain  a 
notion or an individual concept of an object.  And so we return to the question: 
what is it for a subject to have a thought about a particular object?  I will argue 
that to think about a particular object which is independent of him, the subject 
must be acquainted with the object.
I want to make it clear from the outset that I am not making huge claims here.  I 
am not claiming that a subject’s acquaintance with an object fully explains how 
he  is able to think about an object.  Rather,  I am claiming that without being 
acquainted with an object, the subject is not in a position to think about it in the 
first place.  Thus my claims are not as strong as Russell’s, the person with whom 
the principle of acquaintance is most associated.  At one point Russell gives the 
notion  of acquaintance  an  explanatory  role,  and  thinks  that  it  is  a  subject’s 
acquaintance with the constituents of a proposition which enables a subject to 
think  about things  in  the  world.1   Campbell,  in  Reference  and Consciousness 
(2002), takes a similar line, when he tries to explain how a subject is able to have 
demonstrative thoughts.  Campbell thinks that conscious attention to an object is 
necessary for a subject to think about an object, and thinks that Russell’s notion 
of acquaintance is a model for conscious attention.  Campbell says:
Russell thought of acquaintance  as  a cognitive  relation  more primitive 
than thought about an object, which nonetheless, by reaching all the way 
to the object, made thought about the object possible.  I will argue that 
this  provides  a  model  for  the  way  in  which  we  think  of conscious 
attention to an object.  It is a state more primitive than thought about the 
object,  which,  nonetheless,  by  bringing  the  object  itself  into  the 
subjective life of the thinker, makes it possible to think about that object. 
(Campbell (2002), p6)
But  Campbell  goes  further than  this,  not only  saying that conscious  attention
makes thought about an object possible, but also that it explains it:
1  Russell's notion of acquaintance is not limited to a subject's acquaintance with particulars.  This 
will be discussed below.59
...conscious attention to an object must be thought of as more primitive 
than thought about the object.  It is a state more primitive than thought 
about an object, to which we can appeal in explaining how it is that we 
can think about the thing. ((2002), p45 my emphasis)
I think that it is because Russell came to think that acquaintance could not be 
playing  this  explanatory  role  that  he  eventually  rejects  the  notion  in  (1919). 
Unlike Russell and Campbell I will not attempt to explain exactly how it is that a 
subject has a singular thought about an object.  Instead, my claim is a much more 
modest  one.  1   argue only  that a  subject’s  acquaintance  with  an  independent 
object  is  a  necessary  condition  for  his  being  able  to  think  about  the  object. 
Without being acquainted with the object, the subject would not be in a position 
to  think  about the  object  in the  first place.  Whilst  I  shall  not  argue  against 
Campbell (2002) here, someone accepting my position need not be committed to 
his.
Nevertheless, despite his own rejection of it, I think Russell was basically right 
about  the  acquaintance  relation.  Although  he  is  notorious  for  later  severely 
limiting what a subject can be acquainted with, I do not think that this is essential 
to the notion.  Instead I think Russell gets it right when he says:
I think that the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is 
simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes 
presentation (Russell (1911), p200-01)
I do not want to claim much more for the relation than this.  This means that I
reject interpretations of Russell which require that a subject has discriminating
knowledge of an object in order to be able to think of it; that he know which
object it is.2  I do not think this is necessary for a subject to have a thought about
an object.  I also think there are cases where a subject may have discriminating
knowledge of an object, but not be able to have a singular thought about it.  The
other thing which I think Russell’s understanding of acquaintance brings out is
that the object with which the subject is acquainted with -  the object present to
the subject -  is essential to the thought.  If the subject were acquainted with a
different  object,  a  different  object  would  be  present  and  he  would  have  a
different thought.  Thus I disagree with those such as Burge (1977), Blackburn
(1984)  and  Bach (1987),  who  think  that  a  single  mode  of presentation  of an
2 Evans calls the principle that to think about an object the subject must know which object he is 
thinking about ‘Russell’s Principle’, which I think is a misnomer.60
object can present a different object depending on the  context.  Instead,  with 
Evans (1982),  I  think the object  is essential  to the mode of presentation.  So 
suppose a subject looks at a red apple, and thinks the thought he would express 
by ‘This apple is red.’  Suppose also that at some point the apple is replaced with 
an identical-looking apple without the subject realizing this.  The subject looks 
and again thinks ‘This apple is red’.  It is a consequence of my understanding of 
the notion of acquaintance that as a different object is presented in each case, the 
subject has two different thoughts.  And the fact that the subject does not have 
discriminating knowledge of either apple  does  not  stop him  being  acquainted 
with each of them -  each is present to him -  and so he can think about each 
apple.
This chapter focuses primarily on the work of Russell.  Russell’s position from 
1903 until 1919 is that a subject’s acquaintance with the world is what makes his 
judgements and thoughts about the world.  A subject’s acquaintance with objects 
and relations puts him in a position to think of them, and it is these very things 
which  are  combined  in  thought.  This  explanatory  role  of  acquaintance  is 
explored, including the more modem variant of Campbell (2002).  I do not want 
to claim as much  for acquaintance as  Russell  did;  I am  not trying to  explain 
exactly  how  thought  and  knowledge  is  possible.  But  I  do  want  to  develop 
Russell’s  basic  notion  of acquaintance  -   that  a  subject’s  acquaintance  with 
objects puts him in a position to think about them -  even if I do not accept his 
reasons  for  this.  Russell’s  understanding  of acquaintance  as  explaining  and 
grounding thought is explored in this chapter, and then a less ambitious role for it 
as restricting singular thought is developed in Chapter 4.
1  Russell’s Early Work: Propositions
1.1  Principles of Mathematics (1903)
In Principles of Mathematics (1903) neither a subject’s thought about the world 
nor acquaintance are major issues for Russell.  Instead, one of Russell’s primary 
concerns is propositions.  Russell’s aim in this book is to discuss logic and the 
theory of classes, and to argue for logicism -  that pure mathematics and logic are 
identical.3  The  reason that propositions  are  so  important  is  that Russell  sees
3 E.g. see the ‘Introduction to the Second Edition’, and the ‘Preface’ for a declaration of the 
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logic  as  concerned  with  propositions  and  not  with  sentences.4  Russell 
acknowledges  Moore’s  influence  on  his  notion  of a  proposition  (e.g.  (1903), 
p.xviii). In ‘The Nature of Judgment’ (1899) Moore argues that:
A  proposition  is  composed  not  of words,  nor  yet  of thoughts,  but  of 
concepts.  Concepts  are  possible  objects  of  thought;  but  that  is  no 
definition of them.  It merely states that they may come into relation with 
a thinker; and in order that they may do anything, they must already be 
something.  It is indifferent to their nature whether anybody thinks them 
or not.  (Moore (1899), pi 79)
Russell agrees that propositions are not composed of words, saying:
...a proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, does not itself contain 
words:  it contains the entities indicated by words. (Russell (1903), p47)
In (1903), Russell calls the constituents of propositions ‘terms’, and a term may
be a particular, a class, a relation, even a non-existent object:
Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false 
proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term....A man, a moment, a 
number,  a  class,  a  relation,  a  chimaera,  or  anything  else  that  can  be 
mentioned, is sure to be a term (Russell (1903), p43)
It seems that Russell thinks of the constituents of propositions as things in the
world.5  This is made clearer in a letter from Russell to Frege in 1904, where he
says:
I  believe  that  in  spite  of  all  its  snowfields  Mont  Blanc  is  itself  a 
component part of what is actually asserted in the sentence ‘Mont Blanc 
is more than 4,000 metres high’.  We do not assert the thought, for this is 
a private psychological matter: we assert the object of the thought, and 
this is, to my mind, a certain complex  [a proposition]...in which Mont 
Blanc is itself a component part.6
Propositions themselves are true  or false.  It  is not a sentence,  or a subject’s
thought,  that  is  true  or  false.  And  propositions  do  not  correspond  to  some
underlying reality -  they are the reality.  There is no separate layer of ‘facts’ to
which true propositions must correspond; a fact, if there is such a thing, is simply
4 Although at this stage Russell does think that sentences and the words that make them up 
approximately reflect propositions and their constituents, e.g. see p41 (1903)
5 Moore says:
It seems necessary, then, to regard the world as formed of concepts.  These are the only 
objects of knowledge.  They cannot be regarded fundamentally as abstractions either 
from things or from ideas; since both alike can, if anything is to be true of them, be 
composed of nothing but concepts. (Moore (1899, pi 82))
This may seem different from the view I have attributed to Russell that terms are things in the 
world, but really there is little difference as there is no distinction between ideas and things in the 
world -  the subject’s thought goes directly to the terms in the world.  See below for discussion.
6 From Nachgelassene Schriften und wissenschaftliche Briejwechsel, vol 2, p250-l, translated in 
Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, pi69, quoted in Hylton (2003), p21062
a true proposition.  The constituents of a proposition do not represent what the 
proposition is about -  they are what the proposition is about.
Russell's  underlying  theory  of  knowledge  at  this  stage  is  that  in  judging 
something to be true, a subject apprehends a true proposition, while in judging 
something to be false he apprehends a false proposition. So, for example, for a 
subject to think that Mary is sitting down he apprehends the proposition with the 
constituents of the particular Mary,  and  the  property  of sitting down.7  If this 
proposition is true then the subject has a true belief; if it is false, he has a false 
belief.  As the constituents of the proposition are terms -  i.e. objects and relations 
in  the  world  -   by  apprehending  a  proposition  the  subject  comes  into  direct 
contact with things in the world.  This is supposed to explain how a subject can 
know things and can think about the world. As Russell continues in his letter to 
Frege, the first part of which is quoted above:
If we do  not  admit  [that  Mont  Blanc  is  a component  part  of what  is 
asserted  in  the  sentence],  then  we  get  the  conclusion  that  we  know 
nothing at all about Mont Blanc.
As Mont Blanc itself is a constituent of the proposition, the subject can know
about  and  think  about  Mont  Blanc.  There  is  thus  no  problem  with  how  a
subject’s representations of particulars and universals -  his notions and ideas to
use Crimmins’s terminology -  can be about particulars and universals.  There are
no representations;  the  subject apprehends  a proposition which  contains these
particulars and universals.  Knowledge  and judgement  is unproblematic -  the
subject’s apprehension of the proposition is all that is needed to explain it.
A subject’s apprehension of a proposition may be thought of as his acquaintance 
with  a  proposition.  So  at  this  stage,  acquaintance  is  doing  some  work  in 
Russell’s theory, explaining how a subject can think things.  But at this point, a 
subject’s acquaintance with the constituents of a proposition is not doing much 
work  for  Russell.  However,  he  does  seem  to  assume  that  to  apprehend  a 
proposition  the  subject  must  be  acquainted  with  each  of  its  constituents: 
particulars  (existent  or otherwise),  relations,  or classes.  This  can  be  seen  by 
Russell’s discussion of Cantor’s theory of the infinite.  Once he accepts Cantor’s
7 Much of Russell’s discussion over this period concerns the unity of  the proposition.  What is it 
that combines the particulars and relations?  I do not discuss such issues much here; Russell’s 
views on this change throughout the period which I am discussing.63
theory Russell holds that there are some infinite classes about which a subject 
can  apprehend  propositions,  and  yet  Russell  thinks that the  subject cannot be 
acquainted with the classes themselves, because they are infinite.  For example, a 
subject  can  understand  the  proposition  expressed  by  ‘Any  number  has  a 
successor'  which  is  about  an  infinite  class.  But  Russell  does  not  allow  the 
infinite class to be a constituent of the proposition, and this seems to be because 
the subject cannot be acquainted with it.  Hence Russell's underlying position 
seems to be that in order to be a constituent of a proposition apprehended by a 
subject, the subject must be acquainted with that constituent, as well as with the 
proposition as a whole.
Because Russell thinks that we cannot be acquainted with infinite classes he feels 
that  he  needs to  introduce denoting concepts  which  enable  a  subject to  think 
about an object with which he cannot be acquainted.  In the above example the 
denoting concept is any number and this denotes an infinite class which is not a 
constituent  of the  proposition.  The  denoting  concept  is  a  constituent  of the 
proposition  instead  of the  infinite  class,  and  it  is  important  to  note  that  this 
denoting concept is, like other constituents, non-linguistic.8  It is an entity which 
somehow denotes another object, and enables the subject to think about this other 
object without being acquainted with it.9  Russell’s view at this point seems to be 
that  a  subject  can  be  acquainted  with  most  objects,  and  can  therefore  think 
directly  about  those  objects  (such  objects  are  constituents  of the  proposition 
apprehended).  But  in  order to  think  about  those  few  objects  with  which  he 
cannot  be  acquainted,  the  subject  must  think  of them  via  denoting  concepts. 
There  is  disagreement  over  whether  Russell’s  discussion  of  infinity  is  an
exception  to  his  early  view that  one  can  be  acquainted  with all  objects,  or
whether it marks a change from his early view.  Hylton takes the former view, 
arguing:
Russell does not state the principle of acquaintance in Principles, but it is, 
I think, implicit in that work.  It receives no formulation because Russell 
simply has no interest in issues of this sort.  Nor is there any reason  for
him  to  formulate  it, since  at  this  stage  in  his  work  it  imposes  no
8 In later work, such as (1905) Russell uses the term ‘denoting phrase’ which is linguistic.  In 
Principles the constituent in the proposition corresponding to a denoting phrase would be a 
denoting concept.  Russell rejects this view in (1905) -  see later discussion in this chapter.
9 For an interesting discussion of whether a subject is acquainted with a denoting concept see 
Levine (1998)64
constraints and is thus quite trivial.  The one exception to this is the case 
of  propositions  about  the  infinite,  for  Russell  denies  that  we  are 
acquainted with any such propositions. (Hylton (1990), p246)
Levine (1998), in ‘Acquaintance, Denoting Concepts, and Sense’ takes the latter
view, seeing Principles as the point when acquaintance is no longer unrestricted
-   there  are  some  objects  in  the  world  with  which  the  subject  cannot  be
acquainted.  This dispute does not matter much here, as the main point to get
across is that in his early work acquaintance with the constituents of propositions
does not do much work for Russell.  The important thing for Russell is that to
think about something the subject apprehends a proposition.  For the few cases
where  the  subject  cannot  be  acquainted  with  an  object  -   examples  include
propositions containing a man,  any man,  some  man etc.  -  Russell  thinks that
non-linguistic denoting concepts are part of the proposition.
Denoting  concepts  are  problematic  for  Russell,  however.  His  notion  of  a 
subject’s apprehending a proposition no longer seems to explain how it is that he 
can think about the world.  By apprehending a proposition a subject is supposed 
to be in direct contact with its constituents, and hence can think about them.  But 
denoting concepts are representational -  the object thought about is represented, 
but is not itself part of the proposition.  Russell at no point seems to give any 
explanation of how such denoting concepts denote what they do, and so how a 
subject can come to think about what the concept denotes.  In the example given 
above, there is no clear explanation of how a subject can think about an infinite 
class -  his thought only seems to be about the denoting concept which denotes 
the class.  As Hylton (2003) puts it:
.. .only if the object we are talking about.. .is actually a component part of 
the proposition which we grasp can our thought actually get through to 
that  object;  only  so  can  we  have  knowledge  which  is  really  about  it. 
(Hylton (2003), p219)
A subject’s apprehension of a proposition no longer seems to explain how he can
think about things.
1.2  The Theory of Descriptions
‘On Denoting’ (1905) marks a key change in Russell’s thought.  Because of his 
Theory of Descriptions, introduced in this article, Russell thinks he can get rid of65
the problematic denoting concepts.  In this article Russell also acknowledges his 
interest in the theory of knowledge, saying that:
The subject of denoting is of very great importance, not only in logic and
mathematics, but also in the theory of knowledge (Russell (1905), p479)
Russell  also  introduces  a  distinction  between  things  with  which  we  have 
immediate acquaintance, and things that we can only know by description.  As 
far as  I am aware, this  is where he  first  gives an  indication of what he takes 
acquaintance to be:
The  distinction  between  acquaintance  and  knowledge  about  is  the
distinction between the things we have presentations of, and the things
we only reach by means of denoting phrases. (Russell (1905), p479)
Acquaintance is a relation between subject and thing where the thing is presented 
to the subject.1 0
As a result of his Theory of Descriptions, introduced in (1905), Russell now feels 
that he can explain how a subject can have knowledge of objects or classes with 
which  he  is  not  acquainted  without  having  to  postulate  denoting  concepts. 
Russell now argues that a subject can have knowledge by description, where his 
knowledge concerns an object denoted by a denoting phrase -  such as ‘a man’, 
‘any man’, ‘the man’, ‘some man’, ‘every man’, ‘no man’ etc.  The subject is not 
acquainted with the object, but instead is acquainted with the meanings of the 
words in the denoting phrase when it is reinterpreted.  For example, if a subject 
knows that everything is blue, then what he knows is ‘x is blue' is always true.  If 
he knows that all men have bones then he knows that ‘if  x is human then x has 
bones ’ is always true.  Most famously, in the case of definite descriptions, if he 
knows that the  King of France is bald then what he knows is that It is not always 
false of  x that x is the King of France and that x is bald and that  ‘if  y is the King 
of France, y is identical with x ’ is always true of  y. (e.g. (1905), p482)  Or, put 
more simply, perhaps, what the subject knows is: at least one thing is the King of 
France, at most one thing is the King of France, and whatever is the  King of 
France is bald.  Schematically, if he knows that the F is G, then what he knows is 
that at least one thing is F, at most one thing is F, and whatever is F is G.  He 
does not need to be acquainted with the object that is the F (although he does 
need to be acquainted the universals F and G).  Russell no longer has to postulate
10 Here, ‘thing’ does not mean particular, but anything that can be a constituent of a proposition.66
denoting  concepts,  because  he  now thinks that the  subject  is acquainted  with 
each element of the proposition as reinterpreted.
Thus it seems that Russell hopes to restore the explanatory role of acquaintance. 
The  explanation  is  again  that  a  subject  can  think  about  things  in  the  world 
because  he  apprehends  a  proposition,  and  he  is  acquainted  with  all  the 
constituents of the proposition.  This means that his thought is unproblematically 
about objects and relations in the world, as he is acquainted with the constituents 
of  the  proposition,  which  are  objects  and  relations,  not  representations  of 
anything.  The  subject  can  also  think  about  things  with  which  he  is  not 
acquainted -  but his thought does not go directly to these things.  Instead, he 
thinks about them by description, which is a different kind of thought from one 
where a particular is part of the proposition.  As Russell says:
All thinking has to start from acquaintance;  but it succeeds in thinking 
about many things with which we have no acquaintance. (Russell (1905), 
p480)
But  it  is  not  clear that the Theory  of Descriptions really achieves  all  Russell 
hopes for it.  Firstly, it does not solve the problem which denoting concepts were 
supposed to solve.  Denoting concepts were a problem for Russell, as he could 
give no account of how a subject’s thought could concern the object denoted, 
rather than the concept itself, but they were introduced for a reason.  This reason 
was to try to explain generality, such as in the statement ‘Every number has a 
successor’.  The  denoting  concept  every  number  was  supposed  somehow  to 
denote an infinite class, with which the subject could not be acquainted.  So one 
might think that in (1905) Russell hopes to eliminate the problematic denoting 
concepts, and also to explain generality, as the latter task was so essential to him 
in (1903).  But in (1905) Russell does not explain generality at all.  He says:
I take the notion of the variable as fundamental; I use ‘C(x)’ to mean a 
proposition [footnote: More exactly, a propositional function.] in which x 
is  a  constituent,  where  x,  the  variable,  is  essentially  and  wholly 
undetermined.  Then  we can consider the two  notions  ‘C(x)  is  always 
true’ and ‘C(x) is sometimes true’, [footnote: The second of these can be 
defined by means of the first, if we take it to mean,  ‘It is not true that 
“C(x) is false” is always true.’] ((1905), p480)67
As Russell comments in  ‘On Fundamentals'  (June  1905, unpublished) he now 
takes the variable to be fundamental and unexplained.11   He also helps himself to 
the notion of a propositional function (C(x)) and the notion of a propositional 
function being always true (‘C(x)  is always true’  can also be written  Vx Cx). 
But by taking such things as fundamental it seems that Russell has given up any 
attempt to explain generality.
More  importantly  for  the  purposes  of  this  chapter,  as  far  as  a  theory  of 
knowledge is concerned, Russell’s Theory of Descriptions does not really restore 
Russell’s  simple  view  of  knowledge  as  a  relation  between  subject  and 
proposition, where the subject is acquainted with each element in the proposition. 
Recall that the subject is supposed to be able to think that Mary is sitting down, 
for  example,  by  apprehending  the  proposition  with  the  constituents  of  the 
particular Mary, and the property of sitting down.  In (1905), for the first time, 
Russell states his Principle of Acquaintance:
Thus is every proposition that we can apprehend (i.e.  not only in those 
whose truth or falsehood we can judge of, but in all that we can think 
about),  all  the  constituents  are  really  entities  with  which  we  have 
immediate acquaintance. (Russell (1905), p492)
When the subject apprehends the proposition that Mary is  sitting down, he  is
acquainted with Mary and with the property of sitting down.  What about when a
subject apprehends a proposition expressed by a sentence containing a denoting
phrase?  In this case, Russell still holds that the subject must be acquainted with
all constituents of the proposition.  But these constituents are not what is denoted
(which the subject may not be acquainted with) but are instead the “constituents
expressed by the several words of the  denoting phrase” ((1905),  p492).  This
means, for example, that a subject who thinks that everything is blue, apprehends
the proposition expressed by ‘x is blue ’ is always true, or Vx x is blue.  But what
does it mean to be acquainted with each element in this proposition?  It would
seem  that  the  subject  must  be  acquainted  with  the  variable  x,  with  the
propositional function x is blue, and with is always true (Vx). This is just what
Moore questions in a letter to Russell in 1905:
What I should chiefly like explained is this.  You say ‘a//  the constituents 
of propositions we apprehend are entities with which we have immediate
1 1  e.g.see p256, Hylton (1990)68
acquaintance.'  Have we, then, immediate acquaintance with the variable? 
And what sort of entity is it? (quoted in Hylton (1990), p256)
But Russell is not sure whether or not we are acquainted with the variable.  As he
responds to Moore:
The view I usually incline to is that we have immediate acquaintance with 
the variable, but it is not an entity.  Then at other times I think it is an 
entity,  but  an  indeterminate  one.  In  the  former  view  there  is  still  a 
problem of meaning and denotation as regards the variable itself.  I only 
profess to reduce the problem of denoting to the problem of the variable. 
This latter is horribly difficult, and there seem equally strong objections 
to all the views I have been able to think of. (quoted in Hylton (1990) 
p256)
As Russell comments, if a subject is acquainted with the variable, and yet his 
thought  is (indirectly)  about  whatever the  variable  denotes,  then  we  have  the 
same problems we had before with denoting concepts.  Although the subject is 
acquainted with the variable, his thought is about whatever the variable denotes. 
And there is no explanation of how the variable denotes.  Alternatively, if it is an 
entity, what kind of entity is it?
Russell seems to hope that he will find a solution to the problem of the variable, 
because at this stage he shows no signs of giving up his theory of acquaintance. 
Russell  still  thinks  that  all  thinking  starts  from  acquaintance  -   and  that 
acquaintance has an explanatory role.  Indeed, rather than giving up on the notion 
of acquaintance, it becomes even more important to Russell.  After 1905 Russell 
begins  to  focus  on  how  a  subject  can judge  and  think  things.  He  thinks  a 
subject's  acquaintance  with  things  and  relations  is  crucial  to  explain  this, 
particularly  when  he  gives  up  his  original  theory  of knowledge,  and  rejects 
propositions.
2  Russell's Rejection of Propositions
Recall  that  around  1905  Russell  thinks  that  thought  or judgement  is  a  dual 
relation between a subject and proposition.  If a subject has a true thought he is 
acquainted with a true proposition; if he has a false thought he is acquainted with 
a false proposition.  There is no separate layer of facts to which true propositions 
correspond; propositions themselves are true or false.  In Problems of Philosophy 
(1912), Russell rejects this, writing:69
The  necessity of allowing  for falsehood  makes  it impossible  to  regard 
belief as a relation of the mind to a single object, which could be said to 
be what is believed.  If belief were so regarded, we should find that...it 
would not admit of the opposition of truth and falsehood, but would have 
to always be true.  This may be made clear by examples.  Othello believes 
falsely  that  Desdemona  loves  Cassio.  We  cannot  say  that  this  belief 
consists in a relation to a single object, ‘Desdemona’s love for Cassio’, 
for if there were such an object, the belief would be true.  There is in fact 
no such object, and therefore Othello cannot have any relation to such an 
object.  Hence  his  belief cannot  possibly  consist  in  a  relation  to  this 
object. (Russell (1912), p72)
In  his  Theory of Knowledge  (1913),  Russell  says  of his  original  view  that  it
results  “from  a  certain  logical  naivete,  which  compels  us,  from  poverty  of
available  hypotheses, to do violence to instincts which deserve respect” ((1913),
plO).  Russell no longer sees how there can be false propositions.  He says:
We might be induced to admit that true propositions are entities, but it is 
very difficult, except under the lash of a tyrannous theory, to admit that 
false propositions are entities  ((1913), pi09)
Instead  of accounting  for  a  subject’s  knowledge  by  saying  that  the  subject 
apprehends  a  proposition,  Russell  introduces  his  multiple  relation  theory  of 
judgement.1 2   Instead of a subject apprehending a proposition, he must now be 
acquainted  with  each  constituent  of  what  was  formerly  thought  to  be  a 
proposition.  So, for example, for a subject to think that Mary is sitting down, 
Russell no longer thinks that the subject apprehends the proposition consisting of 
Mary and the property of sitting down.  Instead, he is acquainted with Mary, and 
acquainted with the property of sitting down.  If a subject judges that Mary loves 
John he must be acquainted with Mary, the relation of loving, and John.  There is 
a link with Russell’s previous view as a subject is still acquainted with objects 
and relations in the world.  It is because of this that he can think of objects and 
relations -  his thought goes directly to them.
Russell  now  thinks  that  if  a  subject  makes  a  true  judgement  his  thought 
corresponds to the facts; if his judgement is false, it does not.  Truth and falsity 
are no longer properties of propositions; instead thoughts or judgements are true 
or false, and true thoughts correspond with the facts.  Thus if a subject thinks
1 2  Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement is slightly different in each of (1911), (1912) 
and (1913).  I ignore these differences here, as they are incidental to my main point, and I focus 
on his theory in (1913).70
truly that Mary is sitting down, there is a corresponding fact of Mary having the 
property of sitting down.  When a subject makes a false judgement there is no 
false proposition for him to apprehend.  So if a subject thinks that Tony Blair is a 
woman, there is no false proposition containing Tony Blair and the property of 
womanhood. The subject is instead acquainted with the object Tony Blair and the 
property of womanhood, and combines these in a certain way, in thought.  It is 
being acquainted with things in the world that enables the subject to think about 
the  world  -   these  things  can  then  be  combined  in  thought  to  make  false 
judgements.  But as this combination of objects and universals does not exist in 
reality -  there is no fact of Tony Blair being a woman -  the way in which the 
objects and universals are combined in thought must be different from how they 
are combined in the world.  This is an issue for Russell as the content of the 
subject's thought is the objects and relations themselves, not representations of 
objects and relations.  The way the subject unites these objects and relations in 
thought must not be the same as the way they are (or are not) united in the world. 
There needs to  be a difference so there can be a correspondence  between the 
judgement and the facts if the judgement is true.  Russell ‘solves’ this problem 
by saying that in the case of  judging that (e.g.) Mary loves John, the subject must 
be acquainted not only the with objects Mary and John and the relation loving, 
but that he must also “.. .know how these three terms are meant to be combined; 
and  this....required  acquaintance  with  the  general  form  of a  dual  complex.” 
((1913), pill)  The  general  form of a dual complex is “something has  some 
relation  to  something”.  The  general  form  of a  subject-predicate  complex  is 
“something has some predicate”.  So if a subject believes that Tony Blair is a 
woman then he is acquainted with the object Blair, the property of womanhood, 
and  also  acquainted  with  the  form  “something  has  some  predicate”.  Russell 
thinks that the subject must be acquainted with these general forms, or what he
calls the logical form:
I think it may be shown that acquaintance with logical form is involved 
before  explicit  thought  about  logic  begins,  in  fact  as  soon  as  we  can 
understand  a  sentence.  Let  us  suppose  that  we  are  acquainted  with 
Socrates and with Plato and with the relation ‘precedes’, but not with the 
complex “Socrates precedes Plato”.  Supposed now that some one tells us 
that Socrates precedes Plato.  How do we know what he means?  It is 
plain that his statement does not give us acquaintance with the complex 
“Socrates precedes Plato”.  What we understand is that Socrates and Plato 
and  “precedes”  are  united  in  a  complex  of  the  form  “xRy ”,  where71
Socrates has the x-place and Plato has the y-place.  It is difficult to see 
how  we  could  possibly  understand  how  Socrates  and  Plato  and 
“precedes” are to be combined unless we had acquaintance vw iith the form 
of the complex. ((1913), p99)
He says (pi 16) that he had originally thought that the subject just needed to be
acquainted  with  objects  and  universals,  but  now  does  not.  It  is  by  being
acquainted with the logical form that our thought can combine the objects and
relations, but the objects and relations are not necessarily united im reality.  By
being acquainted with the form, the subject understands what it is for the objects
and universals to be related.  Russell concludes:
I do not know how to make this point more evident, and I must therefore 
leave it to the reader’s inspection, in hopes that he will arrive at the same 
conclusion. ((1913), pi 16)
How a subject is acquainted with a logical form is complicated -  logical forms
cannot themselves have constituents, but must be simple, for instance -  but the
details  do  not  concern  us  here.  The  important  thing  is  thatt  a  subject’s
acquaintance with objects,  relations and logical  forms are what enable  him to
think and judge things.
Acquaintance is thus vital to Russell  (1913).  It is through acquaintance that a 
subject has contact with the external world:
All  three  kinds  of acquaintance  [with  objects,  universals  and  logical 
forms]  fulfil the same function of providing the data for judgement and 
inference ((1913), pi 00)
By being acquainted with such things, the subject can combine them in thought
to make true or false judgements.  Russell (1913) now elaborates omthe notion of
acquaintance,  explaining that there  are  various ways  in which,  for instance,  a
particular can be presented to a subject.  For instance (p79) there is attention,
which selects one object.  There is also sensation, memory (“which applies only
to  past objects”) and  imagination  (“which  gives  objects without any temporal
relation  to  the  subject”).  These  are  all  relations  between  subject  and  object
which  are  “recognizably  different  ways  of  experiencing  particular  objects”.
These relations “provide the data” or enable a subject to think abwut particular
objects.  There  are  similar  relations  of  acquaintance  between  subject  and
relations, and subject and logical forms.72
3  The Notion of Acquaintance
3.1  Why Did Russell Reject Acquaintance?
Russell abandons his book Theory of Knowledge before completing it.1 3   But he 
does  not  abandon  acquaintance  at  this  stage;  indeed,  that  acquaintance  is 
essential  seems  self-evident to  him.  But  then  in  ‘On  Propositions’  (1919)14, 
Russell gives up acquaintance saying only that he will no longer assume it as it is 
not “empirically discoverable”.  Is this really his only reason?  Acquaintance was 
essential to him before -  without it a subject could not have knowledge of the 
world.  Would he really reject it just because it was not empirically discoverable, 
if he took it to be playing a vital role?  I think it is more plausible that Russell 
previously took acquaintance to be playing a role that he now decided it could 
not be playing.
I  think  acquaintance,  for  Russell,  is  doing  two  things.  When  a  subject  is 
acquainted  with  objects  and  relations  in  the  world,  these  are  present  in  his 
experience.  It is being so present in his experience which makes it possible for 
the subject to think about them.  In addition, it is these very things with which 
the subject is acquainted which are also combined in thought when a judgement 
is made.  By being acquainted with particulars, relations and logical forms, the 
subject can combine these  in thought to  make judgements.  His  acquaintance 
with  these  things  explains  how judgements  are  made  and  how  knowledge  is 
possible.  I do not think that there is anything wrong with the first role -  that of 
objects being present in experience, making it possible for subjects to think of 
them.  It is the second role -  that of combining these objects and relations in 
thought -  which is problematic.  We then have the questions of what exactly is 
being combined in thought, and how is the subject acquainted with each element. 
This is particularly problematic when it comes to general thoughts.  Russell does 
not actually talk about how a subject has general thoughts in (1913); he abandons 
the  book  before this point and discusses  only  “atomic propositional  thought”. 
But what  might  it  be  for a  subject  to  have  a general  thought,  on  his theory? 
Recall that in (1905) a subject who thinks (for example) that everything is blue 
must apprehend the proposition expressed by ‘x is blue ’ is always true, or Vx x is
1 3  The speculation is that he abandoned it because Wittgenstein pointed out to him that his theory 
made it possible to judge nonsense.
1 4  In Collected Papers of  Bertrand Russell Vol 8, p29473
blue.  This  involves  being  acquainted  with  each  of the  constituents  of the 
proposition.  By (1913) Russell  no  longer thinks that there are such things  as 
propositions,  but  presumably  he  would  think  that  for  a  subject  to  think  that 
everything  is  blue, the  subject  would  have  to  be  acquainted with each  of the 
terms in what Russell formerly thought of as a proposition, and combine these in 
thought.  So the subject would have to be acquainted with the variable x, with the 
propositional  function x  is  blue,  and  with  is  always  true  (Vx)  (and  with  the 
logical form of the statement).  He would then combine each of these in thought.
But  then,  of course,  Russell  cannot  avoid  the  question  of  what  it  is  to  be 
acquainted with the variable.1 5   The variable is part of the thought,  combined 
with other things.  And the way in which it becomes part of the thought, being 
there to combine with other elements, is by the subject being acquainted with it. 
Russell  never  manages  to  give  a  satisfactory  answer  to  whether  or  how  the 
subject  is  acquainted  with  the  variable,  and  without  this  it  seems  he  cannot 
explain how descriptive or general thought is possible.  His aim was to explain 
how  a  subject  has  knowledge  and  makes  judgements,  and  if  he  thinks 
acquaintance cannot be playing this role, it seems understandable that he would 
give up on it.  Although Russell does not say this explicitly, I think this must be 
at least part of the reason why he rejects acquaintance.
The  problem  for  Russell  is  his  theory  of knowledge  -   the  way  the  subject 
combines  things  to  make  a judgement.  The  problem  is  not  the  relation  of 
acquaintance  per  se.  Of  course,  Russell’s  Multiple  Relation  Theory  of 
Judgement  is  not  the  only  way  in  which  acquaintance  may  be  given  an 
explanatory  role  in  thought.  In  Section  3.3  below  I  will  briefly  consider 
Campbell’s (2002) proposal.  But before that I want to focus on what I think is 
the first role of acquaintance for Russell -  that when a subject is acquainted with 
objects, the objects are present to the subject in experience. It is being so present 
in his experience which makes it possible for the subject to think about them.  In 
particular I want to focus on what it is to be acquainted with particular objects.
1 5  Or, for that matter, what it is to be acquainted with a propositional function.74
3.2  Acquaintance with Particulars
Russell writes the following:
When an object is in my present experience, then I am acquainted with it; 
it is not necessary for me to reflect upon my experience, or to observe 
that the object has the property of belonging to my experience, in order to 
be acquainted with it, but, on the contrary, the object itself is known to 
me without the need of any reflection on my part as to its properties or 
relations.  This  point  may  perhaps  be  made  clearer  by  an  illustrative 
hypothesis.  Suppose  I were occupied,  like Adam,  in bestowing names 
upon various objects.  The objects upon which  I  should bestow names 
would all be objects with which I was acquainted,  but  it would not be 
necessary for me to reflect that I was acquainted with them, or to realize 
that they all shared a certain relation to myself.  What distinguishes the 
objects to which I can give names from other things is the fact that these 
objects are within my experience, that I am acquainted with them, but it is 
only  subsequent  reflection  that  proves  that  they  all  have  this 
distinguishing characteristic;  during the process of naming they  appear 
merely as this, that, and the other. (Russell (1913), p39)
This is the notion of acquaintance with particulars which will be developed in the
next chapter.  The object is present to the subject in experience,  and it is this
which puts the subject in a position to be able to think of it.  It is this which is
essential  for a subject to  have  non-first-personal  thoughts  about  objects.  But
Russell  (1911,  1912,  1913)  thinks  that  the  objects  which  can  be  present  in
experience to a subject are severely limited.  By (1913) he thinks that the only
particulars with which a subject can be acquainted are sense-data, of either the
inner or outer sense.  These are the only objects which the subject can name, with
what  Russell  calls  logically proper names.  Hence these  are  the  only  objects
which a subject can have singular thoughts about -  all other thoughts concerning
objects must be descriptive thoughts which denote an object.  Is this a necessary
result of taking the acquaintance relation between subject and object to be the
converse of the object being present to the subject?
It is not.  This limitation on the objects with which a subject can be acquainted is 
not a result of this understanding of acquaintance.  It is not the case that Russell 
comes to the conclusion that a subject can only be acquainted with sense-data by 
analysing this notion of acquaintance.  Instead, I think it is Russell’s further role 
which  he  gives  to  acquaintance  -  that of explaining thought  in  his  theory  of 
knowledge  -  which  results  in this  restriction.  Russell  thinks that to  make  a 
judgement the subject is acquainted with things in the world, and combines these75
in  thought.  If the  objects  with  which  a  subject  could  be  acquainted  were 
unrestricted then his thoughts that (e.g.) Hesperus is a planet and that Phosphorus 
is a planet would both be the same thought.  Each would involve the subject 
being acquainted with the planet Venus and being acquainted with the property 
of being a planet, and combining these in thought.  But a subject might believe 
one and  not the other,  and how could this  be  possible  if they  were the  same 
thought?  It  is  because  of  his  theory  of  knowledge  rather  than  his  basic 
understanding  of  acquaintance  that  Russell  thinks  that  what  a  subject  is 
acquainted with must be severely restricted.1 6
This is not an issue if one accepts only Russell's understanding of acquaintance 
as  an  object  being  prepept  to  a  subject,  without  accepting  his  theory  of  yu 
knowledge.  The same object may be present to a subject in different ways.  This  ‘ 
does not mean that the object itself is not present in experience -  only that the 
subject does not realize that it is the same object in each case.
33  Comparison with Campbell (2002)
Campbell starts his book Reference and Consciousness (2002) by saying:
It is experience of the world that puts us is a position to think about it. 
Without  experience,  we  would  not  know  what  the  world  is  like. 
(Campbell (2002), pi)
This is very similar to the role  for acquaintance proposed in this thesis.  It is
objects being present in experience which enables subjects to think about objects.
More specifically, Campbell takes conscious attention to an object to be what
explains how a subject can think about an object demonstratively, and says that
Russell’s notion of acquaintance “provides a model” for conscious attention:
Russell  thought  of acquaintance  as  a cognitive  relation  more primitive 
than thought about an object, which nonetheless, by reaching all the way 
to the object, made thought about the object possible.  I will argue that 
this  provides  a  model  for  the  way  in  which  we  think  of conscious 
attention to an object.  It is a state more primitive than thought about the 
object, which nonetheless, by bringing the object itself into the subjective 
life of the thinker, makes it possible to think about that object. (Campbell
(2002), p6)
1 6  In the case of the self, Russell eventually reaches the conclusion that we are not acquainted 
with it because he thinks that it is not present in experience.  He follows Hume in this respect. 
But this is not his reasoning for why we are not acquainted with other objects .76
Like  Russell,  Campbell  also  appeals  to  what  he  calls  a  Relational  View  of 
experience.  The content of a subject’s perception are the objects and properties 
which he perceives, rather than representations of them.  Campbell explains this 
by appealing to the ‘view’ a subject perceives.  The constituents of the view are 
the objects and properties themselves.  Campbell considers objections to this, the 
main one being the following:
I think that one powerful reason for resistance to the Relational View of 
experience is the thought that to characterize the content of an experience, 
it cannot be enough simply to say which object is being experienced: you 
must also say how the object is being experienced, you must characterize 
the way in which the object is being perceived by the subject.  After all, 
two people could be  seeing the very same object, and yet the intrinsic 
character  of  their  experiences  be  quite  different.  This  in  itself  is 
undeniable.  It is the next step that leads to rejection of the  Relational 
View.  The next step is to say that the way in which the object is given is 
independent of whether the object exists, and independent of whether the 
subject is experiencing  one or many similar objects.  (Campbell  (2002) 
pi 26)
Campbell’s  suggestion  is  that  although  the  content  of a  subject’s  perception 
consists of the objects and properties which he perceives, this does not mean that 
they cannot be experienced in a certain way.  The worry for objectors might also 
be that if a subject’s thought is based on his experience, then how can he think 
about the same object in different ways if that object is part of the content of the 
thought?
But  unlike  Russell,  Campbell  does  not  describe  the  content  of thought  as  a 
combination of objects and properties.  Rather than talking about the content of a 
subject’s thought he talks about the subject’s capacity to use a singular term to 
refer to an object, his capacity to verify propositions involving the term, and his 
capacity to act on the basis of such propositions (e.g. p5, also Chapter 2, etc.). He 
thinks that by being acquainted  with  object -  by  consciously attending to the 
object -  the underlying information-processing systems “swing into play”:
It  is  the  liaison  between  conscious  attention  and  the  underlying 
information  processing  subsystems  which  provides  you  with  your 
capacity to use the term, to verify propositions involving a term, or to act 
on the basis of such propositions. (Campbell ((2002), p5)
Like Russell, however, Campbell’s aim is not just to say what puts a subject in a 
position to think about the world, but to explain how it is that a subject can think77
about the world.  Campbell goes into great detail explaining the links he thinks 
there  are  between  a  subject’s  conscious  attention  to  an  object  and  the 
information-processing that goes on in the subject’s brain.
Can Campbell’s account succeed where Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of 
Judgement does not?  Because the content of a thought or judgement need not 
involve a combination of objects and relations, the problems Russell has with the 
variable  do  not  appear  to  be  an  issue  for  Campbell.  But  I  will  not  explore 
Campbell’s account any further here, as the details of it do not affect the main 
point to be argued for in this thesis.  One may reject Campbell’s account of how 
conscious attention links with the information-processing subsystems that enable 
one to have thoughts about objects, and yet still think that what is important for a 
subject to have a thought about an object is that he is acquainted with the object -  
that the object is present in his experience.  The proposal in this thesis is that this 
is  what  is  necessary  for  a  subject  to  have  non-first-personal  thoughts  about 
objects.  And that this is not needed for the subject to think about himself first- 
personally.  The following chapter aims to develop this notion of acquaintance, 
in  order  that  this  key  difference  between  first-person  and  non-first-personal 
thought can be brought out in Part III.78
Chapter 4 
The Role of Acquaintance: Restricting Singular Thought
The aim of this thesis is not to explain exactly how thought, or even singular 
thought,  is  possible.  Instead,  it  is  to  highlight  a  key  difference  between  a 
subject’s  first-person  thought,  and  his  non-first-personal  thought  about 
independent objects.  The proposal is that a subject’s acquaintance with an object 
is essential for him to have a non-first-personal singular thought, and that this is 
not required for his first-person thoughts.  The notion of acquaintance that brings 
out this distinction is basically that of Russell’s:
I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive 
relation to that object i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself....
I  think the  relation  of subject and object  which  I  call  acquaintance  is 
simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes 
presentation... I wish to preserve the dualism of subject and object in my 
terminology,  because  this  dualism  seems  to  me  a  fundamental  fact 
concerning cognition. (Russell (1911), p200-l)
For a subject to think about an object that object must in some way be present to
him.  For a subject to think first-personally, the object -  himself -  need not be
present in this way.
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify what is meant by an object being present 
to a subject, and to explain why this should be a requirement for a subject to 
think  about  an  object.  I  will  begin  by  saying  what  I  think  the  relation  of 
acquaintance is not.  It does not involve the subject knowing what kind of thing 
the object is, or having discriminating knowledge of the object.  Instead,  it is 
more like Evans’s (1982) notion of information.  Evans thinks that for a subject 
to  be  able  to  think  certain  types  of  singular  thoughts  -   thoughts  he  calls 
information-based particular thoughts -  a subject must have information from 
the object.  I will argue that this information-link between subject and object is 
similar to an acquaintance relation.  But having information from an object does 
not  explain  exactly  how  the  subject  is  able  to  think  about the  object;  it  is  a 
constraint on what objects the subject can think about.  Having information from 
an object, or being acquainted with an object, puts the subject in a position to 
think about it.  Purported counterexamples to the requirement that a subject must 
be acquainted with an object in order to have a singular thought about it will then79
be considered.  By showing why a subject does not have a singular thought in 
such cases, the reasons for an acquaintance requirement become clearer.
1  Acquaintance Does Not Involve Knowing Which
The restriction that a subject must be acquainted with an object in order to think 
of it is sometimes interpreted as meaning that a subject must know which object 
it  is about which  he  is thinking.  The  following principle  is  called  ‘Russell's 
Principle’, by Evans (1982):
In order to be thinking about an object or to make a judgement about an 
object, one must know which object is in question -  one must know which 
object it is that one is thinking about. (Evans (1982), p65)
Evans explicitly attributes this to Russell, and in a footnote asks the reader to see
the  section  of Russell’s  Problems  of Philosophy,  where  Russell  discusses  his
Principle  of  Acquaintance.  McDowell  ((1990),  p257,  and  elsewhere)  also
suggests that Russell himself equates Russell’s Principle with his Principle of
Acquaintance.  Recall Russell’s Principle of Acquaintance is:
Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of 
constituents with which we are acquainted (Russell (1911), p209; (1912), 
p32)
It is true that Russell justifies this principle by saying:
...it is scarcely conceivable that we can make a judgement or entertain a 
supposition without knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing 
about (Russell, (1911), p209; (1912), p32)1
But it is a misinterpretation of Russell to say that this means that a subject must
know which object he is thinking of.  Nowhere does Russell  say this.  He only
says that the  subject  must know  what it is that  he  is thinking  about.  This is
knowledge  of  things  -   an  expression  Russell  uses  interchangeably  with
acquaintance,  and  with  the  converse  of an  object  being  present  to  a  subject.
Acquaintance as knowledge of things is contrasted by Russell with knowledge of
truths'.
The word ‘know’ is here used in two different senses. (1) In its first use it 
is applicable to the sort of knowledge which is opposed to error, the sense 
in which what we know is true, the sense which applies to our beliefs and 
convictions, i.e. to what are called judgements.  In this sense of the word 
we  know that  something  is  the case.  This  sort of knowledge  may be 
described  as  knowledge  of truths.  (2)  In the  second  use  of the  word 
‘know’  above, the word applies to our knowledge of things,  which we 
may call acquaintance.  This is the sense in which we know sense-data.
1  In (1911) the principle starts with “ ...it seems scarcely possible to believe...’80
(The distinction is roughly that between savoir and connaitre in French, 
or between wissen and kennen in German.) (Russell (1912), p23)
In  his  Theory  of  Knowledge  (1913),  Russell  also  describes  a  subject’s
acquaintance with an object as his knowing an object.  For instance:
When an object is in my present experience, then I am acquainted with it; 
it is not necessary for me to reflect upon my experience, or to observe 
that the object has the property of belonging to my experience, in order to 
be acquainted with it, but, on the contrary, the object itself is known to me 
without  the  need  of any  reflection  on  my  part  as  to  its  properties  or 
relations. (Russell (1913), p39, my emphasis)
It is important to realize that Russell treats a subject’s knowing an object as the
same as that object being present to the subject.  The fact that he uses the word
‘know’  does not mean that this  is not the same as the object being present in
experience.  Knowing a thing is being acquainted with it, which is the same as
the object being present to the subject.  As has been discussed in Chapter 3 of
this  thesis,  by  the  object  being  present  to  the  subject,  the  subject  can  think
directly about the object.  Knowledge of things grounds the subject’s knowledge
of truths.  A subject’s knowing which object it is does not come into it.
Thus  I  disagree  with  McDowell  (1990)  who  suggests  that  Russell  conflates 
‘know the object which... ’ and ‘know which object....’.  Russell himself makes 
no  such  conflation.  But  McDowell  goes  on  to  suggest  that  there  could  be  a 
reason  for such a conflation because the sorts of cognitive relations that must 
hold between subject an object in order for the subject to be acquainted with the 
object will also suffice for the satisfaction of the know which requirement.  But 
this is not obviously the case.  A subject may perceive a red apple.  The object is 
present to him, and so he is acquainted with it.  He can think about it.  He may 
later perceive an identical-looking red apple and not realize it is a different apple. 
He  is  also  acquainted  with  this  apple.  And  yet  he  cannot tell  the difference 
between the two apples; he does not have discriminating knowledge of them.  If 
a subject’s knowing which object he is thinking about is interpreted in terms of 
his having discriminating knowledge of the object, in this case he does not know 
which object he is thinking about.  Yet he is acquainted with each apple in each 
case.  Acquaintance and knowledge which do not coincide.
The proposal in this thesis is that for a subject to think about an object he must be 
acquainted with it -  that object must be present to him.  But are there reasons for81
thinking that this is wrong and that instead it is a subject’s knowing which object 
he  is thinking of which  is  necessary  for a subject’s thought about an  object? 
Sometimes a subject’s knowing which object he is thinking of is understood as 
the  subject  knowing  what  kind  of object  he  is  thinking  of.  Thus  we  find 
Anscombe saying that one of the reasons a subject cannot refer to himself using 
‘I’ is because he cannot associate a ‘conception’ with the term ‘I’.  She writes:
The use of a name for an object is connected with a conception of that 
object.  And so we are driven to look for something that, for each ‘I’-user, 
will be the conception related to the supposed name ‘I’, as the conception 
of a  city  is  to  the  names  ‘London’  and  ‘Chicago’,  that  of a  river  to 
‘Thames’  and  ‘Nile’,  that  of  a  man  to  ‘John’  and  ‘Pat’.  Such  a 
conception is requisite if‘I’ is a name. (Anscombe (1975), pl41)
By associating a conception with a term, the subject thinks of the kind of thing
the object referred to is.  Dummett (1973) also holds this view.  According to
him, we cannot single out an object if we do not know what kind of thing it is; in
just pointing to something we do not single out an object, as several kinds of
object could occupy the same location.  For instance, both a statue and a lump of
clay can occupy the same location.  Until we are able to single out the object, we
cannot think of it.  This possibly has some plausibility if one thinks of reality as
an “amorphous mass”, as Dummett ((1973), p577) does, where objects are not
present to a subject, but the subject must instead use his knowledge of kinds to
single them out.  But it loses  its plausibility if one supposes that objects are
indeed given or present to the subject.  It seems that a subject can think about and
refer to an object before he comes to know what kind it is.  He can be radically
mistaken about what kind of thing he is observing, for instance.  A subject may
think ‘This is a live animal’ when in fact what is in front of him is a stuffed toy.
That the subject needs to know what kind of thing he is referring to is opposed
by many: Ayers (1974), Hirsch (1982), Campbell (2002) and Sainsbury (2007) to
name  but a  few.  Hirsch  provides  an  illustration,  describing  a child who  has
grown up never having seen any vehicles.  When he first sees a car, being driven
so fast that it looks all blurred, even though he does not know what kind of object
it is he can nevertheless refer to that big blue thing.  Perhaps it is possible that
after thinking about an object the subject usually comes to know what kind of
thing an object is, and associates this knowledge with the object when he thinks
about it.  But this does not seem necessary to refer to the object in the first place.
In  thinking  about  an  object  the  subject  may  be  radically  mistaken  about  the82
object’s properties.  He is not having a descriptive thought, concerning an object 
which satisfies some description or has some specific properties.  Instead he is 
thinking of, and referring to, an object which is present to him,
In at least some cases Evans (e.g. (1982), pi78-9) agrees that a subject can be 
“radically  mistaken”  about  the  kind  of thing  one  is  thinking  about,  and  still 
succeed in having a singular thought.  However, he interprets a subject knowing 
which  object  he  is  thinking  of  as  the  requirement  that  the  subject  have 
discriminating knowledge of the object. This means that the subject must either 
know what differentiates the object ffom all other objects, or he must have the 
ability to work this out.  In some cases -  for instance, abstract objects -  this does 
involve knowing what kind of thing the object is.  In other cases,  it does not, 
provided that a “definitely extended object is indicated” (pi78-9).  In the case of 
a physical object the proposal is that the subject needs to think of the object as 
temporally and spatially located, and have the ability to locate the object.  By 
being able to do this he can distinguish the object from others and thus can think 
about it.2
According to Evans, in order to think of an object, a subject must have an Idea of 
an object, where he defines Idea in the following way:
An Idea of an object, then, is something which makes it possible for a 
subject to think of an object in a series of indefinitely many thoughts, in 
each of which he will be thinking of the object in the same way (Evans 
(1982), pl04).
Evans thinks that to have an Idea of an object a, the subject must have either a 
fundamental Idea a -  where he thinks of a as possessing the fundamental ground 
of difference  it  possesses,  and  so  knows  what  distinguishes a  from  all  other 
objects -  or he must know what it would be  for his  Idea of a to equate to a 
fundamental Idea of a.  Evans attempts to defend this position in Chapter 4 of 
The  Varieties  of Reference,  particularly  Section  4.4.  He  starts  from  the  point 
(pi06) that all objects are distinguished from one another in certain fundamental 
ways.  It seems that Evans is aiming to give an account of reference which will 
also  apply  to  abstract  objects,  although  it  is  not  clear  that  the  examples  he
21  do not consider abstract objects.  My proposal is limited to concrete objects; that to think about 
an independent concrete object a subject must be acquainted with it.83
discusses initially are obviously abstract objects.  For instance, the examples he 
gives are:
...we may say that shades of colour are distinguished from one another 
by their phenomenal properties, that shapes are distinguished  from one 
another by their geometrical properties, that sets are differentiated from 
one  another  by  their  possessing  different  members,  that  numbers  are 
differentiated from one another by their positions in an infinite ordering, 
and  that  chess  positions  are  distinguished  from  one  another  by  the 
positions of pieces upon the board. ((1982), pi 06-7)
Whilst  on  many  views,  sets  and  numbers  are  abstract  objects,  it  is  far  from
obvious that shades of colour or shapes are.  Let us leave this to one side.  The
key point is that Evans  first explores reference to abstract objects because  he
wishes to distinguish his position from verificationism, which cannot account for
such reference.  But this attention to abstract objects leads him to focus on things
which are not really relevant to a subject’s thought about non-abstract objects. It
may be plausible that to think of the number 3, a subject must think of it as the
third number in the series of numbers, and so thinks of it in a way in which it is
discriminated from all other numbers.  But is having discriminating knowledge
of an object really necessary for a subject’s thought about a concrete object?
Evans tries to defend his case that fundamental Ideas are involved in some way 
in all thoughts about objects by considering a general thought of the form some 
G is F.  He proposes that there  is no thought about objects of a certain kind 
which does not presuppose the idea of one object of that kind ((1982), pi 08).  So 
it seems that if I were to think that some number is odd then I must think that 
some object individuated by the fundamental ground of difference appropriate to 
numbers is odd. Evans thinks that it is not knowledge of the fundamental ground 
of difference for a particular object which is important for a subject to have a 
general thought -  so not knowledge, for example, that three is the third object 
along  the  infinite  ordering.  Instead,  he  thinks  that  the  subject  must  have 
knowledge of the fundamental ground of difference in general -  in the case of 
numbers the fundamental ground of difference is their position along an infinite 
ordering.  Does this also apply to physical objects?  Although at this point in the 
argument  Evans  is  thinking  of abstract  objects,  he  later  wants  to  extend  the 
argument  to  spatio-temporal  objects,  so  I  think  these  considerations  about 
general thoughts must also apply to general thoughts which may denote physical84
objects.  So, for the sake of argument, suppose that if I were to think that some 
cat is tabby then I must think that some object, individuated by the fundamental 
ground  of difference  appropriate  to  cats,  is  tabby.  But  this  seems  to  be  an 
explanation of what it is to think of something as having the property of being a 
cat -  what  it  is to  satisfy  some  description.  But what does this tell  us  about 
singular thoughts? As yet, this does not seem to tell us anything at all about what 
it is to think about particular objects.  If a subject thinks that some number is 
odd, or that some cat is tabby, then this seems to be of the form 3x. Gx & Fx. 
Perhaps to know this the subject needs to know what it is for something to be a 
G, but this does not seem to tell us what it is to think of a particular object.
Evans thinks that to think a general thought of the form 3x. Gx & Fx one must 
think of “an F thing which is differentiated from all other objects by a ground of 
difference  appropriate to  Gs.”  (pi08).  This  in  itself is highly  debatable.  But 
assume for a moment that there is some truth in it. Evans thinks that this same 
point applies to particular thoughts about Gs (pi 09) because he thinks that such 
thoughts also involve the idea of a G’s being F.  But do they really?  There 
seems no reason to say that such thoughts must involve the idea of a G’s being F 
unless one is already subscribing to Russell’s Principle -  that to have a thought 
about an object one must know which object it is.  Yet Evans insists that the 
fundamental level of thought is initially supposed to be independent of Russell’s 
Principle.
One of the reasons Evans thinks the fundamental level of thought is important is 
because he thinks that it can explain how a subject’s thought can be subject to the 
Generality Constraint.3  This is the requirement that if a subject can think the 
thought that a is F and can think that b is G, then he can also think that a is G 
and b is F.  If he can think that a is F,  so thinking of and referring to object a, 
then he must also be able to think of a as having different properties, and must be 
able to think of the property F as applying to different objects (Evans (1982), 
p75, pi01).  To be able to think a is F, a is G, a is H etc., Evans argues that a 
subject must either have a fundamental Idea of a, or know what it would be for 
his Idea of a to equate to a fundamental Idea of a:
3  For an argument that the Generality Constraint is itself false, see Travis (1994)85
Provided a subject knows what it is for identifications like [S = a \ [where 
S is a fundamental Idea of an object] to be true, a link is set up between 
his Idea a, and his entire repertoire of conceptual knowledge, and he will 
be  able to  grasp as  many propositions  of the  form [a  is F~\ as he  has 
concepts  of being  F.  His  Ideas  make  contact  with  his  concepts  [of 
properties]  so to speak, at the fundamental  level, and hence there is no 
need,  or possibility,  of accounting for his  knowledge  of what  it is  for 
propositions about the object to be true one by one. (Evans (1982), pi 12)
But  even  if an  appeal  to  a  fundamental  level  of thought  can  explain  how  a
subject’s thought can conform to the Generality Constraint, this is not the only
way it could so conform.  Whatever it is that enables the subject to think about a
particular object may be the same in each thought about it.  The fundamental
level of thought is not the only way of explaining this.
What  it  comes  down  to  is  that  Evans  thinks  that  a  subject  who  cannot 
discriminate between two objects cannot have singular thoughts about them.  In 
the  example  of the  subject  who  is  acquainted  with  two  different  apples,  but 
cannot tell them apart,  Evans thinks that  subject cannot have a thought about 
either apple.  But  why  should  this  be?  Evans  ((1982),  p90)  gives  a  similar 
example, describing the case of a subject who sees a steel ball rotating, and then 
on  a different  day  sees  an  identical-looking  steel  ball  rotating.  We  are  also 
supposed to assume that the subject forgets about the first ball, because of a head 
injury.  Evans  assumes,  rightly  it  seems,  that the  subject cannot discriminate 
between the two balls.  He thinks that in this case the subject cannot be having a 
singular thought about the ball he remembers seeing. Evans says:
...there is nothing...he can do which will show that his thought is really 
about one of the two balls (about that ball) rather than about the other. 
(Evans (1982), pi 15)
But why should a subject need to  be able to do something to show that he is
thinking  of one  object  rather  than  another?  Sainsbury  (2007)  suggests  this
requirement comes from a “residual verificationism” in Evans work.  But there
seems no independent reason for thinking that a subject thinking of a red apple
must be able to show that he is thinking of one object rather than another.  The
fact that he is acquainted with that particular apple -  a particular red apple  is
present to him - is enough to make the subject’s thought about that apple.86
A subject’s knowing which object he is thinking of is not the same as the subject 
being acquainted with the object.  The proposal in this thesis is that, in the case 
of  non-first-personal  thoughts  about  independent  objects,  it  is  a  subject’s 
acquaintance with an object which is necessary for him to think about and refer 
to the object -  he does not need to know which object he is thinking about.
2  Acquaintance and Information Compared
The notion of acquaintance which I propose is essential  to singular thought is 
much more like Evans’s notion of information.4  According to Evans, many, but 
not all, singular thoughts involve the subject having (a bit of) information from 
the object he is thinking of.5   Evans says:
We can speak of a certain bit of information being of, or perhaps from, an 
object, in a sense resembling the way in which we speak of a photograph 
being of an object ((1982), pi 24)
A subject can have information from an object by perceiving the object.  He may
receive  information  from  others  about  the  object  -   information  can  be
transmitted in communication.  And information can be retained in memory.
Evans specifies the content of information from an object in the same way that he 
specifies the content of a photograph of an object.  He says:
I  shall  suppose  for  the  moment  that  this  content  can  be  specified 
neutrally, by an open sentence in one or more variables (the number of 
variables  corresponding  to  the  number  of objects  in  the  photograph). 
Thus if we are concerned with a photograph  of a red ball  on top of a 
yellow square, then the content of the photograph can be represented by 
the open sentence
Red(;t) &  Ball(jc) &  YeIlow(y) &  Square(y) and On Top Of(x^) 
((1982), pi 24-5)
In other places Evans also suggests that informational content can be existential.6 
However, he always makes it clear that he does not think that the specification of 
content should involve reference to the object it is about (e.g. pi25).  This may 
lead one to think that the information does not involve the object it is about, and 
so that the object itself is not essential to the information.  This would be very
4 For further discussion on Evans’s notion of information see Martin (2002), particularly Section 
5.
5  Exceptions to this are supposed to be thoughts involving descriptive names.  See below, Section 
3.1, for discussion.
6 See, for instance, (1982) pi27 where a subject receives the information that there is a native 
with a spike through his nose87
different from the notion of acquaintance proposed in this thesis. For example, 
the content of the information from two identical twins wearing exactly the same 
clothes  may  be  identical.  This  may  look  similar  to  (e.g.)  Bach’s  (1987) 
understanding  of  modes  of  presentations  of  objects,  where  the  mode  of 
presentation of an object does not determine a particular object.  If the content of 
the information is the same from each twin, and the subject’s thought depends on 
this  content,  then  his  thought  will  be  the  same  no  matter  which  twin  he  is 
thinking of.  The context would determine which twin is being thought about, but 
this is not essential to the thought.
Such an interpretation of Evans would be mistaken.  Evans is very  careful to 
distinguish between the  content of the  information and the bit of information 
itself.  Although the content of the information does not involve the presentation 
of a particular object, there is an information link between subject and object, 
consisting of information from the object which is received (or gathered) by the 
subject.  If there is an object which is the source of the information, this object is 
essential to the information.  As Evans says:
...the  notion  of  the  same  (bit  or  piece  of)  information...deserves 
explanation, even though it is common....We want to be able to say that 
two  informational  states (states of different persons) embody the  same 
information,  provided  that  they  result  from  the  same  informational 
event...,  even  if they  do  not  have  the  same  content:  the  one  may
represent the same information as the other, but garbled in various ways. 
Conversely,  and  obviously,  it  is  not  sufficient,  for  two  informational 
states to embody the same information, that they have the same content. 
When two states embody the same information, they are necessarily such 
that if the one is of an object x, then so is the other. (Evans (1982), pi 28- 
9)
This notion of information is very similar to Russell’s notion of acquaintance as 
an  object  being  present  to  a  subject.  It  differs  from  acquaintance  in  that 
information for Evans is supposed to be non-conceptual. This is not a concern for 
Russell -  he moves quite easily between saying that a subject knows an object, 
and  that  the  object  is  present  to  the  subject  in  experience.  Information  also 
differs from Russell’s notion of acquaintance in that it can be from no object.  In 
contrast, Russell thinks that the objects of acquaintance cannot be “illusory” or 
“unreal” as:
An acquaintance which is acquainted with nothing is not an acquaintance 
but a mere absurdity. (Russell (1913), p48)88
For Russell, if there is no object, there is no acquaintance, and so no singular 
thought.  But  for Evans,  if there  is  no  object,  there  can  still  be  information; 
perhaps  the  information  system  is  malfunctioning  in  some  way,  resulting  in 
hallucination.7 But if it is from an object, it is necessarily from that object -  the 
information links the subject and object, or the object is present to the subject. 
This is the same as Russell’s notion of acquaintance.
In Chapter 3, Section 3.2, it was suggested that a subject can be acquainted with 
an object in two different ways, resulting in different thoughts about this object. 
Thus, for example, a subject can think about Hesperus and Phosphorus without 
realizing that they are the same object, but he is still acquainted with the planet 
Venus in each case.  Russell does not allow for this, but this is because of his 
theory of judgement involving the combination of objects and relations, rather 
than the role of acquaintance.  Does Evans’s notion of information allow for this 
possibility?  Evans certainly allows that a subject may have two different Ideas 
of the same object, but this is because the subject identifies the object in two 
different ways.  But presumably he identifies the object in two different ways 
because the information -  not the content of the information -  is different in each 
case.  Two informational states embody the same information provided that they 
result from the same informational event.  This does not mean that they embody 
the same information provided that they result from the same object.  A subject’s 
perception of Phosphorus in the morning and his perception of Hesperus in the 
evening  are  different  information  events,  resulting  in  different  information. 
“When two states embody the same information, they are necessarily such that if 
the one is of an object x, then so is the other” (pi 28).  This does not mean that if 
two  information  states  are  of  object  x  then  they  must  embody  the  same 
information.  Thus understanding acquaintance along the lines of Evans’s notion 
of information,  and taking this to be the  necessary condition for thought also 
allows for a subject to have two different thoughts about the same object having 
the same property.  The subject has different information from the object, and 
there is a different information link in each case.
7 The subject still cannot have a singular thought in this case according to Evans, because he does 
not know which object he is thinking about.89
It is worth noting that if information can be from nothing this leaves open the 
possibility of a subject being able to have a singular thought where there is no 
object.  For instance, he may be hallucinating and his information comes from 
nothing.  That a subject can have a singular thought in such a case is denied by 
Evans, as there is no object for the subject to discriminate or identify, and so the 
condition in Russell’s Principle is not met.  But if, as is proposed in this thesis, 
discriminating knowledge of an object is not required for singular thought, and it 
is  information  which  is  important,  then  perhaps  singular  thought  with  no 
reference is possible.  Of course, a hallucination which seems to the subject as if 
he were perceiving an object will not result in the same thought as a perception 
of an identical-looking object.  In the first case, nothing is presented, while in the 
second case an object is presented.  This will make the two thoughts different. 
As the point of this thesis is to  say what is necessary for a subject to  have a 
singular thought about an object, rather than whether he can be in a similar state 
of mind if there is no object, this will not be pursued further here.  But there 
seems no reason in principle why a subject could not have a singular thought 
which is the result of the information system malfunctioning.8
I think that a subject can be acquainted with an object -  the object can be present 
to him -  in the same kinds of cases in which Evans proposes that a subject can 
have information from an object.  The paradigm of an acquaintance relation is 
perception; by perceiving an object the subject is in a position to think about it. 
Acquaintance can  also  be  retained  in  memory.  This  does  not  mean  that the 
subject somehow ‘perceives’ the object in memory.  Instead, the fact that he has 
once perceived the object and retains this in memory is enough for him to think 
about  it.  Even  if he  misremembers  the  object -  perhaps  he  remembers it as 
yellow and it was red -  he is still thinking about the object originally perceived. 
The  object  remembered  is  the  one  that  was  perceived  and  which  led  to  the 
memory,  not  the  one  which  fits  the  description.  Acquaintance  transmitted 
through testimony is probably the most problematic case.  It may seem that if a 
subject is told ‘Mary is sitting down’ and does not himself perceive Mary, then 
he can think of Mary only by description.  To think of Mary by description the
8 For further discussion on this see Sainsbury (2007), especially his final chapter on mental 
reference.  Sainsbury argues that there can be mental reference in the absence of a referent, 
although he does not think that acquaintance is necessary for reference.90
subject might think of her as the person the speaker is telling him about, and this 
would  be  a descriptive thought  rather than  a  singular thought.  But  in  many 
cases, names do not work like this.  An object is originally given a name by a 
person who is acquainted with it, most usually via perception.  Kripke (1972) 
calls  this  a  dubbing  or  a  baptism.  The  original  user  of the  name  receives 
information from the object.  He can pass this information on by using the name 
to refer to the object.  A hearer being told about this object by the speaker’s use 
of the name receives information -  the information is transmitted by the use of 
the name.  So, for instance, a subject may be told ‘Mary is the best student in the 
class’.  Through the use of the name, the object Mary is presented to him.  He 
can think about her.  The information he receives is that she is the best student in 
the class.  But even if the content of this information turns out to  be  false -  
perhaps Mary is a very poor student -  the subject can still think about Mary.
I do not pretend to have given anything like a full account of the different ways a 
subject can be acquainted with an object here.  The above is only a brief sketch. 
But I think that in such cases the subject is acquainted with an object -  he has an 
information link with the object -  and this puts him in a position to think about 
the object.  Without having  information  from  the object -  without the  object 
being present to him -  the  subject cannot have  a  singular thought  about that 
object.
3  Is Acquaintance Necessary?
A  subject can think about and refer to an object if he is acquainted with that 
object.  The fact that the object is present in his experience enables his thought to 
be  about  that  object,  rather  than  another  one.  But  is  this  condition  really 
necessary?  Is there any reason why a subject could not have a singular thought 
about an object he has never encountered and has never been told about?
Crimmins (1992) argues that there is no reason why this could not happen.  He 
suggests, for example, that a subject’s thought expressed by the sentence  ‘The 
shortest spy is a spy’ can be a singular thought about an object even if the subject 
is  not acquainted with the  shortest  spy.  Crimmins believes that a thought or 
belief is  about an  object if it contains  a notion of an object.  Crimmins  says91
explicitly that one need not be acquainted with an object in order to have a notion 
of it, although he also admits that he does not have a general account of notion 
content ((1992), p80).  His view is that it is very easy for a notion to be of an 
object; he calls this a “promiscuous account of notion content” (e.g. p89).  His 
aim is not to explain exactly how this is possible, but instead to refute the claim 
that acquaintance is necessary for a notion to be o/an object.  Crimmins suggests 
a reliabilist  account, where a subject may first have a general belief that there is 
a unique object fulfilling a certain property.  And the having of this general belief 
can then lead to the subject possessing a new notion of the object:
To have a notion of a thing, arguably, is to have an at-least-tacit belief 
that  it  exists  (not  necessarily  that  it  exists  now),  and  (on  a  reliabilist 
theory of knowledge) this belief will count as knowledge that the thing 
exists if the original general belief itself counts as knowledge. (Crimmins, 
(1992), p89)
Crimmins accepts that there are general thoughts, which differ from particular 
thoughts about objects.  So the thought the shortest spy is a spy, may be a general 
thought, which is satisfied by the object who fulfils the description the shortest 
spy.  But unlike the view proposed in this thesis, Crimmins also proposes that a 
subject  can have  a particular belief about  the  shortest  spy,  even  if he  is  not 
acquainted with the individual who is the shortest spy.  If a subject’s belief about 
the shortest spy does not contain a notion then  it is a general belief, but if it 
contains a notion then it is a singular belief about the person who is the shortest 
spy.  But can it really be that simple to form a notion of an object, and so think of 
an object?
Crimmins accepts that many have the intuition that a subject cannot form notions 
of an  object  unless  he  is  acquainted  with  it,  but  he  thinks  that  this  can  be 
explained  by  the  fact  that  notions  of  objects  with  which  a  subject  is  not 
acquainted are not often useful.  He gives an analogy of FBI file folders ((1992), 
p87-8) where a file is opened to track down a suspect.  Crimmins believes there 
is no reason why the FBI could not open a file for ‘the heaviest person who will 
commit murder next year’.  He argues that this file is about this person,  even 
though the FBI is not acquainted with this person.  However, the file is not useful 
as it cannot link to other information.  It cannot be tied up with other information 
about  the  suspect,  or be  used to  direct  an  action  towards  the  suspect.  But92
Crimmins  thinks  that  this  does  not  mean  that  such  files  are  not  about  the 
individual  in question “...so long as we  understand the  force of the  practical 
constraint: they are useless files.” ((1992), p88) He argues that the same is true of 
notions:
...the significant possibility of recognition -  of connecting new beliefs, 
perceptions,  intentions  and  actions  to  a  pre-existing  notion  -   is  an 
important practical constraint on the formation of notions.  There is no 
reason to form an idle notion: a notion that one is not significantly likely 
to connect in the future to the thing it is a notion of.  Notice that this is 
not a conceptual restriction about what is required for having a notion that 
is truly of a thing.  It is undeniable that we typically form beliefs truly 
about individuals only when we are  related  to  them  in a more or  less 
intimate manner.  And this fact falls out directly from a simple constraint 
on the usefulness of forming a notion of an individual. ((1992), p88)
The only problem that Crimmins sees for such “promiscuous”  notions  is that
they are “useless” -  they cannot link up with other information about the object.
But can a subject really have such a notion of an object in the first place?  What
is it that makes his thought about one object rather than another?  Why is his
thought that the shortest spy is a spy not just a general thought about whatever
happens to be the shortest spy?
I will return to Crimmins’s “promiscuous” notions below.9  But first I want to 
consider  views  which  enable  a  subject  to  have  singular  thoughts  without 
acquaintance, yet which are not quite as promiscuous as Crimmins’s suggestion. 
These  are  thoughts  which  a  subject  comes  to  have  by  accepting  sentences 
containing descriptive  names  (Evans  (1979),  (1982))  and dthat-terms  (Kaplan
(1978)  (1989a), (1989b)).  Descriptive names and dthat-terms are supposed to be 
singular terms which refer to objects, and the subject is supposed to be able to 
think about the objects referred to by understanding a sentence containing the 
descriptive name or dthat-term.  Evans (1982) and Kaplan (1989a) propose that 
in understanding such singular terms, the subject can have a singular thought, 
even when he is not acquainted with the object.  I think this is wrong.  Such 
thoughts  are  not  singular  thoughts.  Either  they  are  a  variety  of descriptive 
thought,  where the object  which  satisfies  the  description  is  the  same  in  each 
counterfactual  situation, or the  singular term  in the sentence accepted  has  not
9 See section 3.3. of this chapter.93
been properly introduced, so whatever the subject is thinking in accepting such a 
sentence he is not thinking a singular thought.
3.1  Descriptive Names
First  let  us  consider  the  case  of the  descriptive  name.  In  ‘Reference  and 
Contingency’ (1979) and also in The  Varieties of Reference ((1982), Chapter 2), 
Evans introduces the descriptive name ‘Julius’ by the stipulation:
(D) Let us use ‘Julius’ to refer to whoever invented the zip (e.g. (1979), 
pl 81)
By this stipulation, Evans builds into the descriptive name that it is a referring 
term, and that it will refer to whoever, in the actual world, invented the zip.  A 
subject counts as understanding the name when he understands the description 
‘the inventor of the zip’.  He does not have to know anything about the person 
who  invented  the  zip,  and  this  person  does  not  have  to  be  present  in  his 
experience in any way.  But because the descriptive name ‘Julius’ is stipulated to 
be a referring term, it behaves in a different way to the description ‘the inventor 
of the  zip’  in  modal  contexts.  ‘Julius  invented  the  zip’  is  contingently  true, 
because the descriptive name ‘Julius’ refers to the same person -  the person who 
actually invented the zip -  in all possible worlds, and in some possible worlds 
this person did not invent the zip.  ‘The inventor of the zip invented the zip’ is 
true in all possible worlds.  ‘The inventor of the zip’  is not a rigid expression, 
and its denotation is not constant across worlds.
Evans thinks that descriptions are not referring terms, primarily because of their 
modal behaviour.  For instance, the following sentence seems to be ambiguous:
The  first man  in  space  might  have  been  an  American  (Evans  (1979), 
pi 89; (1982), p55)
It can mean either that the person who was actually the first man in space -  Uri 
Gagarin -  might have been an American.  Or it can mean that an American, 
someone other than Gagarin, might have been the first man in space.  In other 
words, there is a possible world in which the man who is the first man in space in 
that world is an American in that world.  Names and descriptive names, on the 
other hand, only permit one reading:
Uri Gagarin might have been an American 
Julius might have been an American94
In each case the denotation of the name remains constant across possible worlds. 
Evans explains reference as the relation between expression and objects which 
makes the following true:
(P)  If R  (ti...tn )  is atomic, and  tj...tn   are referring expressions, then
R(ti.. .tn) is true iff <the referent of tj  the referent of t„ > satisfies R.
((1979),pl84)
Evans  says  of (P) that  it  simultaneously  defines  reference  and  satisfaction  in 
terms of truth ((1979), pi 84).  He thinks that any name or expression  whose 
contribution to the sentence in which it is occurs is stated by the above relation of 
reference  is  a  referring  term.  Proper  names  and  descriptive  names  both 
contribute to the sentences in which they occur in this way.  For proper names, 
their semantic contribution is their referent, as stated in clauses such as:
The referent of ‘Mary’ = Mary 
For descriptive names we have clauses such as:
Vx(the referent of ‘Julius’ = x <-> x uniquely invented the zip)
This clause uses only the relation of reference in (P), and together with clauses 
for predicates,  will  give  us truth conditions  for  sentences containing  ‘Julius’. 
Because ‘Julius’ can sometimes be empty, Evans accepts that we need to adopt a 
negative  free  logic  if  we  are  to  have  such  terms  as  referring  terms,  with 
modification to existential generalization and universal instantiation. But he does 
not  think  that  this  is  a problem.  If we  try  to  assign  a  reference  to  definite 
descriptions  using  a  principle  like  (P)1 0   we  capture  only  one  reading  of  a 
sentence like “The first man in space might have been American”.  It is primarily 
for  such  reasons  that  Evans  thinks  that  descriptive  names  refer,  but  definite 
descriptions do not.
But  Evans  admits  that  we  could  treat  definite  descriptions  as  referring 
expressions  if  we  relativize  the  relation  of  reference  to  a  possible  world. 
However, Evans does not want to do this.  He says:
Simply in  order to  assimilate  descriptions to  referring expressions,  we 
introduce a major change in the semantic apparatus in terms of which we 
describe  the  functioning  of  referring  expressions  in  general.  As  a 
consequence  of  this  change,  we  ascribe  to  names,  pronouns  and 
demonstratives semantical properties of a type which would allow them 
to get up to tricks they never in fact get up to; since their reference never
1 0 Actually, a principle like (P) modified to connect reference with the notion of truth with respect 
to a world95
varies  from  world  to  world,  this  semantic  power  is  never  exploited. 
(Evans (1982), p56)
So  the  reason  Evans does not want to  treat descriptions  as referring terms  is 
because  their  reference  varies  from  world  to  world.  According  to  him,  the 
reference of descriptive names does not vary from world to world.  But is there 
really any reason to think of them as referring terms, rather than as descriptions 
whose denotation does not vary from world to world?
In fact, Bostock ((1988), p367) has suggested that it is wrong to treat descriptive 
names as having the same denotation in each possible world.  He thinks  it  is 
wrong to treat the so-called reference of the name -  the actual inventor of the zip 
-  as what must be held constant across possible worlds:
The  fact  is  that  where  an  expression  does  have  a  sense  as  well  as  a 
reference...and  where  we  would  also  say  that  its  sense  determines  its 
reference, then we just do count as preserving the sense as the right way 
to  preserve  the  ‘meaning’  of  that  expression  for  modal  purposes. 
(Bostock (1988), p368)
But suppose we accept that Evans is entitled to stipulate that ‘Julius’ refers to the
same object -  the actual inventor of the zip -  in all possible worlds.  The result
here seems to be to treat the name ‘Julius’  as equivalent to the description ‘the
actual inventor of the zip’.11   ‘Actual’ is a rigidifier -  its role is to refer us back to
the way things are in the actual world, no matter what possible worlds are being
talked about.  Even if it is accepted that a term can have such properties, is there
any reason to think a subject accepting a sentence containing such a term has a
singular thought about an object?
In  The  Varieties of Reference  (1982)  it certainly  seems  that  Evans thinks  so. 
Indeed, accepting sentences containing descriptive names  seems to be the one 
exception to his  view that a subject must have  information  from an object in 
order to refer to it.  Evans is always very clear that he thinks singular thought (or 
as he calls it, particular-thought) is distinct from a descriptive thought, even if 
only one object is denoted by the description.  For instance he says:
...I mean to give expression to the view that the particular-thought and 
the existential thought are different in content: the thought that some G is 
F does not become a particular thought because there happens to be only 
oneG. ((1982), pi 10, n33)
1 1  This suggestion is made by Davies and Humberstone (1980), although Evans himself does not 
specify that the name is equivalent to the rigidifled description.96
But he then goes on to say:
We are characterizing a purely formal difference between thoughts which 
will allow the thought that Julius is F (...) to be a particular-thought.  If 
the  object of the  Idea  8*  invented  the  zip,  then  only  the  truth  of the 
proposition T8*  is F ~] is capable, as things stand, of making it true that 
Julius is F (though of course, since many individuals might have invented 
the zip, there are many propositions of the form f8 is F~| that might, in 
some absolute sense, have made it true that Julius is F). ((1982), pi 10, 
n33)
Recall from Section 2 that Evans holds that for most singular thought the subject 
must have information from the object, and must know which object it is; he 
must have discriminating knowledge of the object.  But according to Evans, the 
essential notion for a subject’s being able to have a singular thought about an 
object is that he has discriminating knowledge of the object -  that he conforms to 
what Evans calls Russell ’ s Principle.  And Evans seems to think that this can 
occur in the case of descriptive names without information.  The description is 
supposed to enable the  subject to  identify the  object,  by the  subject knowing 
distinguishing facts about the object.1 2
Despite what Evans thinks in (1982), I think much of his work in ‘Reference and 
Contingency’ (1979) is aimed precisely at showing that a subject who accepts a 
sentence containing a descriptive name does not have a singular thought.  In this 
work, which is a precursor to work on two-dimensional semantics, Evans argues 
that the epistemological content of a sentence should be distinguished from its 
modal content.  He says:
I shall not attempt to give an analysis of the notion of [epistemological] 
content here; I want to rely upon the intuitive sense according to which, if 
two sentences have the same content, then what is believed by one who 
understands and accepts the one sentence as true is the same as what is 
believed by one who understands and accepts the other sentence as true. 
On this, very strict, view of sameness of content, if two sentences have 
the same content, and a person understands both, then he cannot believe 
what  one  sentence  says  and  disbelieve  what  the  other  sentence  says. 
When  two  sentences  meet  this  condition,  I  shall  say  that  they  are 
epistemically equivalent. ((1979), p200)
Evans’s notion of epistemological content is something like Dummett’s notion of
assertoric content.  Dummett (e.g. in ‘Meaning in Terms of Justification’ (2002)
1 2  In fact, even by Evans’s standards, I am not sure that a subject’s understanding descriptive 
names should count as fulfilling Russell’s Principle -  the subject grasps a criterion for applying 
the name, but does he really know which object is referred to? (cf Bostock (1988), p370)97
and elsewhere) says that to understand the assertoric content of a sentence the 
subject must know what is conveyed by a speaker who on any occasion uses it on 
its own to make a statement (pi8).  Dummett contrasts this with the ingredient 
sense  of a  sentence;  to  grasp  this,  the  subject  must  grasp the  contribution  it 
makes to determining the assertoric content of any more complex sentence  in 
which it is embedded.  For instance, the sentences ‘It is raining here’, and ‘It is 
raining where I am’ have both the same (epistemological) content (Evans) and 
assertoric content (Dummett).  What is  believed by one who understands and 
accepts one as true, is believed by one who understands and accepts the other as 
true.  Or as  Dummett would put  it,  a  speaker  uttering either sentence  would 
convey the same information to the hearer.  Embedded, they may well give us 
sentences which have different assertoric contents -  for instance,  ‘It is always 
raining  here’  and  ‘It  is  always  raining  where  I  am’  do  not  have  the  same 
assertoric content, as ‘here’ is temporally rigid while ‘where I am’ is not.  Thus 
the  embedded  sentences  have  different  ingredient  senses.  In  a  similar  way, 
Evans argues that the sentences ‘Julius is F   and ‘The inventor of the zip is F  
have  the  same  epistemic  content,  even  though  they  embed  differently  under 
modal operators:
We know that the sentences ‘Julius is F’ and ‘The inventor of the zip is F’ 
are  associated  with  different  propositions  [a  function  from  possible 
worlds to truth values in a possible worlds semantics]... . Nevertheless, it
seems clear that the two sentences are epistemically equivalent  Belief
states  are  individuated  by  the  evidence  which  gives  rise  to  them,  the 
expectations,  behaviour,  and  further beliefs which may  be  based  upon 
them, and in all of these respects the belief states associated with the two 
sentences are indistinguishable. We do not get ourselves into new belief 
states by ‘the stroke of a pen’ (in Grice’s phrase) -  simply by introducing 
a name into the language. ((1979), p202)
This seems to be an argument for the case that a subject accepting a sentence
such as  ‘Julius is F   does not have a singular thought.  Evans agrees that the
subject’s thought is equivalent to the thought that he would have if he accepted
the  sentence ‘The inventor of the  zip  is F ,  and that this is a general thought
which  denotes  an  object  -   it  is  not  a  singular  thought.  Consider  again  the
suggestion that the name ‘Julius’  is equivalent to the rigidified description ‘the
actual  inventor of the  zip’.  This  description  denotes  only  (and  at  most)  one
object,  and  the  object  remains  constant  across  possible  worlds,  because  the
denotation is always the inventor of the zip in the actual world.  But why should98
a  subject  have  to  be  thinking  about  an  object  in  order  to  understand  this 
description?  Evans is always very clear that a general thought differs  from a 
singular thought in content, even if only one object is denoted by the  general 
thought.
Descriptive names are not a counterexample to the proposal that for a subject to 
have a singular thought about an object he must be acquainted with the object.  A 
subject can  understand  a descriptive  name  without  being acquainted  with  the 
object  it  denotes,  because  he  understands  the  description.  This  is  a  case  of 
descriptive, or general thought, rather than singular thought.
3.2  Dthat-Terms
Dthat-terms are supposed to be another counterexample to the proposal that to 
think about and refer to an object the subject must be acquainted with the object. 
They differ from descriptive names in that their meaning is supposed to be only 
the object referred to -  there is supposed to be no descriptive content.  Kaplan 
introduces the term in his article ‘Dthat’ (1978):  ‘dthatfa]’ is supposed to be a 
directly  referential  term  (one  whose  meaning  is  only  the  object  referred  to) 
whose reference is the denotation of ‘a ’, where ‘a ’ is a description or a singular 
term.  But a is not part of the meaning of ‘dthatja]’ -  it serves only to fix the 
reference.  Kaplan  explains  the  reasoning  behind  introducing  such  a  term  as 
follows:
Recall  that  we  earlier  regarded  demonstrations,  which  are  required  to 
‘complete’ demonstratives, as a kind of description.  The demonstrative 
was  then treated as  a directly  referential  term  whose  referent  was the 
demonstratum of the associated demonstration.
Now  why  not  regard  descriptions  as  a  kind  of  demonstration,  and 
introduce  a  special  demonstrative  which  requires  completion  by  a 
description  and  which  is  treated  as  a  directly  referential  term  whose 
referent is the denotation of the associated description?  Why not?  Why 
not indeed! I have done so... ((1989a), p521)
Kaplan  thinks  that  sentences  formed  using  ‘dthat  [a]’  will  refer  directly  to
objects. As an example, ‘dthat [the first child to be bom in the 21st century]’ will
refer to that child, so any sentence containing the term will refer to the  child.
Kaplan also thinks that such objects can be named:
My liberality with respect to the introduction of directly referring terms 
by  means  of ‘dthat’  extends  to  proper  names,  and  I  would  allow  an 
arbitrary definite description to give us the object we name.  “Let’s call99
the  first  child  to  be  bom  in  the  twenty-first  century  ‘Newman  1”’ 
((1989a), p560, n76).
‘Newman  1’ and ‘dthat [the first child to be bom in the 21st century]’  are both
supposed to be singular terms which refer to an object despite the  fact that a
subject is not acquainted with the object.  And not only can the terms refer to an
object, but any subject understanding a sentence containing such terms can come
to  have  beliefs  about  the  object  -   he  can  have  singular thoughts  about  it  -
despite not being acquainted with it.  Kaplan writes:
The introduction of a new proper name by means of a dubbing in terms of 
description and the active contemplation of characters  involving  dthat- 
terms -  two mechanisms for providing direct reference to the denotation 
of an  arbitrary  definite  description  -   constitute  a  form  of  cognitive 
restructuring; they broaden our range of thought. ((1989a), p560, n76)
In the descriptive names case  I  have argued that the  subject does not have  a 
singular thought,  but  instead  has  a  general  or  descriptive thought,  where  the 
object denoted (if there is one) is the same in each possible world.  But Kaplan’s 
dthat-terms are not supposed to be like this.  They are supposed to be directly 
referential.  However, in ‘Afterthoughts’ (1989b) Kaplan realizes that ‘dthat’ is 
not always interpreted in this way:
On one interpretation, “dthat” is a directly referential singular term and 
the content of the associated description is no part of the content of the 
dthat-term.  On another interpretation, “dthat” is syntactically an operator 
that requires syntactical completion by a description in order to form a 
singular term. (1989b, p579)
If interpreted as a syntactically complete singular term, then the content of the
dthat-term is its denotation.  It is the object picked out by the description that is
‘taken around’  each possible world.  But if interpreted as an operator then the
content is not the referent but is instead something like an actualized description.
As Kaplan puts it:
In this case the proposition would not carry the individual  itself into a 
possible world but rather would carry instructions to run back home and 
get the individual who there satisfies certain specifications.  The complete 
dthat-term would then be  a rigid description which induces  a complex 
‘representation’  of the referent into the content; it would not be directly 
referential. (Kaplan (1989b), p580)
If this  were  the  correct  interpretation  then, just  as  in the  case  of descriptive
names,  a  subject  understanding  a  sentence  including  a  dthat-term  would just
involve him understanding a description.  This need not involve him having a100
thought  about  an  object.  A  subject  understanding  the  sentence  ‘Dthat  [the 
shortest spy] is a spy’ does not have a singular thought about the person who is 
the shortest spy, but only has to understand the description.  But what if ‘dthat’ is 
interpreted as Kaplan originally intended -  as a directly referential singular term? 
Does that mean that a subject accepting such sentences has a singular thought?
It does not.  The description ‘a ’  in  ‘dthat[a]’  is not part of the content of the 
thought.  It is the content which is held constant across counterfactual situations. 
The  description  ‘a ’  is  instead  supposed  to  be  the  character,  where  character 
determines the content of the expression in every context (e.g.  (1989a), p505). 
Kaplan accepts that the cognitive significance of a thought is its character rather 
than its content (see (1989a), p530).  He also says:
When we say that a word  is directly referential  are we  saying that its 
meaning is its reference (its only meaning is its reference, its meaning is 
nothing more than its reference)?  Certainly not. [footnote: We see here a 
drawback to the terminology ‘direct reference’.  It suggests  falsely that 
the reference is not mediated by a meaning, which it is.  The meaning 
(character)  is  directly  associated,  by  convention,  with  the  word.  The 
meaning  determines  the  referent;  and  the  referent  determines  the 
content....] Insofar as meaning is given by the rules of a language and is 
what is known by competent speakers, I would be more inclined to say in 
the case of directly referential words and phrases that their reference is no 
part of their meaning.....
Meanings tell us how the content of a word or phrase is determined by 
the context of use.  Thus the meaning of a word or phrase is what I have 
called its character. ((1989a), p520-l)
Nevertheless,  Kaplan thinks that by accepting a sentence containing a directly 
referential term, a subject can have a singular thought:
...  a  special  form  of knowledge  of an  object  is  neither  required  nor 
presupposed in order that a person may entertain as object of thought a 
singular proposition involving that object.
There is nothing inaccessible to the mind about the semantics of direct 
reference,  even  when the  reference  is  to  that which we know only by 
description.  What  allows  us  to  take  various  propositional  attitudes 
towards singular propositions is not the form of our acquaintance with the 
objects but is rather our ability to manipulate the conceptual apparatus of 
direct reference. ((1989a), p536)
I think that this is wrong.  Kaplan is led to this conclusion because of his work on 
demonstratives and indexicals  like  ‘I’.  He thinks that such terms  are directly101
referential -  their content is the object denoted, and the object remains constant
across  counterfactual  situations.  Their  meaning  is  their  character.  A  subject
understanding  ‘I’  needs  to  understand  the  rule  that  it  refers  to  whoever  is
speaking or writing ((1989a), p520).  A subject understanding a demonstrative
needs to understand the accompanying demonstration, where a demonstration is: 
...typically, though not invariably, a (visual) presentation of a local object 
discriminated by a pointing. ((1989a), p490)
In these cases Kaplan is right that a subject does have a singular thought -  he is
thinking about an object.  But with demonstratives, the object is present to the
subject.  It must be in order for the subject to be able to demonstrate it.  It is
because of this that the subject can think about the object.  With ‘I’, as I shall
argue  in  Part  III  of this thesis,  it  is the  fact that  the  object  thought  about  is
identical with the subject which enables him to think about it reflexively.  Kaplan
(1989a)  thinks  that  the  description  in  a  dthat-term  does  the  same  work  as  a
demonstration.  But what is  it that enables a subject to  think about an object
here?  With  a  dthat-term  the  character  is  a  description.  But  why  should
understanding  a  description  enable  a  subject  to  think  about  an  object?  If
‘dthat[a]’ is supposed to function as a syntactically complete singular term, then
its character does not enable the subject to think of the object, so the term has not
been properly introduced.
Kaplan himself is less confident in this matter in his  ‘Afterthoughts’.  He says 
that he is “not entirely unsympathetic” with the following suggestion:
...that all names...however introduced, carry their referent as meaning; 
but not all names carry knowledge of their referent.  Those names that 
were properly introduced, by ostension or based on some other form of 
knowledge  of the  referent,  carry  and  transmit  the  requisite  epistemic 
connection.  But in  a tiny  fraction  of cases the  connection  is absent -  
semantics (or metasemantics) does not require it -  and in these cases we 
have direct reference, and expressibility, but no apprehension. ((1989b),
p606)
It is knowing the object which is essential for a subject to have a singular thought 
about an independent object.  Otherwise, how is his thought about that particular 
object?3.3  Crimmins’s ‘Promiscuous’ Notions
Neither descriptive names nor dthat-terms are counterexamples to the view that 
to think about an object the subject must be acquainted with the object.  Either to 
understand sentences containing such terms the subject must have a descriptive 
thought, or the term in the sentence has not been properly introduced.  If it is a 
descriptive thought only one object satisfies this description, but that does not 
make  the thought  a singular thought.  Crimmins  (1992)  accepts  a distinction 
between singular thought and descriptive thought, so why does he want to say 
that the thought that the shortest spy is a spy can be a singular thought about the 
shortest  spy,  even  if  the  subject  is  not  acquainted  with  the  shortest  spy? 
Crimmins thinks the objection to having a notion of an object in this case is that 
the notion is not useful.  It cannot be tied up with other information about the 
object, or be used to direct an action towards the object.  But this is not the point. 
The  point  is  how a  subject  has  a thought  about  an  object  in  the  first  place. 
Without the object being somehow present in experience, there is nothing which 
makes the thought about that object.  As McCulloch writes, criticizing  such a 
view:
On this view, our capacity to refer gives us the prodigious ability to zap 
across  space  and  time  to  the  object  in  question  (if there  is  one)  and 
thereby come to stand to it in the relation described by (P) -  and all by 
uttering a perfectly general sentence in the right frame of mind.  What an 
incredible feat! (McCulloch (1985), p578)
A  subject  thinking  a  descriptive  thought,  even  when  it  is  an  actualized 
description, is not having a singular thought.  If the situation were different -  if a 
different possible world were actual -  a different object would be denoted by the 
description, but the subject would still have the same thought.  This is not the 
case with singular thought.  A subject is thinking about a particular object, and 
this  object  individuates  the  thought.  If the  situation  were  different,  but  the 
subject has the same thought, then he would be thinking of the same object.  If he 
is thinking of a different object then it is a different thought.104
descriptive thought, then the suggestion is that exportation is  invalid,  and the 
report cannot be existentially generalized.  It cannot be concluded either:
3x John believes x is a spy
or
John believes of the shortest spy that he is a spy.
If the report is instead being used to attribute a singular thought about the person 
who is the shortest spy then exportation and existential generalization are valid.
The idea to be considered in this chapter is that existential generalization and 
exportation are valid when the belief reported is about an object.  But there is a 
further point too.  This further idea is that our intuitions about when such beliefs 
are  about  an  object  are  playing  off  our  intuitions  of  when  the  subject  is 
acquainted with the object.  We think that John believes of the shortest spy that 
he is a spy when he is acquainted with the person who is the shortest spy -  when 
he somehow knows this person.  If he is not acquainted with the shortest spy then 
his belief is a general belief and a report of it cannot be existentially generalized 
or exported.  Thus exportation and existential generalization are linguistic tests 
for acquaintance.
1  Kaplan’s Proposal
The proposal that, in order for the exportation and existential generalization of a 
belief attribution to be valid the subject of the report must be acquainted with the 
object thought about, is made by Kaplan in ‘Quantifying In’ (1969).  His article 
is  written  in  response  to  Quine’s  ‘Quantifiers  and  Propositional  Attitudes’ 
(1956), where Quine argues that while quantifying into modal contexts makes no 
sense, quantifying into propositional attitudes does.  That is, Quine argues that 
while it is invalid to infer 3xD Fx from □ Fa, it makes epistemological sense to 
conclude that 3x(J believes Fx) from (J believes Fa).  For example, Quine thinks 
that from:
Necessarily 9 is greater than 5, 
it is illegitimate to conclude that:
3x Necessarily x is greater than 5.
However, from:
John believes Mary is tired, 
it can be concluded:105
3x John believes x is tired.
The  reason  that  Quine  thinks  that  we  must  be  able  to  quantify  into 
epistemological contexts is because a sentence such as:
Ralph believes that someone is a spy, 
can be analysed in two ways.  Under one reading, Ralph just believes that there 
are spies.  Under another reading, Ralph believes that a particular person is a spy. 
Quine proposes that to make sense of this second reading we have to quantify 
into a belief context:
3x Ralph believes that x is a spy.
What we have here is the explicitly linguistic suggestion from Quine that if a 
belief is about an object then its report can be analysed by quantifying into a 
belief context.
Things are not quite so straightforward for Quine, though, as although he thinks 
that in order to capture reports of beliefs about objects one must quantify into 
belief contexts, he does not think that so quantifying makes logical sense.1   This 
is  because Quine takes  belief contexts (like quotation contexts) to  be opaque, 
where the names or singular terms within the context are not purely referential. 
He  thinks  that  in  opaque  contexts,  neither  substitution,  nor  existential 
generalization is valid.  Quine thus proposes that there are really two different 
senses of the word ‘belief -  a relational sense, which admits both substitution 
and  existential  generalization,  and  a  notional  sense,  which  admits  neither. 
Notional belief is a two place relation between a subject and (Quine thinks) a 
sentence.  The  belief report  expressed  by  ‘John  believes  that  Mary  is  tired’ 
relates John to the sentence ‘Mary is tired’.  Mary might also be called ‘Jane’ by 
some people, but John might be unaware of this.  As the sentence ‘Mary is tired’ 
is opaque, it does not follow that John believes that Jane is tired:  John is not 
related to the sentence ‘Jane is tired’ and ‘Jane’ cannot be substituted for ‘Mary’ 
in  the  opaque  sentence  ‘Mary  is tired’.  It  is  also  illegitimate to  existentially 
generalize.  However,  in  its  relational  sense,  belief is  a  three  place  relation 
between a subject, an object, and (for Quine) a sentence containing a variable. If 
‘John believes that Mary is tired’ is to be understood in its relational sense, it can 
also be written as ‘John believes of Mary that she is tired’.  It relates John to the
1  This is discussed in detail in Kaplan (1986), Fine (1989) and Stanley (1997)106
object Mary, however this object may be named, and says of her that she is tired. 
Existential generalization is valid, as is substitution. In a relational belief report it 
is not specified what belief the  subject holds -   i.e.  on Quine’s view  it is not 
specified what sentence the subject accepts or how the object thought about is 
denoted.  The report just states that the subject has a belief about an object, and 
so the sentence the subject accepts meets a certain condition -  it contains a name 
which refers to an object.
But  it  does not  seem  necessary  to  say  that there  are  two  different  senses  of 
‘believe’  in  belief reports.  In  ‘Opacity’  (1986)  Kaplan  argues  that  Quine  is 
wrong to  assume  that because  substitution  fails  in belief contexts,  existential 
generalization must also fail.  He agrees that there are two readings, of (e.g.) a 
report such as:
Ralph believes that someone is a spy,
These are:
(1) 3x (Ralph believes that x is a spy), and
(2)  Ralph believes that 3x (x is a spy).
Kaplan argues that once we have analysed the report in two different ways:
...what  remains  to  do  in  order  to  ‘disambiguate’  the  lexical  item 
[‘believe’]  is completely determined:  [(1)]  requires the relational  sense, 
[(2)] takes the notional sense... Yet it was the language of [(1)] and [(2)] 
that was regarded as ‘dubious’ and as demanding reformulation.  In this 
case, if ‘disambiguation’ suffices, re-ambiguation does so likewise.  If we 
can  provide  meaning  preserving  rules  which  transform  each  logically 
dubious  formulation  into  a  unique  indubitable  one,  then  the  very 
existence of those rules shows that the original doubts were unfounded. 
((1986), p237)
Take the  belief report  ‘John  believes that  Mary  is tired’.  If Kaplan  is  right, 
against Quine, then although we cannot substitute and obtain ‘John believes that 
Jane is tired’  even if ‘Jane’  and ‘Mary’  refer to the same object, it still makes 
sense to existentially generalize and conclude that 3x John believes x is tired, and 
exportation is justified,  so John believes of Mary that she is tired can also be 
concluded.  We do not need two different senses of belief.  In the same way, a 
subject may believe that Hesperus is a planet, and believe that Phosphorus is not 
a planet.  We cannot substitute ‘Hesperus’  for ‘Phosphorus’  in reports of these 
beliefs,  as  that  would  not  accurately  report  what  the  subject  believes. 
Nevertheless, it seems correct to say that the subject believes of Hesperus that it107
is a planet, and that he believes of Phosphorus that it is not a planet.  And this is
because his belief is about an object in each case.
What are the conditions, if any, on a subject’s belief which make the existential 
generalization and exportation of a report of his belief valid?  Kaplan (1969) 
follows Quine in thinking that it is justified to export or existentially generalize 
belief reports when the belief reported is about an object.  But he goes further 
than  Quine  and  proposes  that  for  this  to  be  the  case  there  must  be  an
acquaintance  relation  between  subject  and  object.  Kaplan  tries to  give  an
analysis of Quine’s relational belief -  a relation between a subject and an object 
and an open sentence.  He does so by seeing what conditions there must be on 
the  name  of  the  object  in  the  sentence  accepted,  for  exportation  and 
generalization to be valid.  However, Kaplan thinks that Quine’s conditions are 
too weak, and allow for (e.g.) exportation in cases where intuitively we would 
think there is no belief about an object.  Quine and Kaplan agree that there are 
two readings of (e.g.):
Ralph believes that someone is a spy.
As discussed before, these are:
(1) 3x (Ralph believes that x is a spy), and
(2)  Ralph believes that 3x (x is a spy).
The first attributes a belief about an object, while the second attributes only the 
general belief that there are spies.  But even if Ralph has only the second general 
belief, he can also have the belief that one of the spies will be the shortest of all 
the spies, and will thus believe that the  shortest spy is a spy.  And if Ralph 
believes that the shortest spy is a spy, then there is nothing in what Quine writes 
to  prevent  the  conclusion  that  3x  (Ralph believes  that  x  is  a  spy).2  Yet  the 
general intuition is that in this case such a belief is not about an object -  it is still 
a general belief -  and so existential generalization should not be valid.
In (1969), in marked contrast to his later work, Kaplan states that:
...I am unwilling to adopt any theory of proper names which permits me 
to perform a dubbing in absentia, as by solemnly declaring “I hereby dub 
the first child to be bom in the twenty-second century ‘Newman 1  ’”, and 
thus grant myself standing to have beliefs about that as yet unborn child. 
((1969), p229)
2 Kaplan takes it that definite descriptions can be referential108
At  this  stage  Kaplan  does  not  think  that  a  subject  can  have  a  belief about 
Newman  1, and does not think that belief attributions about Newman  1   can be 
existentially generalized.  Instead, to be able to have thoughts or beliefs about an 
object  the  thinker must be  en  rapport  with  that  object;  if the  thinker  has  a 
thought expressed by a sentence  ‘a is F , then he must be en rapport with a. 
Kaplan explains this by saying that the name  ‘a’  must be of a, and must be a 
vivid name for a.  He originally explains what he means for a name to be of an 
object by discussing the relation of a picture to its subject.  For a picture (or a 
name) to be of an object, then the object “must serve significantly in the causal 
chain leading to the picture’s production and also serve as object for the picture” 
(1969, p226) Just because a picture resembles an object does not mean that it is 
of that object.  I might own two identical cups and take a picture of just one of 
them, cup 1.  Even though my picture also looks like cup 2, it is not of cup 2 as 
cup 2 was not causally linked to the picture.  In the same way a name must be of 
its subject; the name must be causally linked to the object it names. There is also 
the requirement that the name must be a vivid name of the object for the thinker:
The notion of a vivid name is intended to go to the purely internal aspects 
of individuation.  Consider typical cases in which we would be likely to 
say that Ralph knows jc  or is acquainted with x.  Then look only at the 
conglomeration of images, names and partial  descriptions which Ralph 
employs  to  bring  x  before  his  mind.  Such  a  conglomeration,  when
suitably arranged and regimented, is what I call a vivid name    If the
name is such, that on the assumption that there exists some individual jc  
whom it both denotes and resembles we should say that Ralph knows x or 
is acquainted with jc , then the name is vivid. ((1969), p229)
For Kaplan, the knowledge or acquaintance the thinker must have of the object is 
not further defined but is basic, and it is taken for granted that there are obvious 
cases when a subject is acquainted with an object.  Kaplan does give examples of 
when a name might be vivid, but he does not take any to be definitional.  He 
thinks that the subject’s knowledge of the object does not entail that the subject 
can  recognize  the  object  under  all  circumstances,  as  there  are  clear 
counterexamples to this (for example, the subject may not realize that Hesperus 
is  Phosphorus).  He  also  does  not  think  that  the  subject  must  always  have 
perceived the object, or be able to locate the object (p230).109
Kaplan (1969) thinks that just having condition i), the causal condition that the 
name  is  of an  object,  is  not  enough  to  permit  existential  generalization  or 
exportation.  This is because of various  counterexamples  such  as  the  case  of 
Sherlock Holmes viewing a murder victim.  Simply by viewing the body, the 
term  ‘the  murderer’  would  be  a  name  of the  murderer  for  Holmes.  Kaplan 
believes  that  definite  descriptions  are  referring  terms,  so  the  sentence  ‘The 
murderer murdered the victim’ refers to the murderer.  However, if this is all he 
knows, the subject’s thought is not about the person who murdered the victim -  
just because the report ‘Holmes believes the murderer murdered the victim’  is 
true,  we  do  not  want  to  conclude  that  3x  (Holmes  believes  x  murdered  the 
victim).  We only want to conclude Holmes believes 3x (x murdered the victim).
For existential generalization and exportation to be valid Kaplan thinks we also 
need condition ii), that the name of the object is a vivid name for the subject.
Holmes needs to be appropriately related to the individual in question before we 
are  prepared  to  say  that  there  is  someone  whom  Holmes  believes  to  be  the 
murderer.
Kaplan’s (1969) proposal is that there is a linguistic test -  that of exportation and  **
.________________________             I/W -*   U
existential generalization -  for when a belief report attributes a singular thought  ^   A *
about an object to a subject.  And the thought is that it is not enough for the ^   A 'L
singular term in the belief report simply to name an object -  a subject accepting a  /k/
sentence containing a referring term still may not have a thought about an object.
Instead, the subject must be en rapport with the object.  So consider the case of
the descriptive name:
(D)  Let  us  use  ‘Julius’  to  refer  to  whoever  invented  the  zip  (Evans
(1979), pl81)
And consider the report:
John believes Julius invented the zip
John believes this only from understanding the descriptive name ‘Julius’.  John
believes  that Julius invented the  zip  because  he  knows that  ‘Julius’  has  been
stipulated to refer to the inventor of the zip.  It does not seem correct to conclude:
John believes of Julius that he invented the zip.
3  Evans does not believe that descriptive names can be exported, but still thinks they are referring 
terms.  At one point Kaplan (1989a) does think that dthat-terms can be exported -  but he is much 
more wary of this in (1989b)110
The  proposal  is  that  John’s  belief  is  not  about  an  object,  and  this  is  why 
exportation is invalid.  And the reason why we think that the belief is not about 
an  object  is  that  John  is  not  acquainted  with  the  person  Julius  -   he  only 
understands the description by which the name was defined.
2  Holton’s Objection
Holton (1994) gives an argument which, if correct, shows that the above cannot 
be right.  He argues that if the test for whether a belief or thought is about an 
object is whether its attribution can be existentially generalized, this cannot fit 
together with a know which account of when a belief is about an object.  If his 
argument is correct it can be extended to show that there cannot be a fit between 
existential generalization and any condition on the relation between subject and 
object.  This means that the proposed linguistic test for whether a subject’s belief 
is about an object cannot fit together with the condition that a subject must be 
acquainted with an object in order to think about it.
Holton ((1994), pi23) considers the sentence:
(1) Hilary believes that she will sail a sloop4 
There are two readings of this.  On one reading it is about a particular object, a 
particular sloop.  On another, it is just a general belief and is not about any one 
sloop.  Holton considers the hypothesis that the difference between the reading 
which is about an object, and that which is not is that, when the belief ascribed is 
about an object, the subject knows which object it is about -  Hilary can answer 
the question ‘Which thing will you sail?’.  His proposal is that this does not fit 
with analysing the two readings of the sentence in the following ways:
(2) [An x: x is a sloop] Hilary believes that she will sail x
(3) Hilary believes that [an x: x is a sloop] she will sail x
(2)  is  supposed  to  be  about  a  particular  sloop,  while  (3)  is  supposed  to  be 
ascribing a  general  belief.  Holton  argues that the  know which criterion  is  not 
what makes a reading of (1) about an object.
Holton’s argument is in given terms of embedded belief reports.  He looks at the 
example:
4 My numberingIll
(4) Hoover charged that the Berrigans believed that their accomplices would 
kidnap a high American official
Analysed  in  terms  of  scope  distinctions  (which  Holton  calls  a  Russellian
analysis) we get three analyses (e.g. see pi25):
(5) [An x: high official x]  Hoover charged that the Berrigans believed that 
their accomplices would kidnap x
(6) Hoover charged that  [An x:  high official x] the Berrigans believed that 
their accomplices would kidnap x
(7) Hoover charged that the Berrigans believed that [An x:  high official x] 
their accomplices would kidnap x
In (5) there is a particular official that both Hoover’s charge and the Berrigans’s
belief are about.  In (6) Hoover’s charge is not about a particular official, but the
Berrigan’s belief is.  In (7) neither Hoover’s charge nor the Berrigan’s belief is
about a particular object.  Holton argues that if what is required for a belief to be
about an object is that the subject knows who the object is, then there should be a
fourth reading -  where Hoover knows who the official is, but the Berrigans do
not.  The Berrigans might have been told of the plan, but not of the identity of the
official, while Hoover knows who it is (pi26).  On a Russellian analysis, there is
no  way  that  Hoover’s  charge  can  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  indefinite
description  while  the  Berrigans’s  belief falls  without  it.  Thus  a  Russellian
analysis in terms of scope distinctions does not fit with the know which criterion.
As Holton discusses ((1994), pi 28), this is not just a problem for accounts which 
specify that the condition necessary for a thought to be about an object is that the 
subject knows which object it is.  It seems to be a problem for any account where 
there is a condition on what it is for a thought to be about an object, whether this 
condition is a causal condition, an acquaintance condition, or something else.5  
Suppose that there is a condition which my thought a is F must meet in order for 
it to be about an object.  Either this condition is met, or it is not.6  If we have an 
embedded belief ascription  ‘A believes that B believes that P’  then either A’s 
belief is about an object, or it is not, and either B’s belief is about an object or it 
is not.  So we have 4 options.  Belief reports of the form  4  A believes that B 
believes  C  believes  that  P’  will  be  ambiguous  in  8  ways.  Analysing  these 
embedded belief reports by using Russellian scope distinctions cannot give us the
5 Pickles (1995) also argues something like this in his response to Holton
6 Someone like Millikan would not hold this, of course.  For her, it would be a matter of degree.112
same number of options.  With a single belief operator we get two readings. 
With an embedded belief we get three readings.  With beliefs of the form  ‘A 
believes that B believes C believes that P’ we get four readings.  Someone higher 
up in the iterations cannot fall within the scope of the indefinite description if 
those at a lower level do not.  So, if Holton is right, being acquainted with an 
object cannot be a condition on having a thought about an object if a subject’s 
having a thought about an object can be tested for by existential generalization.
In fact, although Holton does not see it like this, his example is not so much a 
problem for a know which or acquaintance restriction on singular thought, but is 
instead an argument against the proposal that singular thought can be marked at 
the level of an attribution of the thought.  Again, if we have the embedded belief 
report ‘A believes that B believes that P’ then either A’s belief is about an object 
or it is not, and B’s belief is about an object, or it is not.  And it is these four 
possibilities which cannot be captured by the scope-distinction analysis.  The 
focus on the know which condition is a little misleading.  Holton disagrees with 
this  analysis,  saying that in the  fourth case, the  Berrigans’s  belief is  about a 
particular individual, without their knowing who it is about (pi26).  However, he 
does not think this is a particular or singular belief because of the failure of the 
know which condition.  So it seems that even thought Holton thinks the belief is 
about something, he still thinks it is a general belief.
In any case, Holton’s argument does not work.  In the fourth option, supposedly
not captured by the Russellian analysis, Hoover is supposed to know who the
official is, while the Berrigans do not.  Or, to put it not in terms of knowing who,
Hoover is supposed to have a particular belief, while the Berrigans do not.  But
surely  it could  be the  case  that  Hoover  has  a separate  belief about  who  the
official is.  Or that Hoover has a separate belief about a particular official.  And
his charge about the Berrigans is not about a particular individual (and nor is
their belief). In more formal terms, there seems no reason why the fourth option
could not be analysed as:
(8)  (Hoover charged that the Berrigans believed that [an x: high official 
x]  their accomplices  would  kidnap  x)  and  ([an  x:  high  official  x] 
Hoover  charged  that  x  would  be  kidnapped  by  the  Berrigans 
officials).Hoover’s charge (or belief) is about the Berrigans’s belief -  and their belief is 
either about an object or is a general belief.  Despite what Holton says, I think 
that in the fourth option their belief is a general  belief.  If Hoover also has a 
belief about an object here, then this seems clearly to be a case of a separate 
belief, over and above his belief about the Berrigans’s belief.  To take another 
example, suppose:
Mary believes Ralph believes that someone is a spy 
The claim is that there is a case which cannot be captured by scope distinctions, 
which is where Ralph has a general belief, but Mary has a singular belief about 
an object.  But surely in the second-level ascription above, Mary’s reported belief 
is  about Ralph’s belief,  and  whether that  is  a  singular or  general  belief.  In 
Holton’s  supposed fourth case, Ralph’s belief is a general  belief,  and Mary’s 
belief is about that.  She may even be mistaken that Ralph’s belief is a general 
belief -  perhaps he is, after all, acquainted with a particular spy.  But this does 
not matter.  Mary believes that Ralph has a general belief, and this is what her 
belief is about.  If Mary happens to have a singular belief about a specific person 
who is a spy, then this is separate from her belief about Ralph’s belief.
Pickles (1995) says of these suggestions that “This claim contradicts the view 
that there  is  a  semantic  ambiguity  in  belief ascription  due  to  the  distinction 
between  general  and  particular  beliefs.  So  if  we  stick  with  this  Russellian 
account of the situation, this latter view has to go” (p77).  But I am not sure why 
this must be the case.  Holton’s argument is that there are more things in the 
world -  more ways of different subjects thinking about objects or having general 
beliefs -  than we would predict on the basis of our use of language, if this is to 
be explained by scope distinctions.  But this does not seem to be such a problem. 
Why should we think that all the various possibilities  should be capturable in 
terms  of  scope  distinctions?  The  suggestion  of  this  chapter  is  that  belief 
ascriptions  are  ambiguous,  and  that  in  some  cases  they  can  be  existentially 
generalized and exported, and in other cases they cannot.  In the cases where they 
can  be  exported  the  proposal  is  that  the  belief is  about  an  object,  and  our 
intuitions about whether or not this is the case play off our intuitions of whether 
the  subject  is  acquainted  with  the  object  thought  about.  There  could  be  a 
semantic ambiguity in belief ascription due to the distinction between general114
and particular belief at the first level -  but there is no reason this must commit us 
to holding that there must be a semantic ambiguity in further iterations.  There is 
no reason to think that such scope distinctions must be able to capture whether a 
‘higher  level’  subject,  who  has  a  belief  about  another’s  belief,  also  has  a 
particular  belief  about  the  object.  The  only  reason  we  might  reach  this 
conclusion seems to be if we think that the distinction in thought between having 
a thought about an object and having a general  belief is only  a shadow of a 
linguistic distinction.  The proposal is that to have a thought about an object the 
subject must be acquainted with the object, and there is a linguistic test for this in 
that when a subject’s thought is about an object, the attribution of the thought can 
be existentially generalised.  There is no reason why the distinction between 
singular  thought  and  general  thought  should  be  marked  in  more  complex 
attributions.
3  What is the Linguistic Test Marking?
Holton takes himself to be arguing against the know which criterion fitting with a 
Russellian analysis of belief reports in terms of scope distinctions.  But actually, 
his argument, if it worked, would show that there cannot be a linguistic test for 
when a belief is about an object.  However, it does not show this -  the distinction 
between  singular  and  descriptive  thought  is  not  marked  in  some  iterated 
attributions,  but there  is  no  reason  why  this  distinction  could  not be  marked 
linguistically at the level of an attribution of the thought.
But even if there is a linguistic test for whether a subject has a singular thought, 
does the validity of existential generalization and exportation really depend on 
whether  the  subject  having  the  thought  attributed  is  en  rapport  with,  or 
acquainted with, the object thought about?  Perhaps what is really driving the 
cases where existential  generalization  is  permissible  is  only that the subject’s 
thought is about an object.  And this is not driven by a subject’s acquaintance 
with the object.
Such a position is in line with those like Soames ((1995) and elsewhere).  He 
argues that it is in the nature of singular terms that they can come out of belief 
contexts.  Acquaintance, according to him, has nothing to do with it.  Soames115
believes  that  names  and  other  singular  terms  refer  directly  to  objects;  the
meaning of a singular term is only the object referred to.  The object referred to
is determined solely by the causal chains that link the referent to the term.  A
subject can refer directly to an object using a singular term, and if the subject
accepts a proposition containing a singular term he automatically has a thought
about the object.  There is no condition that an ascription of a thought about an
object can impose which is not already present in the acceptance of a singular
proposition.  Soames writes:
...to  believe  a  proposition,  it  is  sufficient  for  one  to  understand  and 
accept  any  sentence  or  representation  that  expresses  that  proposition 
((1995), P518)
And to accept a sentence one need not be acquainted with anything; in Beyond 
Rigidity ((2002), p72) Soames argues that all that is required to be a competent
user of a name or expression ‘n’ is that:
(i)  the  user  has  acquired  a  referential  intention  that  (somehow) 
determines the object as the referent of n
(ii)  the  speaker  knows  that  assertively  uttering  ‘n  is  F’  involves 
saying of the referent of n that it ‘is F\
Because of this, with any attributions of thoughts, if there is a term referring to
an object existential generalization and exportation are valid.  Acquaintance is
irrelevant.
Soames agrees with the intuitions that dthat-terms and descriptive names  cannot 
come out of belief contexts.  So for instance, he thinks that it is incorrect to say 
that John believes of Julius that he invented the zip or that John believes of dthat 
[the first child bom in the 21st century] that he is the first child bom in the 21st 
century.  However, he thinks that because  of this,  John does  not believe that 
Julius invented the zip or that dthat [the first child bom in the 21st century] is the 
first child bom in the 21st century, as if he did, then exportation would be valid. 
Soames argues along these lines in Reference and Description (2005), where he 
argues against the possibility of a priori knowledge of a contingent proposition. 
He argues that a subject accepting a sentence such as ‘dthat [the shortest spy] is a 
spy’ does not have contingent a priori knowledge, as if he did then we would be 
able to export a belief report containing the sentence, which we cannot.  Soames 
concludes:
7 For further discussion see Chapter 4 of this thesis.116
Regarding  this  scenario  [the  introduction  of a  descriptive  name],  one 
must say either (i) that the name hasn’t successfully been introduced after 
all, (ii) that the speaker doesn’t understand the name he has introduced, or
(iii)  that  understanding  and  justifiably  accepting  a  true  sentence 
containing the name is not sufficient for knowing the proposition p which 
it expresses to be true.  Either way, apriori knowledge of a contingent 
proposition has not been achieved. (Soames (2005), p55-6)
At this  point there  is not that much disagreement  between  Soames’s  and  my 
positions.  Neither of us thinks that by accepting the sentence 4  Julius invented the 
zip’  or  ‘dthat[the shortest spy]  is  a spy’  a  subject  (John,  say)  has  a  singular 
thought. However, I am happy to say, at least in the case of descriptive names,8 
that we can say that John believes that Julius invented the zip, because in this 
case  the  subject  has  a  descriptive  thought.  This  is  a priori  because  of the 
meaning of ‘Julius’.  But it is only superficially contingent9, because of its modal 
behaviour.  It is not true in all possible worlds, because the description contains a 
rigidifier, which refers us back to  the  denotation  in the  actual  world  in  each 
possible situation.  But  I  agree with  Soames that this does not mean that a 
subject can have a priori knowledge of a contingent singular proposition.
Where we disagree is over cases like proper names.  Soames thinks that all that is 
required for a subject to have a singular thought is that he  accept a sentence 
containing a proper name.  And reports of such thoughts can be exported.  I think 
that there is an additional constraint on having a singular thought; the subject 
must be acquainted with the object.  He must know the object.  It may well be 
that the cases where we think a subject has a singular thought coincide.  I think 
that acquaintance can be transmitted through testimony, and so in understanding 
a sentence containing a proper name, the subject is acquainted with the object 
referred  to,  and  so  can  think  about  it.  But  it  is  important  to  note  that  this 
additional acquaintance restraint is not necessary  in  deflationary accounts  like 
Soames’s.
Despite  their  intuitive  plausibility,  I  do  not  think  the  linguistic  tests  of 
exportation  and  existential  generalization  cannot  help  us  to  decide  whether
8 In the case of dthat-terms, particularly if they are interpreted as syntactically complete directly 
referential terms, I am more inclined to say that the name has not been successfully introduced. 
See Chapter 4.
9 See Evans (1979)117
acquaintance  is a condition on singular thought.  I think that the most plausible 
explanation is that exportation is valid when a subject is thinking about an object, 
rather than  having a general  thought.  The  reason  exportation  seems  to  be  a 
linguistic  test  for  acquaintance  is  because  in  the  case  of  non-first-personal 
thoughts about objects, it is a necessary condition that the subject is acquainted 
with the object in order to have a singular thought about an object.  But this is 
because without being acquainted with an object, the subject is not in a position 
to think about it.  His thought is not about one object rather than another.  If a 
subject is not acquainted with an object then his thought is descriptive, even if 
only  one object is  denoted.  The  linguistic  test  does  not give  us  any  further 
reasons to think that a subject must be acquainted with an object in order to refer 
to it.118
Chapter 6 
Acquaintance and Possible Worlds
Acquaintance is important.  Being acquainted with an object puts a subject in a 
position to think about that object.  It is what makes a subject’s thought about 
one object rather than another.  Acquaintance restricts the thoughts a subject is 
able to have -  he cannot have a singular thought about an object if he is not 
acquainted with it.  And if the object is different, the thought is different -  a 
subject’s thought about that apple on the left is different from his thought about 
that apple on the right.
That  acquaintance  is  important  has  consequences  for  how  the  content  of  a 
subject’s thought can be represented.  The purpose of this chapter is to argue that 
if a subject’s acquaintance with an object is necessary for him to think about and 
refer to the object, then his thought content cannot be represented by  sets of 
metaphysically possible worlds.
The discussion in this chapter is based on  a version of Jackson’s Knowledge 
Argument, given by Stalnaker in ‘On Thomas Nagel’s Objective Self, (2003a). 
As usual, Jackson’s Mary is in her black and white room and knows everything 
there is to know about colour but has never seen colours.  In this example she is 
told that she is going to come out of her room and be shown either a red or a 
green  apple.  So  before  this  experiment  takes  place,  she  knows  that  the 
possibilities still open to her are that she will be in front of a red apple, or she 
will be in front of a green apple.  She comes out of her room and sees an apple -  
the red one.  But although she now knows what it is like to see a colour -  what 
red  is  like -   she  still  does  not know what  colour  it  is -   she  does  not know 
whether it is red or whether it is green.  What has changed?  If a possible worlds 
account of content is correct, it must be able account for what goes on in this 
example.  But  I  will  argue  that  it  cannot.  The  reason  it  cannot  is  that 
acquaintance is doing some work here.  When Mary is acquainted with the apple 
the possibilities are reset,  and the possible worlds  account of thought content 
cannot accommodate this.119
I begin with a brief overview of a possible worlds account of thought content, 
including how it must be adapted to allow a subject to have an informative belief 
in the necessary proposition. I will also discuss Stalnaker’s (2003a) proposal of 
how a possible  worlds  account  can  accommodate  subjective,  or self-locating, 
beliefs.  This differs from his account in Tndexical Belief (1981).  I then turn to 
Stalnaker’s  example.  My  aim  is  to  show the  effect that  acquaintance  has  on 
Mary’s  belief,  and  why  this  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  a  possible  worlds 
account of thought content is insufficient.
1  A Possible Worlds Account of Thought Content
On a possible worlds account of thought content, there are many possible worlds 
compatible with a subject’s thoughts.  When he comes to  have a new  belief, 
possible worlds no longer compatible are eliminated.  A belief is informative and 
a subject comes to have objective knowledge if some possible worlds are ruled 
out.  Possible worlds -  different possibilities -  are  what assertions  and  other 
states with content distinguish between. As Frank Jackson puts it:
...  to represent is to make a division into what accords with, and what 
does not accord with, how things are being represented as being. ((2001), 
p617)
And Stalnaker says:
...the  content  of speech  acts  and  intentional  mental  states  should  be 
identified  with  their  truth-conditions,  represented  by  a  set  of possible 
situations. ((1999), p26)
If I say ‘Mary is sitting down’, for example, then the content of my assertion is
the set of all and only the possible worlds in which Mary is sitting down.
I  will  assume a version  of two-dimensional  semantics to  allow this  notion of 
thought  content  to  account  for  the  fact  that  a  subject  can  come  to  have  an 
informative  belief  in  the  necessary  proposition.1   Without  two-dimensional 
semantics, as both ‘Hesperus’  and ‘Phosphorus’  refer to the same object in the 
actual world, they refer to the same object in all possible worlds.  The belief that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus is true in all possible worlds, and no worlds are ruled 
out.  Thus the belief cannot be informative.  With two-dimensional semantics, 
when a subject comes to learn that Hesperus is Phosphorus the content of his
1  See Chapter 2, Section 3.1, for discussion.120
belief is  the  diagonal  proposition  which  is  not  necessary.2  The  content  of a 
subject’s belief is characterized by giving a one-dimensional proposition, a set of 
possible  worlds.  Normally  this  will  just  be  the  standard  (one-dimensional) 
horizontal  proposition expressed.  But sometimes  this does not give the  right 
result, and in such cases the content is the diagonal proposition.3
As  was  discussed in  Chapter 2,  Stalnaker comes to  the  conclusion  that even 
allowing that the content of an assertion or thought is sometimes the diagonal 
proposition, a possible worlds account of content still has problems explaining 
indexical  thoughts.  As  Stalnaker limits  epistemic possibility to  metaphysical 
possibility  he  does  not  allow  possible  worlds  containing  an  objective  I  to 
characterize a subject’s belief content.  Thus he thinks that a subject’s thought 
expressed by ‘I am F  cannot be represented by a set of metaphysically possible 
worlds.  For instance, suppose the amnesiac Lingens comes to believe what he 
would  express  by  ‘I  am  Lingens’.  What  belief  is  he  expressing?  What 
possibilities is he ruling out?  He already knows that Lingens is the cousin of a 
spy, and so Lingens is in all the possible worlds compatible with his background 
beliefs.  But  what  happens  when  he  learns  what  he  would  express  by  ‘I  am 
Lingens’?  Perhaps, because he knows he is wearing a red shirt (what he would 
express by ‘I am wearing a red shirt’) he now knows that Lingens is wearing a 
red shirt, so he can rule out all of those worlds in which Lingens is not wearing a 
red shirt.  Similarly for any other property F that he knows he possesses.  He 
now knows Lingens possesses this property, and can rule out those worlds in 
which Lingens does not possess this property.  But this ruling out of worlds does 
not represent the information he expresses when he says ‘I am Lingens’.
Stalnaker’s idea, after his rejection of his  ‘Indexical Belief  (1981) account, is 
that subjective or indexical content is like ordinary  content in that it is to be 
understood in terms of the way it distinguishes between possible worlds.  But 
these must be labelled or indexed possible worlds.  With subjective information,
2 In fact, if acquaintance restricts the thoughts a subject is able to have, and the object is essential 
to the thought, then on many understandings of two-dimensional semantics, the diagonal 
proposition will also be necessary in this case.  I will ignore this point here, although it is 
obviously another reason for thinking that a possible world’s account of thought content cannot 
be correct.
3  For further discussion and explanation of this, see Chapter 2.121
the  identity of the  information  is  essentially  tied  to  the context  of speech  or 
thought in which the possibilities are being distinguished among (e.g. (2003a), 
p256).  When  we  specify  the  set  of possible  worlds  we  must  also  include 
information  about  the  subject  who  expresses  or  thinks  a  thought  with  that 
content.  So suppose again Lingens says ‘I am Lingens’.  Then the content of this 
assertion is represented by the  set of possible worlds containing Lingens,  but 
which are indexed to the subject as Lingens and the present time.  When Lingens 
says ‘I am Lingens’ he labels himself as the subject.
Lingens
The box represents Lingens’s thought content (just one possible world here is 
being used as representative of many).  The possible world contains Lingens, X 
and Y.  It is indexed to Lingens, and he labels himself as subject using an T- 
label.
Stalnaker’s later account is similar to Lewis’s in ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se' 
(1979).  Recall Lewis proposes that the content of a belief is a property rather 
than a proposition.  As Lewis  says (pi47) this is the same  as saying that the 
content  of a  belief is  a  set  of centred  possible  worlds,  rather  than  a  set  of 
uncentred possible worlds.  A centred possible world is a possible world with a 
designated object and time at the centre.  If a subject believes what he would 
assert by ‘I am F’ the content of this belief is the set of centred worlds in which 
the designated centre is F.  The difference between Stalnaker’s labelled worlds 
and Lewis’s centred worlds is that, with labelled worlds, the designated centre is 
indexed to a particular individual and time -  the individual who is in that belief 
state at^that time.  So if Lingens believes ‘I am F , on Lewis’s view, his belief 
has the content of the set of centred worlds in which the designated centre is F. 
On Stalnaker’s account, the beliefs content is the set of labelled worlds in which 
Lingens is designated to be the centre and is F.  On Stalnaker’s new account, like 
the Fregean’s, the thought content of two different subjects thinking ‘I am F  will122
be different, as a different object will be labelled as subject in each case.  So in 
this, it differs from Lewis’s proposal.
Lewis's  ‘two  gods'  example  ((1979),  p i39)  can  be  explained  using  labelled 
worlds.  Recall that Stalnaker*s earlier explanation in ‘Indexical Belief could not 
account for this.4 When the god (X, say) on the tallest mountain learns that he is 
on the tallest mountain he is not ruling out objective (uncentred) possible worlds. 
He is not ruling out a world where god X is on the coldest mountain and another 
god is on the tallest mountain -  the reverse of what the actual situation happens 
to  be.  This  would  only  represent  the  information  that  X  is  on  the  tallest 
mountain.  It  does  not  represent  the  information  X  expresses  by  T  am  on  the 
tallest mountain’.  On a labelled worlds view,  what god  X  is doing  is  labelling 
himself as subject as the god on the tallest mountain.  He  is ruling out labelled 
worlds where the god on the coldest mountain  is labelled as subject.  ‘I  am the 
god on the tallest mountain*  is subjective information -  labelled possible worlds 
are being ruled out.
2  Stalnaker’s Example
Let us now consider Stalnaker’s example of Mary emerging from her black and 
white  room.  Stalnaker  thinks  we  can  use  his  possible  worlds  account  of 
indexical thought to explain what it is that Mary ‘knows’ when she comes out of 
her room.  Before she comes out of the room, she knows that she will either be in 
front of a red or a green apple.  The possibilities open to her can be represented 






4 See Chapter 2, Section 3.2, for discussion.123
When she comes out, she still does not know which world she is in as she does 
not know whether she is in front of a red or green apple.  What has changed? 
According to Stalnaker, it is just her position in the world.  She is now able to 







Stalnaker’s point is that when she comes out of her black and white room Mary 
does  not  gain  any  objective  knowledge  -   she  is  not  ruling  out  any  possible 
worlds.  Instead, she is now in a position to represent an objective fact from a 
subjective point of view.  The possibilities still open are R and G, but these are 
now indexed to Mary herself.
It is important to note that Mary is not gaining subjective knowledge either -  she 
is not ruling out any labelled possible worlds.  She is just now in a position to 
represent subjective information about this experience.  There is such a thing as 
subjective information,  which  is gained by ruling out  labelled possible worlds. 
Lewis’s ‘two gods’  scenario is such a case.  But the Mary case is not like this. 
No  worlds  are  ruled  out  -  Mary  can  now just  represent  the  possible  worlds 
differently.
Stalnaker’s example is supposed to convince us that Mary’s ignorance before she 
comes out of the room is the same as her ignorance after she comes out -  the 
possibilities  still open to her are the  same as  in both cases she does not  know 
whether she is in front of the red or the green apple.  Coming out of the room has 
not changed this.  He wants us to agree that when Mary comes out of her black 
and  white  room  and  sees  colour  for  the  first  time  she  is  not  gaining  any 
knowledge -  either subjective or objective.  His possible worlds account entails 
that she learns nothing because no worlds are ruled out.  But is it right that she 
learns nothing?  If it is not, his account of subjective content must be wrong.  I124
will argue that we can show that Mary does indeed gain information -  but also 
that this information cannot be represented by ruling out possible worlds.
3  The Problem
Stalnaker thinks his example shows that there is no need to postulate subjective 
facts -  phenomenal information -  to explain what Mary knows when she comes 
out of her black and white room.  This is a controversial area, as those who think 
that  there  sire  subjective  facts  in  this  case  often  assume  both  that  a  subject  is 
acquainted with these facts, and that he cannot be wrong about them.  But I think 
that we can show that Mary does learn something -  gain information -  when she 
comes out of her room, without worrying about subjective  facts.  What  makes 
her learn something new is that she is now acquainted with an object and so is 
able to have a new thought about it -  a thought which she could not have before. 
The  issue  turns  on  acquaintance,  not  on  subjective  facts.  Exactly  the  same 
problems  will  arise  for  Stalnaker  if a  subject’s  acquaintance  with  an  external 
object restricts what he can think about.  So let us consider a modified example 
where Mary has singular thoughts about external objects.
Suppose Mary knows absolutely everything there is to know about two  stars -  
Betelgeuse and Rigel -  but she has never seen them. No one has ever seen them, 
so everything she learns about them is in descriptive terms.  She is told that she 
will come out of her room and see one of the stars, but is not told which one it 
will be.  After she comes out of her room she sees one of the stars -  and is now 
in a position to represent subjective information about this experience.  But she 
still  does  not know which  star she  is in  front of.  So,  if Stalnaker’s view just 
discussed is correct, her ignorance can be modelled in similar ways both before 
and after she comes out of her room.  If Stalnaker is right, Mary does not learn 
anything  new when  she comes  out of the  room -  neither possible  worlds,  nor 
labelled  possible  worlds  are  ruled  out.  When  she  was  in  the  room,  the 
possibilities open to her were that Mary was in front of Betelgeuse or that Mary 
was in front of Rigel.  When she comes out, the same possibilities are open, only 
they are now indexed to Mary herself.  When she comes out of her room she is in 
a position to represent subjective information about the experience.  She can now125
think ‘Is this Betelgeuse or is this Rigel?’ and she could not think it in this way 
before.
But it is the representation of subjective information once she comes out that is 
the main problem.  What is the subjective information that Mary can represent 
once  she comes out of her room?  If acquaintance restricts what a subject can 
think about, then the thoughts that Mary can think will depend on which star she 
is actually in front of.  Stalnaker and I agree that a subject cannot think ‘Is this 
Betelgeuse  or  is  this  Rigel?’  before  she  is  actually  in  front  of a  star.  But 
Stalnaker thinks that once she is in front of a star she can now think this -  and it 
does not matter which star she  is in front of.  He thinks of ‘this’  as a variable 
label.  Whereas,  if acquaintance  is important,  the thoughts a subject is able to 
have will depend on which star she is in front of -  on which world is actual.  If 
Mary sees Betelgeuse then she can wonder: Is thise Betelgeuse or is thise Rigel? 
If she sees Rigel then she wonders: Is thisR Betelgeuse or is thisR Rigel?
Because  the  possibilities  open  differ  depending  on  whether  she  is  actually  in 
front of Betelgeuse of Rigel, then Mary must have learned something when she 
comes out of her room.  If what Mary wonders differs depending on whether she 
is in the Betelgeuse world or the Rigel world, then that information must also be 
different from the information she had whilst still  in her room, and before  she 
was acquainted with the stars.  Recall that Stalnaker, unlike Jackson, thinks that 
when Mary comes out of her room she does not learn anything -  there is no new 
information.  But there must be new information if what Mary wonders differs 
depending on what world she is in.
To bring out this point, consider the case of Mary and her friend Alice, both in 
the room, never having seen either Betelgeuse or Rigel.  They  know everything 
about the stars in descriptive terms, but are not acquainted with them.  They are 
told  that  when  they  come  out  of the  room,  one  of them  will  be  in  front  of 
Betelgeuse and the other in front of Rigel.  In fact, Mary is in front of Betelgeuse 
and Alice is in front of Rigel.  Before, when they were in the room, they were in 
the same information state.  When they come out of the room they are not.  So 
each  of them  must  have  learned  something,  and  this  is  because  they  are  now126
acquainted with an object and can have a singular thought about it.  And since 
they  do  learn  something,  Stalnaker’s  account of subjective  information,  which 
has the consequence that there is no information update, must be wrong.
Acquaintance  resets  what  possibilities  there  are  -  it  affects  the  powers  of 
representation and does not only limit the range of possibilities.  And it is this 
which is incompatible with a possible worlds account of thought content.127
Part III




To  think  about  an  independent  object,  a  subject  must  be  acquainted  with  the 
object.  The object must be present to him in some way.  Perhaps he perceives 
the object.  Perhaps he hears about it, or reads about it.  Perhaps he remembers it, 
from having once perceived it or heard about it.  Such relations make the object 
present  to  the  subject.  By  being  acquainted  with  it  in  such  ways,  he  is  in  a 
position to have a singular thought about that particular object.
What about in his own case, when he thinks first-personally?  What puts him in a 
position  to  be  able  to  think  about  and  refer  to  himself?  My  claim  is  that 
acquaintance  is not needed  because  a subject  is already in a position to think 
about himself.  But what does this mean? This means that the subject is at the 
centre of his scheme of reference.  By being acquainted with other objects he is 
able to ‘reach out’ and think of those objects.  But he does not need any sort of 
acquaintance  relation to  be  able  to  think  of himself.  He can think of himself 
reflexively.
To make sense of this claim, we need to consider subjective first-person thought. 
Subjective first-person thoughts are defined as those which have grounds which 
are from the  first-person  perspective.  Their grounds have an  ‘internal’  aspect; 
they  are  from  the  inside.  There  are  specific  ways  of experiencing  things,  or 
knowing things from the first-person perspective.  There is a first-personal way 
of experiencing the wind blowing my hair about, for instance, which grounds the 
subjective first-person thought ‘The wind is blowing my hair’.  Perry, in ‘Myself
and / ’  (1997) describes this first-personal way as follows:
This is a method for finding out whether someone has some property or 
does not, that we can each use to find out about ourselves, but can’t use to 
find out about others.  What one  finds out may be accessible to others, 
using different methods.  But the particular method in question can only 
be  used  by the  person  in  question  to  find  out about  himself or herself. 
Feeling hunger is normally a way of detecting that one’s own stomach is 
short  of food.  Feeling  thirst  is  a  way  of knowing  that  one’s  throat  is 
parched or that one’s body is short of water.  There is a certain feeling, 
that children are  trained  to  recognize,  that  signals that one’s bladder is 
full.  In each case,  someone else can determine the same thing, using a129
different  technique.  This  alternative  technique  may  even  be  superior. 
Perhaps you can tell that I am blushing, by looking, when I am not sure. 
Perhaps you can be sure that my stomach is full, having noticed what I 
have put into it, when I am still in that charming interval between being 
full and feeling full.  Parents are often better judges of the states of their 
children’s  bladder than  the children themselves  are.  So the point  isn’t 
that  our  reflexive  methods  of  knowing  about  ourselves  are  always 
infallible  or superior to  any  other methods.  It  is that only we  can  use 
them. (Perry (1997/2000), p334)
There  are  specifically  first-personal  ways  of experiencing  things.  There  are 
specifically  first-personal  ways of remembering things,  from the inside.  There 
are first-personal ways of anticipating, hoping, wanting.  This list is by no means 
exhaustive.  These first-personal  grounds, from the first-person perspective, are 
what ground the subject’s subjective first-person thoughts.  His subjective first- 
person  thoughts  are  from  this  perspective.  Only  he,  the  subject,  can  have
thoughls-from This~parti^ular perspective; it is peculiar to him.  When he thinks 
first-personally  the  subject  ascribes  these  experiences  to  himself.  He  is  not 
present  in the experience;  he,  the  subject, thinks of himself reflexively.  First- 
person thoughts are about their own thinker, the subject.
If,  like  Perry  (1997)  and  Crimmins  (1994)  one  thinks  of singular  thought  as 
involving  notions,  when  a  subject  thinks  first-personally,  based  on  these  first- 
personal grounds, he has a self-notion.  Alternatively, one might like to think of 
this as an ability to think of oneself reflexively.  In English, such thoughts are 
directly expressed by T  -  a subject uses T  to refer to himself reflexively.  Such 
thoughts are not descriptive thoughts; the subject does not think of himself as the 
subject of these experiences.  He thinks of himself reflexively, and has a singular 
thoughTaBouflum^  subject of thought.  Velleman  (1996)  puts  it  in the 
following way:
What  makes  a  thought  subjectively  reflexive,  after  all,  is  that  it  is 
indexical in a special way: it has a peculiar way of pointing.  A reflexive 
thought picks out a person at its center by mentally pointing to him in a
distinctively  inward-directed  fashion  Genuinely  reflexive  thoughts
don’t rely on an antecedent specification of their target:  they just point to 
the  subject,  at  the  center  of thought.  They  are  -  to  put  it  somewhat 
paradoxically - unselfconscious about their reference, in that they require 
no other thought about whom they refer to. (Velleman (1996), p60)130
It  is  unlikely  to  be  denied  that  a  subject  has  a  first-person  perspective  on the 
world,  and  that  it  is  this  perspective  which  grounds  many  of his  first-person 
thoughts.  But  it might be objected that it is precisely in having these  grounds 
that a subject is acquainted with himself, and it is this which enables him to think 
first-personally.  For instance, Evans (1982) argues that in some of these special  J 
first-personal  ways  which  a  subject  has  of  learning  about  himself,  he  has 
information from himself.1   It is this information from himself -  his acquaintance 
with  himself  in  experience  -   which  grounds  his  first-person  thoughts.  It  is 
because such thoughts are grounded in information from himself, he thinks, that 
they are immune to error through misidentification.  It makes no sense to say, for 
example, ‘Someone is sitting down, but is it I who is sitting down?’ when this is 
known in a first-personal way:
...Immunity  to  error  through  misidentification  is  a  straightforward 
consequence  of demonstrative  identification;  it  will  exist  whenever  a 
subject’s Idea of an object depends upon his ways of gaining knowledge 
of it. (Evans (1982), p218)
On this view, when a subject experiences (e.g.) sitting down from the inside he is
acquainted  with  himself.  He  is  present  to  himself as  a  physical  object.  He
experiences himself sitting down,  and it is this which puts him in a position to
think about himself. Just as perceiving that apple, say, puts a subject in a position
to think about that apple, so experiencing himself as a physical object puts him in
a position to think about himself.
r  )
In  the  next  chapter  it  will  be  argued/that  this  view  is  mistaken.  The  subject 
thinks of himself first-personallV-b^cause he  is the  subject of the thought.  He 
does not  need to  be acquainted  with himself in  order to think of himself.  To 
think that acquaintance must be involved is to misunderstand the nature of first- 
person  thought,  where  the  subject  thinks  reflexively.  Acquaintance  is  only 
needed to enable him to think of objects independent of himself.
Before this,  I  want to consider a different worry.  The concern  is that there  is 
something circular in this reflexive account of first-person reference.  A subject
1   Evans does not think that the subject has information from himself in all cases of self-ascription. 
But he does think that bodily perception is a case where the subject has information from himself, 
and it is because he has this information that he can form an Idea of himself.  He can then use this 
Idea to think about himself in other first-personal thoughts even when he is not receiving 
information from himself.131
thinks first-personally by referring reflexively.  He can intend to refer to himself. 
But what does it mean to say that he intends to refer to himself?
1  Anscombe’s Circularity Argument
Anscombe  (1975)  frames  the  circularity  worry  in  terms  of the  word  T .  She 
considers the token-reflexive rule, which she explains as:
“1” is the word each one uses when he knowingly and intentionally refers 
to himself. (Anscombe (1975), pi36)
When he uses the word ‘I’, a subject must be intending to refer to himself.  But
Anscombe  thinks  we  cannot  understand  what  is  meant  by  ‘himself  here.  It
cannot be the ordinary reflexive,  she thinks, as a subject can intend to refer to
himself without  realizing  it  is  himself.  Perry’s  (1977)  subject  the  amnesiac
Lingens might well  intend to refer to  Lingens, and do so  successfully, without
realizing that he is referring to himself.  ‘Lingens’  is also a term which Lingens
can used to refer intentionally to himself.  For the token-reflexive rule to explain
how ‘I’ can refer first-personally, Anscombe thinks ‘himself must be a ‘peculiar
reflexive’ (pi36).  Anscombe thinks this peculiar reflexive can only be explained
in terms of ‘I’.  What Lingens does not realize is what he would express by ‘I am
Lingens.’  As  ‘himself  can  only  be  explained  in terms of ‘I’,  this  makes the
token-reflexive rule circular.
Because of her argument that the token-reflexive rule is circular, Anscombe then 
goes on to say:
If that is right, the explanation of the word ‘I’ as ‘the word which each of 
us uses to speak of himself  is hardly an explanation!  At least,  it is no
explanation  if that  reflexive  has  to  be  explained  in  terms  of ‘I’  We
seem to need a sense to be specified for this quasi-name  7 ’....we have 
not got this sense just by being told which object a man will be speaking 
of, whether he knows it or not, when he says ‘I’....We have a right to ask 
what he knows; if ‘I’ expresses a way its object is reached by him, what 
Frege called an ‘Art des Gegebenseins’, we want to know what that way 
is and  how it comes about that the only object  reached  in that  way by 
anyone is identical with himself. ((1975), pi37, my emphasis).
Because  she  thinks the  token-reflexive  rule  is  circular,  Anscombe  goes  off to
search  for how  ‘I’  can  ‘latch on’  to  its object.  How does the  subject  refer to
himself?  Because she concludes that what is normally required for reference is
lacking in first-person thought, she concludes that ‘I’ does not refer.132
Some have interpreted Anscombe’s argument as showing that a ‘deeper’ level at
which a subject can refer to himself in thought is needed.  O’Brien (1994, 1995a)
argues  something along these  lines.  She  argues that Anscombe’s  argument  is
based  on  the  unobjectionable  premise  that  a  subject  can  refer  to  himself
intentionally without  referring  to  himself first-personally.  The token-reflexive
rule does not distinguish between these two cases and so cannot be what explains
first-person  reference.  O’Brien  thinks  that  Anscombe  has  made  an  error  in
assuming that what explains first-person thought should be present in the token-
reflexive rule itself:
[Anscombe] seems to have thought that that element would be missing if 
it were  absent  from  the  specification  of the  rule and would be  present 
only if it were included in the specification of the rule.  We have come to 
see that the required element need not be part of the rule, but is rather 
something that a user of the rule can bring to bear when they use the rule. 
That  required  element  is:  the  knowledge  that  a  subject  has  that  they 
themselves are using a term when they are. (O’Brien (1994), p280)
This interpretation of Anscombe is not surprising, as it is one that seems obvious 
when one considers how we understand the use of ‘I’ by other people.  Suppose 
someone  says  ‘1   am  sitting  down’.  Although  in  one  way  we  understand  the 
meaning of the words, we do not understand what is said unless we know who is 
using the term ‘I’.  We cannot have singular thought about the person, unless we 
are acquainted with the person who is saying ‘I’.  How do we know who is using 
‘I’  in  our  own  case?2  I  am  using  it.  But  what  does  this  mean?  If this  is 
understood  in  terms  of the  token-reflexive  rule  there  appears  to  be  a  regress. 
Perhaps I need to be acquainted with myself in order to know that I am using the 
term.
This  is not Anscombe’s argument, however.  Anscombe thinks that the token- 
reflexive rule can distinguish between a subject’s first-personal and his non-first- 
personal  thought about  himself.  But it can only  do this when  ‘himself  is the 
indirect reflexive.  And she thinks the indirect reflexive can only be understood 
in terms of T .
2 O’Brien (1995a) goes on to suggest that this deeper understanding involves knowledge of our 
own actions133
Why exactly does Anscombe think the indirect reflexive can only be explained in 
terms of ‘I’?  And why, if the token-reflexive rule is circular, is her conclusion 
that a subject must have a conception associated with ‘I’, if it is to refer?31  think 
that  the  answers  to  these  two  questions  are  based  on  the  same  thing  -   that 
Anscombe assumes that in order to understand any referring expression we must 
grasp its sense.  And she thinks that in order to grasp a term’s sense, the subject 
must have a conception of the object referred to; he must know what  kind of 
thing it is.
To see this, consider the first part of her argument. In this, she is arguing that the 
‘himself  in the rule “ I’  is the word each one uses in speaking intentionally of 
himself  cannot be what we would think of as the ordinary reflexive pronoun. 
She says:
Consider:  ‘Smith  realizes  (fails  to  realize)  the  identity  of an  object  he 
calls ‘Smith’ with himself.  If the reflexive pronoun there is the ordinary 
one,  then  it  specifies  for us who  frame or hear the  sentence  an  object, 
whose  identity  with  the  object  he  calls  ‘Smith’  Smith  does  or  doesn’t 
realize:  namely  the  object  designated  by  our  subject  word  ‘Smith’.
(Anscombe (1975), pi37)
This  is  one  way  of understanding  the  pronoun.4  In  understanding  this  third-
person  sentence  we  understand  that  the  word  ‘himself  picks  out  the  same
referent  as  the  subject  term  ‘Smith’.  We  might  well  use  this  third-person
sentence to report our hearing of a first-person utterance by Smith; perhaps ‘I am
(not) Smith’.  In hearing the words T’ or ‘myself said by Smith it is true that we,
as listeners could pick out the speaker.  Anscombe continues, trying to explain
why treating ‘himself as the ordinary reflexive in this way should be a problem:
But that does not tell us what identity Smith himself realizes (or fails to 
realize).  For, as Frege held, there is no path back from reference to sense; 
any object has many ways of being specified, and  in  this case,  through 
the peculiarity o f the  construction,  we  have  succeeded in specifying an 
object  (by means  o f the subject o f our sentence)  without specifying any 
conception under which  Smith’s mind is supposed to latch on to it.  For 
we don’t want to say  ‘Smith does not realize the identity of Smith with 
Smith.’ (Anscombe (1975), pi37, my emphasis).
The problem seems to be that although we can understand the sentence in third-
person terms,  it gives us no  indication of what,  in  first-person terms,  it  is that
Smith knows.  It does not explain how Smith manages to refer to himself.  That is
3  By a conception, Anscombe means that the subject knows what kind of thing the object is.
4 See the discussion of Rumfitt in Section 2 below for another way of understanding the pronoun134
why it must instead be the peculiar indirect reflexive.  The indirect reflexive will 
explain  how  a  subject’s  mind  can  Tatch  on’  to  himself.  But  the  assumption 
already  underlying this is that if Smith thinks,  in the first-person,  ‘I  am  (not) 
Smith’ he must grasp the sense of the word T .  He must think of himself in the 
same  way  as he  thinks  of other objects.  For Anscombe,  this means having a 
conception  of himself which  enables  him  to  pick  out  the  object  which  he  is. 
Then,  to  understand the  sentence,  he  must  also  be  able to  pick  out the  object 
named  ‘Smith’.  Perhaps  he  has  read  about  Smith  and  so  can  have  a  singular 
thought about him.  He must then  either  realize or not realize  that this  object 
Smith is the same as himself. Because the ordinary reflexive pronoun gives us no 
idea of what this conception could be, Anscombe concludes that the reflexive in 
this  case  must  be  a  special  sort  of reflexive  pronoun;  one  that  can  only  be 
explained  in  terms  of ‘I’.  Hence  she  concludes  that  the  token-reflexive  rule 
cannot explain anything.
To an extent Anscombe is right.  ‘I do not realize Smith is myself means ‘I do 
not realize I am Smith’.  ‘Myself  is explained in terms of ‘I’.  But this does not 
mean that the rule ‘1  use T  to refer to myself is circular.  It is true that this rule 
just means ‘I use ‘I’ to refer to the object I am’.  But this is only problematic for 
Anscombe because she is in the grip of a theory which insists that to be able to 
refer to an object the subject must have a conception of the object.  Obviously 
that is not explained by the rule.  It is this same belief which leads her to search 
for the sense of ‘I’; what conception can be associated with it?  I think that the 
mistake arises by trying to explain our capacity  for first-person thought  in the 
same way that we treat our understanding of what other people say.  If we hear 
Smith say ‘I am not Smith’  then we, as listeners can think of the person called 
Smith  (perhaps  we  have  met  him  or  heard  of him),  and  we  can  identify  the 
referent  of ‘I’  demonstratively.  But  why  should  we  assume  that  first-person 
thought behaves in the same way?
In  subjective  first-person  thought  a  subject  has  first-personal  grounds  for  his 
thought.  He  refers  reflexively;  he  is  the  subject of the  thought,  and  refers  to 
himself, ascribing predicates to himself.  Such thoughts can be directly expressed 
by ‘I’  in English, which the subject learns at an early age can be used to refer to135
himself.  It is not circular to say that a subject uses T  to refer to himself.  It only 
seems circular if we think ‘himself must explain how the subject’s mind ‘latches 
on’ to the object he is.  But this is not what is going on in reflexive first-person 
thought.  The subject’s mind does not need to ‘latch on’ to an object in order to 
refer.  This is only required for him to think of independent objects.  He can refer 
reflexively, unproblematically, because he is the subject of the thought.
Some  might object that the conclusion that the token-reflexive  rule  is  circular 
does not depend on the premise that reference to oneself requires a conception of 
oneself.  It  may  be  conceded  by  the  objector  that  Anscombe’s  picture  of 
reference involving knowledge of the kind of object is important later on in her 
argument, but this is only when she attempts to show that if we refer using ‘I’ we 
can only be referring to an Ego.  The notion of a conception does not come into 
play  in the initial  stages of Anscombe’s argument, they might say.  The initial 
premise  is  just  that  first-person  reference  differs  from  non-first-personal 
reference to oneself.
But why  is  it that first-person reference differs  from non-first-person reflexive 
reference?  Anscombe  thinks  we  cannot explain this  using the token-reflexive 
rule:
...unless the reflexive pronoun itself is a sufficient indication of the way 
the  object  is  specified.  And  that  is  something  the  ordinary  reflexive 
pronoun cannot be. ((1975), pi37)
Throughout  her  argument,  Anscombe’s  main  contention  is  that  the  reflexive
pronoun in the token-reflexive rule cannot explain to us what it is that Smith (her
subject)  knows;  it  cannot  explain  how  his  mind  latches  onto  the  object  he  is.
There does not seem to be any problem about what the subject knows when he
refers non-first personally to himself -  he can pick himself out in the same way
as he picks out other people and  refer to  himself in the same way.  Non-first-
personal reference to himself is the same as non-first-personal reference to other
objects.  But  what  is  the  special  first-person  way  in  which  a  subject  refers to
himself,  which  Anscombe  believes  is  necessary  to  refer  first-personally?  Her
whole issue is that the indirect reflexive ‘himself should explain to us what this
special conception must be, but it can only do this in terms of ‘I’.  Because of
this,  any  explanation  of  ‘I’  in  terms  of  the  token-reflexive  rule  must  be136
insufficient,  and  we  must  go  on  a  search  for  what  this  special  first-person 
conception could be.  Anscombe’s picture of reference and her assumption that 
reference  in the  first-person case must be  similar to  reference to  independent 
objects  underlies  her argument.  And  it  is  because  this  is  mistaken  that  her 
argument does not go through.
Those who object to my reading of Anscombe may still agree that her argument 
that the token-reflexive rule is circular does not go through.  They may think this 
not  because  they  believe  there  is  an  assumption  concerning  conceptions  for 
reference, but because they think that Anscombe has not considered the contrast 
between  referring  to  oneself  by  using  the  token-reflexive  rule  (first-person 
reference) and referring in a way which just happens to conform to the token- 
reflexive  rule  (non-first-personal  reference  to  himself).  This  latter  claim  is 
correct, but it misses something, and on its own does not explain very much. 
What makes it the case that one is using the rule rather than just conforming to 
it?  When the amnesiac Lingens refers to Lingens then he is referring to himself 
in the same way that he refers to other objects.  In this thesis it has been argued 
that to do this the subject must be acquainted with the object.  In this example, 
the subject Lingens is acquainted with an object -  Lingens -  which just happens 
to be himself.  As he happens to be referring to himself, he happens to conform 
to  the token-reflexive  rule.  The  difference  with  first-person thought  is  that  a 
subject refers using the token-reflexive rule. He refers reflexively to himself, the 
subject.  Because  he  is  the  subject,  he  does  not  need  to  be  acquainted  with 
himself.  The fact that no acquaintance is required shows us how referring using 
the  token-reflexive  rule  can  indeed  be  distinct  from  merely  referring  in 
conformity with the rule.
2  Rumfitt’s Response to Anscombe
Rumfitt, in  ‘Frege’s Theory of Predication:  An Elaboration and Defense, with 
Some  New  Applications’  (1994),  agrees  that  the  token-reflexive  rule  is  not 
circular.  But  he  has  different  reasons  for this.  His  view  is  not that  there  is 
something special about the first-person perspective.  He does not think that it is 
by undergoing experiences from this perspective the subject can refer to himself 
reflexively.  Instead, he thinks that when a subject intends to refer to himself he137
does not have an intention towards an object. What the subject has is an intention
1   >•* to  self-refer,  which  is  the  intention  of an  act.  If an  object  (himself)  were  / ^  
involved in the specification of the act, then in order to think about this object the 
subject would have to think about it in the way that he thinks about other objects. 
Rumfitt thinks that this means that the subject would have to know the object 
(himself).  But because there is no object involved there is no need to explain 
how a subject can know himself.
Rumfitt’s discussion, like Anscombe’s, concerns how we are able to understand 
and use ‘I’  in language.  He also starts from the token reflexive rule which he 
explains, when talking of Anscombe’s example as
(I)  ‘I’  is the word Smith  [a speaker]  uses when he knowingly and
intentionally speaks of himself. (Rumfitt (1994), p632)
Now  recall  that  Anscombe  thinks  that  this  is  not  adequate,  as  the  pronoun
‘himself cannot specify or explain how it is that Smith’s mind ‘latches on’ to the
object to which ‘himself  refers if it is the ordinary reflexive.  And if it is the
indirect reflexive, she thinks it can only be explained in terms of ‘I’.  Rumfitt
suggests that ‘himself is not a referring expression at all5 -  its function is not to
pick out an object.  So, even if one thinks that acquaintance with an object, or
knowing  an  object,  or  having  a  conception  of  an  object,  is  necessary  for
reference, this need not be present in the case of ‘I’.  Thus Rumfitt thinks that he
can undercut Anscombe’s circularity argument.
Rumfitt points out that that there are two opposing interpretations of ‘himself in
(I).  The  first  he  attributes  to  Evans  (1977),  in  ‘Pronouns,  Quantifiers  and
Relative Clauses’, and the second to Geach (1968, 1972). Evans’s account seems
the intuitive way to treat reflexive pronouns, and is what Anscombe assumes in
her argument above.  Evans says:
If ct is a sentence containing the singular term positions pi  and pj, which 
are chained together, and pi contains the singular term x and pj contains 
the pronoun k  , then the denotation of k  in ct is the same as the denotation 
of x. (Evans (1977), p89)
In Anscombe’s sentence ‘Smith realizes (fails to realize) the identity of an object
he calls  ‘Smith’  with himself  she thinks that the word  ‘himself  refers to the
same object as the subject term ‘Smith’, hence assuming that the pronoun is a
5 Although ‘I’ is.138
referring expression which picks up its referent in this case from the subject of 
the sentence.  Rumfitt argues that instead pronouns should be analysed as Geach 
suggests.  Geach believes that reflexive pronouns are not referring expressions at 
all.  Instead,  they  are  “surface  manifestations  of  a  higher-order  linguistic 
functional of the same category as ‘Ref(<t>)’” (Rumfitt (1994), p623).  Ref(<|>), as 
Rumfitt explains, takes a two-place predicable /?(£,r|) to a one-place predicable 
fig) “in such a way that for every name n,^(n) = /i(n,n).” (Rumfitt (1994), p604). 
The best way to think of what Rumfitt calls predicables is to think of them as 
symbolizing  properties  or  relations.  Rumfitt  gives  the  following  example:  ‘x 
contradicts y'  is  a predicable,  which  symbolizes the  relation of contradicting 
(p602).  So in this example, the linguistic functional Ref(<|>) takes us from the 
two-place predicable ‘x contradicts y ’  to the one place ‘x contradicts x\ or ‘x 
self-contradicts ’.  A predicable which needs completion by two singular terms to 
give an atomic sentence is taken by the functional to a reflexive predicable which 
needs  completion  by  only  one  singular  term.  On  this  analysis  of  reflexive 
pronouns, the pronoun ‘himself has the same sense as Ref(<|>).  We understand 
Ref(<|>) if we know what it would be for x to < j>  x when we know what it is for x to 
< |>  y (e.g. if we know what it is for x to kill x when we know what it is for x to kill 
y). We are supposed to be able to grasp the sense of Ref(<|>) without having to 
grasp the sense of all its instances.
Rumfitt explains that he thinks that (I) -   ‘I’  is the word  Smith uses when he 
knowingly and intentionally speaks of himself -  should be analysed as the word 
which Smith uses when:
(*)  Smith intends to do that.  Refer to himself.
This differs from non-first-personal reflexive reference which may be analysed in 
other various ways, for example:
(+i)  Smith intends to do that.  Refer to Smith.
or
(+2)  Smith intends to do that.  Refer to that person with his pants on 
fire.
Using the accounts of intention and acts developed earlier in his paper, Rumfitt 
then analyses (*) as:
Smith stands in the intending relation to the act (p refers to P).139
Rumfitt believes that in order to  stand  in the  intending relation to  an act, the 
subject must know what it would be to do an act (he calls this the ‘conceptual 
requirement’ (p622)). Because of this, he thinks that in order to be able to use the 
word ‘I’ Smith must know what it is to do the act (p refers to p).  But the act (p 
refers to p) differs from the act (e.g.) (P refers to Smith) in that in order to know 
how to do the act, the subject does not need to know anything about an object. 
As Rumfitt explains,  Smith can know what it  is to do the act (P  refers to  p) 
simply by understanding what it means for x to refer to y, and in addition, by 
having the
...second-level capacity of knowing what it is for x to Ref(<|>) if he knows 
what it is for x to < |>  y. It is these capacities that underpin the ability to 
discern the common predication in (for example) ‘Jones refers to Jones’, 
‘Brown refers to Brown’, etc. (Rumfitt (1994), p633-4)
In first-person thoughts, as opposed to non-first-personal reference to himself,
there is no need for Smith to be able to pick out the object which he is.  In non-
first-personal reference to himself, to meet the conceptual requirement, and so to
know what it is to do an act (e.g. in case (+1)) Smith must know what it is to
refer,  and  ‘know who’  Smith is.  But in first-person thought he just needs to
know what it means to refer, possess this second-level capacity, and intend to
commit this act of self-reference.  If this explanation is correct Rumfitt believes
that anyone will:
...by virtue of understanding ‘I’, know that he may realize his ambition to 
refer to himself by uttering that word.  And having explained what it is to 
intend to refer to  oneself in terms  that do  not involve  ‘I’,  there  is  no 
circularity in using such a notion [the token-reflexive rule] to specify the 
meaning of‘I’. (Rumfitt (1994), p634).
Rumfitt avoids  the  need  for a  subject to  have  a conception  of himself or be 
acquainted  with  himself when  he  thinks  first-personally  because  no  object  is 
supposed to be in the act he intends when he intends the act of self-reference. 
Therefore, he does not need to be able to single out any object in order to meet 
the ‘conceptual requirement’.  This analysis is based on a general conception of 
intention developed by Rumfitt, where what is intended is not a particular state of 
affairs, but an act or act-type.  In self-reference, I do not intend the state of affairs 
that / self-refer, or that 1 refer to myself (an object), or of reference to myself; I 
just intend an act of self-reference.  If I did need to know who the agent was, or if 
there  was  an  object  involved,  then  Rumfitt’s  account  would  not  undercut140
Anscombe’s  argument  if he  still  wished  to  conform  to  a  similar  underlying 
picture of reference.  Then, to meet the conceptual requirement, I would need to 
be able to pick out the agent.  To support his account, Rumfitt aims to make it 
clear that a subject can intend an act without intending that an agent perform an 
act,  and he  also  attempts to  explain how a subject can  intend  an  act  of self- 
reference.
Rumfitt’s initial discussion of acts takes place within an analysis of what it is to 
order; he sees ordering as a three-place relation, relating orderer, addressee, and 
act.  An act is defined as a thing done by an agent, and its identity conditions are 
given in terms of the identity conditions of the senses of action predicables which 
specify the act (Rumfitt (1994), p618).  An action predicable is  a predicable 
where the imperative of the predicable makes sense; for example,  washes the 
dishes’ is an action predicable because the imperative ‘Wash the dishes!’ makes 
sense.  The action predicable  washes the dishes’ specifies the act of washing 
the dishes, and any and only action predicables with exactly the same sense will 
specify the same act.  Thus  it seems that acts are well-defined, and an act is 
indeed supposed to be distinct from a state of affairs; an act is performed by an 
agent,  the agent is  not involved  in the  definition of the act.  It  is  therefore 
important to explore whether it is possible to order an act, rather than to order the 
state of affairs of someone performing an act.
Rumfitt considers this issue by examining how we might analyse the report of an 
order:
Knacker ordered Plod to arrest Mr. Hyde.
He  rejects  what  might  seem  to  be  the  obvious  analysis,  which  would  treat 
ordering as a relation between an orderer and a state of affairs.  Such an analysis 
might be represented as follows:
Knacker ordered that.  Plod arrest Hyde.
In this analysis,  the  second  sentence  specifies  a  state of affairs,  and  the  first 
sentence represents Knacker being in the ordering relation to the state of affairs 
picked out by the demonstrative ‘that’; the state of affairs specified by the second 
sentence.  Rumfitt rejects this because he  says that the sentence  ‘Plod arrests 
Hyde’ misrepresents what Knacker actually ordered; he argues:141
In giving his order to Plod, Knacker uses no word that designates Plod; 
indeed, he need not even know who Plod is. ((1994), p617)
This seems correct to an extent, but not fully correct.  It is true that Knacker does
not need to know who Plod is, and so having the name Plod in the specification
of what is ordered may misrepresent the content of what is ordered.  But Knacker
does need to know who Plod is in another sense.  He needs to know that he
addresses his order to someone; he is acquainted with Plod and can single him
out even if he does not know his name.  In Rumfitt’s preferred analysis:
Knacker ordered Plod to do that. Arrest Hyde!
the second sentence may better give the content of Knacker’s order, as it does not
mention Plod by name, but it still  seems to contain an (implicit) grammatical
subject.  Rumfitt thinks that this analysis is equivalent to:
Knacker ordered Plod thus.  You arrest Hyde.
saying:
The choice between these variants will, I suppose, turn on the fruitfulness 
of the  linguists’  notion  of an  understood  grammatical  subject,  but  for 
present purposes the choice  is a matter of detail.  Whether or not the 
second utterance of the parataxis contains a grammatical subject, what is 
crucial is that it suffices to identify a predicable, in this case % arrests 
Hyde’. ((1994), p618)
The two variants specify the same action predicable.  But is it really an act that is 
ordered?  The  grammatical  subject,  understood  or  otherwise,  is  involved  in 
specifying the content of the order.  There is both an agent and an act involved 
in what is ordered -  the act alone is not ordered, but rather the state of affairs of 
the agent performing the act.  Thus the addressee seems to be an essential part of 
the state of affairs that is ordered.  Knacker is ordering the agent Plod to arrest 
Hyde.  Although the state of affairs he is ordering is better specified by  ‘You 
arrest Hyde’ rather than the state of affairs specified by ‘Plod arrests Hyde’, this 
does not mean Knacker is not ordering an agent to perform an act.  Rumfitt’s 
analysis of ordering as a three-place relation between orderer, addressee, and act 
is somewhat misleading.  It seems to me that the act must pick up its agent from 
the  addressee,  and  it  is  the  state  of affairs  involving  the  addressee  which  is 
actually being ordered.
However, it is the analysis of intention which is crucial in Rumfitt’s explanation 
of how a subject can think first-personally.  It does not matter if only states of142
affairs rather than acts can be ordered,  as long as acts without agents  can be 
intended.  Rumfitt  sees  his  analysis  of intention  as  similar  to  the  analysis  of 
ordering, only in this case the intending relation is supposed to be a two-place 
relation (rather than three-place) between intender and act.  ‘A intends to < |> ’  is 
analysed as:
A intends to do that act. < |> .
Of course I accept that a subject can intend acts, rather than states of affairs.  It is 
precisely such acts that are from the first-person perspective.  The subject might 
intend to mow the lawn; he intends to do this act in the future.  He intends this 
act from the point of view of the subject, who is to perform the act in the future. 
But Rumfitt, if his comparison with orders is anything to go by, does not seem to 
think of acts as understood in a first-personal way.  Suppose Knacker orders Plod 
to  do that act.  Arrest  Hyde.  ‘Arrest Hyde’  is  supposed to  specify an  action 
predicable which refers to an act.  But it is not an act understood from the first- 
person perspective.  Is Rumfitt’s understanding of acts intended now supposed to 
involve acts from the first-person perspective?
I do not think that an agent can intend an act which is not from the first-person 
perspective.  He can intend that other people perform acts, but this is to intend a 
state of affairs.  He can intend that John mow the lawn, for instance.  But here he 
is not just intending an act.  And he may intend that he himself perform an act, in 
such a way that this intention is not from the first-person perspective.  But if he is 
just  intending  an  act,  he  must  be  thinking  of this  act  from  the  first-person 
perspective.6
Rumfitt must be proposing that a subject can intend an act, where this does not 
involve  intending  himself to  perform  an  act.  If he  has  to  intend  himself to 
perform the act, then his account does not undercut Anscombe’s.  He will have to 
explain what it is for a subject to think of himself in the intention, and Rumfitt 
wants to avoid this.  But once he accepts that a subject can intend just an act, 
then he surely must accept that there is a way of intending things from the first-
6 If a subject intends an act and if he intends that he himself perform an act, he is intending the 
same event to occur.  But he is thinking of this event in two different ways, the first of which is 
first-personal.143
person perspective.  Just as there is a way of remembering from the first-person 
perspective; from the inside.  And just as there is experiencing things from the 
first-person perspective.  And if he accepts this, then his account is unmotivated. 
It  is because there are  such  first-personal  grounds that a  subject can  refer to 
himself.  Such first-personal  grounds  are  the  basis  for  subjective  first-person 
thoughts.  The subject is the subject of such thoughts, and can think of himself 
reflexively, ascribing such experiences to himself.
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We can thus explain how a subject is able to think about himself first-personally 
without resorting to Rumfitt’s analysis of a subject’s intention to refer to himself 
being an intention of an act of self-reference.  This is just as well, because it is 
unclear that we really understand what it is to intend such an act.  Recall that 
Rumfitt’s account has a ‘conceptual requirement’ that in order to intend an act a 
subject must know what it would be to do the act.  We are supposed to know 
what it would mean to self-refer by knowing what it is for x to refer to y and 
possessing the second-level capacity of understanding Ref (9).  This means that 
we must understand what it is for x to (p x if we understand what it is for x to 9 y. 
But how is it that we know what it is for x to refer to x?  If we understand how x 
can  refer  to  y  in  terms  of acquaintance,  must  acquaintance  be  involved  in 
understanding how x refers to x?
Some examples may make this point clearer.  Suppose I understand what it is for 
Mary to scratch John’s head.  To do this, she must locate John, reach over to 
him, and scratch his head.  But does my understanding of what it is for Mary to 
scratch Mary’s head involve this?  She does not have to locate Mary and reach 
her hand over to her to scratch her head.  There is a particular way of scratching 
one’s own head, which does not first involve locating someone and reaching out 
an arm.  There is a specific way of moving one’s own arm in order to scratch 
one’s own head, and it is not clear that one can understand this on the model of 
scratching another’s head.  To take a different example, if I understand that Mary 
loves John or that Mary hates John, can I really understand on the basis of my 
understanding of Ref (9) what it is for Mary to love herself, or hate herself?144
When a subject thinks first-personally he intends to refer to himself, the subject. 
He  is  the  subject  undergoing  first-personal  experiences,  remembering  things 
from the inside, and intending to act in the future.  He ascribes such experiences 
to himself, and refers to himself, the subject.  We do not need to explain how 
‘himself can ‘latch on’ to an object.  It is not an independent object which the 
subject needs to be acquainted with in order to refer; it is the subject, himself. 
And we do not need to explain ‘himself away, saying that it does not refer to an 




The  first-person  perspective  is  key  to  understanding  subjective  first-person 
thought.  Because he has experiences from this perspective, the subject can refer 
reflexively to himself.  He has singular thoughts about himself.  These are like 
singular  thoughts  about  other  objects  in  that  the  subject  is  thinking  about  a 
particular object.  In first-person thought this object is himself.  Whether or not 
his  first-person  thought  is  true  depends  on  how  things  are  with  a  particular 
object;  himself.  However,  first-person  thought  differs  from  singular  thought 
about other objects in that in order to think of himself first-personally, the subject 
does not need to be acquainted with himself.  In this respect, reference in first- 
person thought is distinct from reference in thoughts about other objects.
It  is  unlikely  that  many  will  deny  that  there  is  a  first-personal  way  of 
experiencing  things  which  can  ground  first-person  thoughts.  A  subject’s 
judgement expressed by  ‘I am sitting down’  is based on very different grounds 
from his judgement that John is sitting down.  The latter judgement may well be 
formed on the basis of perceiving John in a sitting-down position.  The former 
can  be  known  from  the  inside.  But  it  might  be  objected  that  some  such 
experiences  from  the  first-person  perspective  are  precisely  those  where  the 
subject  is  acquainted  with  himself in  experience.  He  has  information  from 
himself, and it is this which enables him to think about himself first-personally. 
In  Section  lof  this  chapter  it  will  be  argued  that  this  is  not  the  case. 
Acquaintance is a relation which enables a subject to think of an object which is 
independent ofTumseTf.  But thlsTs not needed to ground reference in first-person 
thought.  The  subject  is  at  the  centre  of his  scheme  of reference  and  refers 
reflexively.  If he is acquainted with himself,  and refers to himself because of 
this, then this is not first-person thought.
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But if it is conceded that it is not a subject’s presence to himself in experience 
which grounds reference in his first-person thoughts, then there may be a further 
worry.  Anscombe (1975) argues that as what is normally required for reference 
is lacking in the first-person case, first-person thoughts expressed by  T’  do not146
refer.  I have argued that this is not the case.  The subject refers to himself. But 
how can we be sure that this is indeed reference?  Is the subject really an object 
of thought; an object among other objects?  Wittgenstein thinks that ‘I’ as subject 
does not refer.  Is this right?  I do not think it can be.  It is because a subject 
refers  reflexively  in  subjective  first-person  thought  that  he  is  able  to  think  of 
himself objectively and yet still first-personally.
My  exploration  of  first-person  reference  concludes  with  a  discussion  of 
objective-first-person thought.  This is first-person thought which does not have 
grounds which are from the first-person perspective.  It is because a subject can 
think  of  himself  reflexively  in  subjective  first-person  thoughts  -   reflexive. 
thoughts  he  expresses  with  ‘I’  in  English1   -   that  he  can  think  of himself in 
objective tirst-persorTthoughts^  In objective first-person tfioughtswhich arenot 
immune  to  error  through  misidentification,  acquaintance  is  indeed  involved. 
Sometimes this might be the subject’s acquaintance with what is in fact himself. 
But this acquaintance does not ground his first-person reference.  Instead,  this 
acquaintance partly grounds an identity judgement; the subject identifies himself 
with  an  object  in  the  world.  But  he  may  sometimes  -  or  even  always  -   be 
mistaken  that  this  object  is  himself.  Yet  this  does  not  stop  him  thinking  of 
himself first-personally.
1  The First-Person Perspective
Someone  who  holds  that  a  subject  is  acquainted  with  himself  when  he 
experiences things from the first-person perspective is unlikely to think that he is 
acquainted  with  himself  in  all  first-person  experience.  For  example,  Evans 
(1982) writes, in discussing a subject’s grounds for his thought expressed by  ‘I 
see a tree’:
Nothing more than the original state of awareness -  awareness, simply, of 
a  tree  -   is  called  for  on  the  side  of awareness,  for  a  subject  to  gain 
knowledge of himself thereby. (Evans (1982), p232)
But Evans thinks that to be able to think what is expressed by  ‘I see a tree’ the
subject must have an adequate Idea of himself.  He has this by being acquainted
with himself -  receiving information from himself -  and identifying himself on
the basis of this information.  Evans thinks that the subject must think of himself
1  Or equivalent terms or verbal inflections in other languages.147
as a physical object in the objective order.  And he can think of himself in this 
way because he is acquainted with himself in some bodily experiences.  Because 
of the nature of first-person memory, he can also think of himself as persisting 
through time.
It is particularly in cases of bodily experience and memory that it is thought that 
when a subject has a first-person experience or memory from the inside, not only 
is  he  experiencing  or  remembering,  he  is  also  experiencing  or  remembering 
himself.  But it is not the experiencing or remembering of oneself which grounds 
first-person reference.  It is the fact that the subject is having such first-person 
memories and experiences which enables him to think of himself reflexively. 
Reference in such cases is not grounded in acquaintance, nor is the first-person
judgement based on an identity judgement of the subject himself with an object 
presented  in  a  first-person  way.  He  experiences  things  from  a  first-person 
perspective and ascribes such experiences to himself.
1.1  The First-Person Perspective in Experience
When a subject experiences sitting down he can experience this in a particular 
first-personal way in which he cannot experience another person sitting down. 
When he feels hot, or as though he will fall over, he again experiences these from 
the inside.  But Evans (1982) argues that these are not just experiences of the 
subject.  They are ways in which the subject perceives or experiences his own 
body:
We have what might be described as a general capacity to perceive our 
own  bodies,  although  this  can  be  broken  down  into  several 
distinguishable capacities: our proprioceptive sense, our sense of balance, 
of heat and cold, and of pressure. (Evans (1982), p220)
These capacities to perceive our own bodies are  supposed to be  analogous to
perception.  When a subject perceives an object he receives information from
that object.  If the information is from an object then it is necessarily from that
object -  that object is present in experience.  It is being so present in experience
that puts the subject in a position to have a singular thought about the object.2
The view of Evans (1982) is that the experiences -  of bodily sensation, of heat
2 See Chapter 4, Section 2, for a detailed discussion of Evans’s notion of information148
and cold, of balance, etc. -  provide the subject with information from himself. 
This puts the subject in the position to think about himself first-personally.3
One of Anscombe’s arguments in ‘The First-Person’ (1975) is supposed to show 
that this cannot be correct.  This argument starts from her premise that a subject 
can  still  think  first-personally  whilst  amnesiac  and  sensorily  deprived.  If 
reference requires the presence of an object then the body cannot be present to 
the subject in such circumstances.  The only object which can be present in such 
circumstances, she thinks, is an Ego, so reference in first-person thoughts must 
be to an Ego.  Anscombe does not want to accept this conclusion, and neither 
does  Evans.  But while  she  concludes that a subject does not refer to himself 
when  he  thinks  first-personally,  Evans  does  not.  In  the  particular  scenario 
Anscombe describes, Evans thinks that the subject can still refer first-personally 
because he is disposed to receive information from his body.  But he is willing to 
accept  a  conclusion  which  Anscombe  finds  unacceptable  -   that  first-person 
thoughts usually refer, but in certain circumstances they can fail to refer.
If a  subject  has  never  had  information  from  himself -   if he  has  never  been 
present  to  himself in  experience -  then  Evans  accepts that  the  subject’s  first- 
person thoughts do not refer:
Consider,  for example,  the  perennial  nightmare:  the  idea that  a  human 
brain might exist,  from  birth,  in a vat,  subject by clever scientists to  a 
complex  series of hallucinations  (including kinaesthetic  hallucinations), 
of a  kind  which  would  enable  the  brain  to  develop  normal  cognitive 
faculties...Here  we  have  a  case  where  a  considerable  element  in  the 
subject’s  conception  of  himself,  both  present  and  past,  derives  from 
nothing.  In all his physical self-ascriptions, there is simply nothing from 
which his information derives.  When he thinks he is moving, or that his 
legs are bent, there  is  nothing  of whose physical  condition  he  is,  even 
inaccurately, informed. (Evans (1982), p250)
Could  a  brain  in  a  vat  refer  to  himself in  thought?  He  is  still  undergoing
experiences,  albeit  of  a  hallucinatory  nature.  Presumably  many  of  the
hallucinations he has been subject to, if they enable the brain to develop normal
cognitive  faculties, are  from the first-person perspective.  He  seems to  see the
world about him, to touch it, etc.  Can he refer to himself, the subject undergoing
these (hallucinatory) experiences?  It seems impossible to give a decisive answer
3  Of course, Evans does not think that a subject’s having information from himself is sufficient 
for reference -  he must also fulfil Russell’s Principle149
to this.  Campbell (1994) certainly seems to think that a subject can have thought 
about himself, based on hallucinatory experiences:
...the  most radical mistakes  about oneself are possible,  consistent with 
the continued use of the first person.  I may think that I am made of glass, 
or that I am a steam locomotive, and my experience may really seem to 
confirm this but these hallucinations would not deprive me of my use of 
the  first  person.  The  token-reflexive  rule  explains  this  immediately. 
(Campbell (1994), pl26)
But someone who shares Evans’s view would simply deny that this is possible.
It is difficult to resolve the dispute.
I  think  that  more  useful  cases  to  consider  are  those  where  a  subject  has 
experiences  from  the  first-person  perspective  which  are  the  result  of deviant 
causal chains.  Suppose a subject X is wired up to Y’s body so that when Y is 
hot, or off-balance, or sitting down, X experiences being hot, or off-balance, or 
sitting  down,  from  the  inside.  If  such  experiences  were  analogous  to  the 
perception of an object, then it seems in such cases that Y is being perceived, and 
not  X.  The  information  comes  from  Y,  not  X;  X  is  acquainted  with  Y  in 
experience, rather than X.  But in such cases.if X judges what he would express  ,  .
by T am hot’  or T am about to fall over’  or T am sitting down’, it seems he is 
still thinking about himself, rather than Y.  The subject X is the subject of these  >   ^
experiences, and thinks about himself.  Because these experiences are as a result 
of being wired up to Y’s body X ends up having false beliefs about himself.  But 
he does not fail to think of himself.
Evans would simply disagree with this, and say that in the scenario envisaged, X  \  ^   fcu
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is not having a singular thought about himself or anyone else.  Unlike  the brain  _ Ipr*  j*
in  a  vat  case,  it  is  not that  there  is  only  hallucinatory  information.  There  is
-   V'') genuine information, from object Y.  But because X has been wired up to Y, X’s  f
senses are not functioning properly; he is not receiving information in the normal 
way.  Because  he  is  not  receiving  information  in  the  normal  way  he  cannot 
identify the object his attempted thought  is about,  and thus cannot conform  to 
Russell’s Principle - that to think about an object one must know which object 
one  is thinking about.  It is  not that no object  is  present  in experience -   Y  is 
present in experience.  But because of the deviant causal chain, X cannot identify 
Y  and  think  about  him.  In  Chapter  4  of this  thesis  it  has  been  argued  that1  DU
discriminating knowledge is not needed for reference to independent objects -  
what is necessary  is that the object is present to the  subject.  If an object  is 
present to the subject then he can think about that object rather than another one, 
and can have a thought about that particular object.  But he does not need to 
know  which  object  he  is  thinking  about  -   he  does  not  need  to  be  able  to 
distinguish it from others.  The subject does not need to be able to show that he is 
thinking of one object rather than another -  being acquainted with one object 
rather than another is enough to make his thought about one object rather than 
another.  In the deviant causal chain case, if an object is present to the subject, 
then it clearly  seems to be object Y,  rather than X.  Yet few would want to 
conclude that when X judges ‘I am about to fall over’ he is thinking of Y.  What 
if this is based on an identity judgement?  Could it be based on ‘That person (Y) 
is about to fall over’ and ‘I am that person’?  But if information from himself is 
supposed to ground X’s first-person reference, how does he refer using ‘I’ here? 
He must have at least some first-person experiences where the information is 
from himself.  But how does he distinguish between information which is from 
himself,  and  information  which  is  from  Y,  in  order  to  make  the  identity 
judgement?  In  both  cases  it  seems  more  plausible  that  X  is  undergoing 
experiences, whoever’s body happens to be the source, and it is in undergoing 
experiences from the inside which grounds his reference to himself.
The  experiences  (or  hallucinations  of experiences)  which  ground  a  subject’s 
bodily self-ascriptions are experiences from the first-person perspective which 
the subject undergoes.  The point of these experiences is not to present an object 
to the subject -  he can refer to himself, undergoing the experiences.  Any attempt 
to make these experiences a relation between subject and object misrepresents 
what  is  going  on.  This  relation  between  subject  and  object  is  needed  for  a 
subject  to  think  about  independent  objects,  but  not  for  him  to  think  about 
himself.
Evans thinks that this is totally wrong.  In defending his own view he says:
Many people will regard the remarks I have made about this [brain in vat] 
case  as  quite  unintelligible.  For  I  have  spoken  of  the  subject
thinking.. .and wondering..., while at the same time I have denied that his 
T-thoughts...have  an  object.  Surely  (people  will  object)  this  is
unintelligible, for if there is a subject, thinking T-thoughts, then his T-151
thoughts  will  concern  himself.  But  why  is  it  thought  that  self- 
identification, or  thoughts about oneself, are as simple as this -  so that, 
whenever  there  is  a  subject,  then  there  is  at  least  one  thing  he  can 
unproblematically think about, namely himself? (Evans (1982), p251-2)
But  it  is  as  simple  as  this.  A  subject  has  experiences  from  the  first-person
perspective and can refer to himself.  He can already think of himself.  He does
not need to be acquainted with himself in order to be in a position to think of
himself.4  Evans thinks that first-person reference cannot be unproblematic.  He
thinks  that  one  reason  such  a  view  seems  plausible  is  because  of a  “false
analogy” with the use of the word  ‘I’  in communication ((1982), p252).  On
hearing someone uttering ‘I’, an audience can think of the person saying T   as
“the utterer of the word ‘I’” -  that is, think of him by description.  And so if this
were the model for first-personal thought, we would have to think of ourselves as
the thinker of this thought, or the subject of these experiences.  Evans thinks that
we do not think of ourselves in this way.  I agree.  But this is not what is being
proposed here.  A subject does not think of himself by description: he does not
think of himself as the subject of these experiences.  He is the subject of these
experiences,  but this  is  not how he  thinks  of himself.  He  thinks  of himself  >
reflexively, and has a singular thought about himself.  It is not a thought about
whatever fulfils a certain condition.  It is a thought about a particular object.
1.2  The First-Person Perspective in Memory
Memory is a faculty for retaining information.  If a subject has a memory-based 
singular  thought  about  an  independent  object  this  is  because  he  possesses 
retained information derived from an encounter with that object. The fact that he 
has once perceived the object and retains this in memory is enough for him to 
think about it.  Even if he misremembers the object -  perhaps he remembers it as 
yellow and it was red -  he is still thinking about the object originally perceived.
The  object  remembered  is  the  one  that  was  perceived  and  which  led  to  the 
memory, not the one which fits the description.
What  about  memories  from  the  first-person  perspective?  When  he  has  such 
memories, does the subject possess retained information, derived from his being
4 One reason why Evans thinks that this is unacceptable is because if this is how he refers, the 
subject cannot identify himself as an objective element in the world, and so cannot represent 
himself as one among others.  This is discussed below in Section 1.4.152
acquainted with himself?  The memories of concern here are those that ground 
subjective  first-person  memory  judgements.  Recall  Higginbotham’s  (2003) 
example5 of a group of people getting together to tell John that he should finish 
his thesis by July.  The subject remembering hearing a voice, ‘hanging in the air’, 
telling John to finish his thesis by July.  He identifies this voice as his.  On this 
basis he concludes that he told John to finish his thesis by July.  But this is not a 
memory from the inside.  He does not remember telling John to finish his thesis 
by July.  He only has a memory from the inside if he remembers speaking as an 
act performed.  In each case the same event is remembered, but it is remembered 
in different ways, one of which is from the first-person perspective.
So  are  such  memories  from  the  inside,  which  ground  subjective  first-person 
memory  judgements,  really  cases  where  the  subject  is  not  acquainted  with 
himself?  When he makes memory judgements does he refer reflexively?  Or is 
there  information from himself retained in memory and it is this  information 
which enables a subject to think about himself?
If the subject is not present to himself in present-tense experiences, there seems 
no reason why he would be present to himself in memories of these experiences. 
Suppose a subject has an experience from the inside, such as seeing a tree, or 
hearing a symphony, or singing a song.  These experiences ground the subjective 
first-person thoughts expressed by ‘I see a tree’, or ‘I hear a symphony’ or ‘I am 
singing  a  song’.  The  subject  may  later have  first-person  memories  of these 
experiences.  These memories  ground the thoughts  ‘I  saw a tree’,  ‘I  heard  a 
symphony’ or ‘I sang a song’.  As the subject is not acquainted with himself in 
the  original  experiences,  neither  is  he  acquainted  with  himself in  memory.6 
First-person memories from the inside are not like memories of other objects. 
For when a subject first thinks about and later remembers an independent object 
he first must be acquainted with the object in order to think of it.  This is retained
5 Discussed in Chapter 1  of this thesis, Sections 2.2 and 2.3
6 Ayers (1991) p278 holds that in remembering one’s past experiences and actions one’s past self 
is in the content of the memory.  He describes the opposing position as ‘implausible’. But it is not 
at all obvious that it is implausible.  I do not mean to suggest that there cannot be cases where the 
subject remembers himself, rather than first-person experiences.  I only claim that the subject has 
some memories from the first-person perspective which do not involve himself in the content of 
the memory.153
in memory, allowing the subject to think of the object later.  But for a subject to 
think about himself he does not first need to be acquainted with himself.  Hence 
acquaintance is not retained in memory in this case.  The memory judgement is 
about an object, the subject, and this is because it is the subject who remembers 
the experience.
*»
However, there is a debate about quasi-memory  in which some people seem to 
make the assumption that first-person memories from the inside are indeed ways 
in which a subject is acquainted with an object. The debate concerns whether 
such first-person memories really are immune to error through misidentification. 
It has already been noted that some memories which ground first-person memory 
judgements are not so immune.  Higginbotham’s (2003) example -  of the subject 
remembering he told John to finish his thesis by July by remembering a voice 
hanging in the air and later identifying this voice as his -  is such a case.  This 
results  in what  I  have termed  an  objective  first-person thought rather than  a 
subjective first-person thought.  But first-personal memories from the inside -  
those  that  ground  subjective  first-person  thoughts  -   are  not  supposed  to  be 
subject to such an error.  For instance, Higginbotham thinks that if I remember 
saying to  John that  he  should  finish  his  thesis  by  July  from  the  first-person 
perspective, then it does not make sense to wonder: ‘Someone said John should 
finish his thesis by July, but did I say John should finish his thesis by July?’.  But 
examples can  be  constructed which  show that perhaps  it does  make  sense  to 
wonder this after all.  These are cases where a subject’s apparent memories are 
not about things he did or experienced, but are  instead causally derived from 
someone else’s experiences.
Apparent  memories  derived  from  someone  else’s  experience  are  termed  ‘q- 
memories’  by  Shoemaker  (1970)  to  get  around  the  linguistic  restriction  that 
memories can only be about one’s own experiences.  Perhaps a perfect duplicate 
of a person, including his brain, has been made.  The original person saw a tree, 
and  the  duplicate  q-remembers  seeing  a  tree,  although  he  did  not  have  the 
original experience.  Or perhaps someone has had his brain divided in two, and 
transplanted  into  two  new  people.  Both  these  people  can  q-remember  the
7 The term ‘quasi-memory’ or ‘q-memory’ is introduced by Shoemaker (1970)154
experiences of the original subject from the inside, as if they had the experiences, 
but they did not have the experiences.  In such cases it seems to make sense for 
the subject to say: ‘Someone saw a tree, but was it I who saw a tree?’
Evans argues that a subject’s first-person memory-based judgements generally 
are immune to error through misidentification.  However, in so arguing he seems 
to  assume  that  both  sides  of the  debate  think  that  in  first-person  memory  a 
subject  has  retained  information  from  an  object,  just  as  he  has  retained 
information from independent objects in memory.  In other words, the subject’s 
memory is of an object having an experience, rather than just a memory of an 
experience from the first-person perspective.  Evans argues that where a subject’s 
memories are causally derived from someone else’s experience, he is not able to 
have a singular thought based on these experiences.  This is because he thinks the 
subject is unable to identify a particular object on the basis of the memory.  But 
the implication is that the subject is receiving information from an object here -  
the object from which the memory was causally derived -  but because of the 
deviant causal chain, he cannot identify the object.  Evans compares his response 
in this case to his responses in section 6.6 (on ‘here’-thoughts) and 7.3 (on bodily 
self-ascription):
This argument is of a kind with which we are already familiar, and we 
have seen that it fails to establish its conclusion (see 6.6 on places, and
7.3  on physical self-ascription.) [Shoemaker’s] argument presents us with 
a case in which information apparently possessed about an object in a 
certain way -  the normal way -  can underlie a judgement about an object 
which is based upon an identification.  But it certainly does not follow 
from  this  that judgements  about  an  object,  based  upon  this  way  of 
possessing information  about  it,  must be  based upon  an  identification. 
(Evans (1982), p242)
In the examples discussed in Sections 6.6 and 7.3 the subject is supposed to be
acquainted with, and receive information from, a place or an object.  Purported
counterexamples, involving deviant causal  chains,  are  dealt with by  Evans  by
saying that in such cases the subject would not be able to have a thought about
the object, because despite being acquainted with the object, he cannot identify
it.  It  is  important to be careful  about two  different senses of ‘identification’
being  used.  By  ‘identification’  in the  above  quotation,  and where  it concerns
immunity to error through misidentification, Evans means that the subject does
not think ‘I was F  on the basis of an identification ‘That man was F  and ‘I am155
that man’.  He does not mean that the subject does not have to identify himself in 
thought -  the  subject  still  must  have  discriminating  knowledge  of himself,  or 
know  which  object  he  is  thinking  about.8  This  is  a  different  sense  of 
identification.  His  argument  suggests  that  he  thinks  that  in  cases  of quasi­
memory, the subject is receiving information from an object (one we might try, 
but  fail,  to  refer  to  as  ‘that  man’).  But  as  he  cannot  identify  -   have 
discriminating knowledge of -  that man, he cannot think about that man.  Thus 
he cannot have the thought ‘That man was F  and ‘I am that man’ and so in such 
as case  he  would  not be  able to  have  a memory-based  singular thought.  But 
usually, there are no such deviant causal chains.
In  information-based  singular  thoughts  which  are  immune  to  error  through 
misidentification,  Evans  thinks  that  the  subject  knows  which  object  he  is 
thinking about on the basis of the information he receives from the object.  In 
first-person  memory judgements  the  implication  is  that  normally  the  subject 
knows  which  object  he  is  thinking  about;  he  knows  this  on  the  basis  of the 
information retained in memory  from himself.  Where there are deviant causal 
chains,  Evans  thinks  the  error  made  is  the  assumption  that  the  memory  is 
functioning normally.  But in normal circumstances, information is retained from 
the self, and the subject can think about and refer to himself on that basis.  It is 
this  information  which  grounds  the  uses  of ‘I’;  it does  not  ground  the  use  of 
‘That person’.
Yet if it is acquaintance rather than discriminating knowledge which is necessary 
foj^a subjecMo have a singular thought about an objecfthen  in the q-memory 
trv  case, like the deviant causal chains in experience case, one would expect that if V
f  w   an object were present, it would be the object from which the memory derived.
r0 0 ^   t  'V **  _ ____________________ _______ _____________ ________ _
\ B u t  if a subject says ‘I saw a tree’  on the basis of such a q-memory, therTRe is
^   ^         — ---------------------------------------------------------------------    —
-v.  still referring to himself, making a mistake about his past experience.  He is not
,  vV-V  "       — -- — ----------—-------------      '
^  ^  p >  *   referring to the person from whom the memory derived.  His judgement ‘I saw a
•A**0 '  tree’ ^couldT of  bourse,  be  as  a  result  of a  mistaken  identity judgement  -   the
*vAr
subject is acquainted with that man in memory, and thinks that that man is F.  He
g
Shoemaker does not think that such thoughts are based on an identification in the latter sense -  
he does not think there is any tracking of the self over time. ((1986/1996), pi 5-16)156
mistakenly identifies himself with that man, to think I am F.  When these are 
genuine  memories  rather  than  q-memories,  the  identity  judgement  is  not 
mistaken.  But if such memory judgements are based on an identification, then 
the object present in experience does not ground the use of ‘I’.  It only grounds 
the  use  of the  demonstrative  ‘that  man’.  How  does  the  subject  think  first- 
personally, in order to identify himself with that man?  Perhaps the reference of 
the first-person is only grounded in present-tense first-person experiences.  The 
subject thinks of himself reflexively, and then identifies himself with the person 
presented  in his memories.  But  I  think  it  is much more  plausible  that  such 
memories, whatever their source, are memories that the subject experiences from 
the  first-person perspective,  and in  so  experiencing this,  he  can  also  refer to 
himself, the subject.  Their function is not to put the subject in contact with an 
object.
Pryor (1999) argues that there is a mistaken assumption in Evans’s reasoning. 
He agrees with me that in memory the subject is not receiving information from 
an object.  It is because he is not receiving information from an object that he is 
not  in  a  position  to  have  a  singular  thought  about  an  object.  No  object  is 
presented in a first-person memory experience.  But Pryor still thinks that first- 
person memory judgements are not immune to error through misidentification. 
Because of the possibility of q-memory he thinks that a subject experiencing a 
memory from the first-person perspective is only entitled to conclude ‘Someone 
was F  and not ‘I was F .  The subject does not have the grounds for a singular 
thought,  but only a general thought.  Where the  subject goes wrong,  if this  is 
indeed a q-memory, is in identifying himself as the thing that is F.  I agree with 
Pryor that if a subject were presented with evidence that some of his first-person 
memories  were  q-memories  then  this  would  undercut  his  justification  for 
believing what he  would express by  ‘I  was F .  But this  does  not affect the 
reference of the first-person.  The subject, if he is to conclude ‘I was F  on the 
basis of knowing that something is F and coming to identify himself as fulfilling 
the condition, still needs to be able to refer to himself.  As above, perhaps he can 
think of himself only by having present-tense experiences from the first-person 
perspective and then identifies himself as the thing that was F.  But this seems 
unlikely.  In first-person memories which ground subjective first-person memoryjudgements, the assumption is that the subject underwent the original experiences 
which have resulted in the memories being retained.  And just as he can ascribe 
experiences to himself, he ascribes past experiences to himself, because he has a 
special  first-person  perspective  on  the  world.  These  experiences,  present  or 
memories, are experiences the subject undergoes; even if they are hallucinatory 
or derived from another source, the subject himself undergoes these experiences, 
and ascribes them to himself, thinking of himself.
13  The First-Person Perspective on the Future
The claim so far has been that experiences and memories from the first-person 
perspective ground subjective first-person thoughts.  There is a particular way of 
experiencing  or  remembering ^something  from  the  inside,  and  because  he 
experiences  things  in  this  way,  the  subject  can  think  first-personally  about 
himself.  But Anscombe has claimed that a subject can still think first-personally 
when amnesiac and in a sensory deprivation tank:
And now let us imagine that I get into a state of ‘sensory deprivation’. 
Sight  is  cut  off,  and  I  am  locally  anaesthetized  everywhere,  perhaps 
floated in a tank of tepid water; I am unable to speak, or to touch any part 
of my body with any other.  (Anscombe (1975), pl46)
When  amnesiac  and  sensorily  deprived,  the  subject  is  not  remembering  or
experiencing  anything  first-personally.  Anscombe’s  example  is  supposed  to
show that the body cannot be present in such a case; as the subject can still think
first-personally, it cannot be the body’s presence which grounds this.  But is it
also a problem for a reflexive account of first-person reference?  He can  still
think first-personally, but as he is not experiencing or remembering anything, can
he refer reflexively?  Or should we conclude with Anscombe that a subject is not
referring to an object when he thinks first-personally?
If the subject could not think at all, then of course he could not think of himself. 
But this is not Anscombe’s suggestion.  He can still think first-personally.  The 
example Anscombe gives is:
Now I tell  myself ‘I  won’t  let this  happen again!’  (Anscombe  (1975), 
pi 46)
This is an intention, which is from the first-person perspective.  Presumably if he 
can think this, the subject can also think things like ‘I want to get out of here’; ‘I 
hope to be somewhere else soon’, and so on.  The subject can intend, and desire,158
and hope things from the inside.  This does not lead to Anscombe’s conclusion: 
■aTthe only thing that couicTbe present is an Ego, if the subject is referring in 
these first-person thoughts he must be referring to an Ego.  The subject is not 
referring to an object present to  him;  he  is  referring to  himself, whatever he 
might be.  In fact, as nothing is present to him in the sensory deprivation tank, 
thTow/jrobject he can think about in there is himself.
1.4  Do Subjective First-Person Thoughts Refer?
Anscombe  concludes that  ‘I’,  used  to  express  first-person thoughts,  does  not 
refer.  This is because what is normally present for reference is not present in the 
first-person case.  The proposal in this thesis is that what is normally present for 
reference is not needed in the first-person case.  A subject’s acquaintance with an 
independent object is needed to put him in a position to think of that object, but 
he can think of himself unproblematically.
But when a subject thinks reflexively, is he really thinking of an object?  If he 
were acquainted with himself then he could think of himself as an object in the 
world.  But if he thinks of himself reflexively, perhaps he is not thinking of an 
object in the world at all.  Perhaps the subject is, as Wittgenstein puts it in The 
Tract  at  us, the ‘limit of the world’ and not in the world:
The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
(Wittgentsein (1922), 5.632)
This worry is related to the question: Are there thinking subjects in the world, 
which are among other objects in the world, and which can think about other 
objects in the world?  I do not pretend to be able to prove that the answer to this 
question  is  yes.  But  if the  answer  is  positive,  as  I  think  it  is -  if there  are 
thinking  subjects  among  other objects  in  the  world -  I  see  no  reason  why  a 
thinking subject cannot refer to himself reflexively, at the centre of his scheme of 
reference.  There is no reason why he would have to be acquainted with himself 
in the world in order to think of himself.
I think that trying to show that a subject is one among others in the world, and 
that he thinks of himself as one among others, is what underlies Evans’s (1982)159
account  of  first-person  reference.9  He  wants  to  avoid  Anscombe’s  and 
Wittgenstein’s conclusion that a subject does not refer to an object in the world 
when  he  thinks  first-personally.  Evans  argues  that  a  subject  must  receive 
information from himself which enables him to think of himself as a physical 
object.  If in order to be able to refer to himself a subject must be acquainted with 
himself as an object in the world, and think of himself as an object in the world, 
then we do not have the worry that first-person thoughts may always fail to refer. 
On Evans’s view of first-person thought a subject must have an adequate Idea of 
himself as a physical object which is part of the objective order:
...this  means  that  one’s  Idea  of  oneself  must  also  comprise...a 
knowledge of what it would be for an identity of the form Tl = 6tl to be 
true, where 5t is a fundamental Idea of a person: an identification of a 
person which...is of a kind which could be available to  someone else. 
(Evans (1982), p209)
The subject can think things he would express by ‘I am sitting down’ because he 
knows what it is for a physical object to be sitting down.
Yet this seems to have things backwards.  Does one really need to understand 
something like ‘sitting down’ at the fundamental level of thought?  It seems that 
a subject can think I am sitting down precisely because he experiences this from 
the first-person perspective.  And the subject ascribes this experience to himself. 
He  can  also  ascribe  ‘sitting  down’  to  other  people  on  the  basis  of  his 
acquaintance with them.  He ascribes the same predicate to himself and others, 
and yet there seems no reason why his reference to himself must involve him 
antecedently  thinking  of himself  as  a  physical  object.  On  the  basis  of  his 
experience from the first-person perspective he can think what he would express 
by  ‘I  am  sitting  down’;  because  of this  he  may,  if he  thinks  about  it,  later 
conclude ‘I am a physical object’.  But he does not need to be able to think of 
himself as  a  physical  object  in  order  to  refer  to  himself in  the  first  place. 
Rgferenceto oneself comes first.  Trying to worlTout what one is comes later
It is because he is the one having experiences'°(frgmjhlfirst  -person perspective  paa
that a subject can ascribe such experiences to himself and therefore think about  y A m x
himself.  And  it  is  because  he  has  such  experiences  that he  comes  to  make  .
-77P/U*.
9 I think this is also what underlies Strawson’s discussion in Individuals (1959), Chapter 3.
10 And memories, and intentions, hopes, desires, etc.  .  ? <9
•  -identity judgements: I am that person in the mirror, I am XX, I am this body, and 
so on.  These judgements may or may not be correct.  But in thinking them, the 
subject is identifying himself as an object in the world.  He is identifying himself 
as an object in the world which can be thought of in several different ways; as 
that person in the mirror, as XX, or as this body, for instance.  He is thinking of 
himself as one among other objects.  In so doing he has objective first-person 
thoughts.  But these identity judgements in no way ground the reference of the 
first-person.
If this seems problematic, it may be because in accepting this, we have to accept 
that a subject can refer to himself without knowing himself and without knowing 
what he is.  But this is surely right.  He does not need to know himself or know 
what  he  is  in  order  to  refer  to  himself.  Because  of  his  experiences,  his 
observations and what he  learns  from other people,  he  may come to  identify 
himself with an object in the world and will learn to ascribe predicates to himself 
based on these identities.  He may also ascribe predicates to himself for which he 
has no grounds.  The identity judgements which he makes -  if they are correct -  
are informative identities.  The subject thinks of himself reflexively and also as 
an object in the world with which he is acquainted.  And it is right that these 
identities should be informative.  In simply referring reflexively we are ignorant 
of what we are.  It is in having objective first-person thoughts based on identity 
judgements  that  we  enrich  our  understanding  of  what  we  are;  and  this 
understanding may or may not be mistaken.
2  Objective First-Person Thought
Objective  first-person  thoughts  are  first-person  thoughts  which  are  not 
subjective.  They are not based on grounds from the first-person perspective.  As 
Evans remarks:
It is vital to remember this feature of our thought about ourselves.  T- 
thoughts are not, as is sometimes suggested, restricted to thoughts about 
states  of affairs  ‘from the point of view of the  subject’.  Nor can the 
thoughts ...  be hived off from genuine self-conscious thought...  (Evans 
(1982), p210)
A  subject’s objective  first-person thoughts  are not non-first-personal  thoughts 
about himself.  To use a familiar example again, Lingens’s thought that Lingens 
is the cousin of a spy is a non-first-personal thought about himself.  His thought161
expressed by ‘I am the cousin of a spy’ is an objective first-person thought.  It
'/ does not have internal grounds, but is genuinely first-personal.  /
A  subject can have objective  first-person thoughts  only because  he  can  have 
subjective  first-person  thoughts.  Because  he  has  experiences  from  the  first- 
person  perspective  he  can  ascribe  these  experiences  to  himself and  think  of 
himself.  He  has  a  self-notion,  perhaps,  or  an  ability  to  think  of  himself 
reflexively,  and  he  can  express  this  using  ‘I’.  He  refers  to  himself without 
knowing himself or knowing what he is, but he nonetheless thinks of an object, 
himself.  He can think of other objects with which he is acquainted and ascribe 
properties to them.  He can ascribe these same properties to himself, should he so 
wish.  He can thus think thoughts such as ‘I was breastfed’, ‘I was unhappy on 
my  first  birthday’,  ‘I  shall  be  dragged  unconscious  through  the  streets  of 
Chicago’ or ‘I shall die’, to use Evans’s examples ((1982), p209).  He ascribes 
these properties to himself.  These objective first-person thoughts are immune to 
error through misidentification as they are not based on an identity judgement.
But many objective first-person thoughts are based on an identity judgement. 
The subject identifies himself with an object in the world.  In order to think of 
this object in the world the subject must be acquainted with it -  so acquaintance 
is  involved  in  objective  first-person thoughts which  are  not  immune  to  error 
through misidentification.  But this acquaintance (which, if he is not mistaken in 
his identity judgement, will be with himself) does not ground the reference of 
objective first-person thoughts.  It does not ground the reference of ‘I’.  In the
reflexively and thinks of X by being acquainted with X.  It is an informative 
identity judgement, with the subject thinking of himself in two different ways.  If 
he also thinks that X is F, then the subject will conclude that T am F.  But even
identity  judgement  expressed  by  ‘I  am  X’  the  subject  thinks  of  himself
if he  is  mistaken  in  his  identity judgement,  when  he  thinks  what  he  would 
express by T am F  he refers to himself, the subject, reflexively.
For instance, a subject may base his thought which he would express by 4 1  am six 
feet tall’ on the judgements ‘I am this body’ and ‘This body is six feet tali’.  He 
can think ‘This body is six feet tall’ because he is acquainted with this body.  But162
when he thinks ‘I am six feet tali’, ‘I’ does not mean ‘this body’.  ‘I’ and ‘this 
body’ will both refer to the same object if the identity judgement is correct.  But 
even if it is correct the subject will think of the object referred to in two different 
ways.  One way is reflexively, and one way is because he is acquainted with it. 
In ‘I am six feet tali’, ‘I’ refers reflexively.  If he is mistaken that he is this body 
then he judges falsely when he thinks  ‘I am six feet tall’  but he still refers to 
himself.
In Chapter 2 it was argued that statements such as ‘I am X’ and ‘I am this body’ 
can be thought of as informative identity statements provided one has a notion of 
content which  is  fine-grained  enough.  A  Fregean  notion  of content  is  fine­
grained  enough,  where  content  is  individuated  in terms  of sense,  rather than 
reference.  The  important thing  is to  understand  what  is  meant by  ‘sense’.11 
Senses  are  traditionally  understood  as  modes  of  presentation  of  objects, 
following Frege (1892).  This is well motivated for thoughts about independent 
objects.  As was argued in Chapters 3 and 4, it is being acquainted with an object 
which puts a subject in a position to think about it.  The object is present to the 
subject in experience, and it is this which enables him to have a singular thought 
about it, rather than another object.  But the same object may be present to the 
subject in different ways; the modes of presentation may be different.  Venus is 
presented in a different way in the morning and the evening; as Phosphorus and 
Hesperus.  There are two different modes of presentation, and hence the thought 
Hesperus is Phosphorus can be informative.  It is not the same as the thought that 
Hesperus  is  Hesperus,  which  involves  only  one  mode  of presentation  of an 
object.
However,  just  because  sense  is  often  understood  in  terms  of  modes  of
presentation of objects, it does not mean that it must always be understood in this
way.  Instead,  I think sense  should be  understood  as a way of thinking of an 
10 object.  The way of thinking of an independent object involves the object being 
present to the subject. The same object can be present to him in different ways, 
without him realizing this.  But thinking reflexively is also a way of thinking of
1 1  This has always been a problem for accounts of content in terms of sense.
1 2  Evans (1982) Chapter 1  suggests understanding Frege’s notion of sense in terms of ways of 
thinking of objects163
an object.  Almost all ways of thinking of objects  involve  acquaintance -  the 
objects  being  present  to  the  subject  -   which  is  why  it  seems  natural  to 
individuate content in terms of modes of presentation.  But this is a mistake.  To 
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In Chapter 2 it was argued that Lewis’s account in ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De
Se’ cannot be quite right, because although it correctly identifies the first-person
perspective,  it does not  identify  an entity,  thought of first-personally.  Mary’s
thought expressed by Mary as ‘I am sitting down’ and Jane’s thought expressed
by  Jane  as  ‘I  am  sitting  down’  have  the  same  content.  The  proposal  that  a
subject  thinks  of himself reflexively  does  not  have  this  consequence.  Mary
thinks of Mary when she thinks reflexively.  Jane thinks of Jane when she thinks
reflexively.  They both think reflexively, but as the objects thought of differ, the
content  of such  thoughts  is  not  the  same.  We  can  also  use  this  proposal  to
account  for the  difference  between  some  subjective  and  objective  first-person
attitudes.  Recall Lewis’s account cannot distinguish the contents of, for instance,
‘I imagine playing Three Blind Mice on the piano’ and ‘I imagine myself playing
Three Blind Mice on the piano’.  The  former is  subjective -  the experience  is
imagined from the inside.  The latter need not be.  It may be non-first personal -
the subject may imagine someone who happens to be himself.  But it may also be
first-personal, but from an external  perspective.  In this case, it is an objective
first-person thought which is immune to error through misidentification because
it  is  not  based  on  an  identification  -   the  object  imagined  is  specified  to  be
himself.13  But these differences can be captured with the present proposal.  The
content of the subjective imagining is an unstructured experience, from the first-
person perspective.  The content of the objective imagining involves the subject 
r   ----------
himself having an experience.  But the subject is thought of reflexively -  he need 
not be thought of non-first-personally.  The object imagined is stipulated to be 
himself.
v
Anscombe, towards the end of ‘The First Person’ (1975), says that as long as we 
think of T’  as a referring expressing there is a deep divide between those who 
think that a subject’s reference in the first-person case must be the same as his
U
h " :
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See discussion in Chapter 2, Section  1, for the problems for Lewis’s account164
reference to other objects, and those who do not.  She thinks that those in the 
former  camp  have  not  perceived  the  difficulty;  they  do  not  appreciate  the 
problem of first-person thought (pi48).  I agree.  To refer to independent objects 
a subject must be acquainted with them, but to think this model applies to first- 
person thought is entirely inappropriate.  A subject’s experiences from the first- 
person perspective do  not put him  in contact with an object (himself)  and so 
enable him to refer to himself.  They are experiences which he undergoes, and 
which he can self-ascribe.  But Anscombe goes on to say that those that have 
perceived the difficulty, and yet continue to think that first-person thoughts refer, 
“are led to rave in consequence” (pi48).  I hope that enough has been said to 
show that this is not the case.165
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